Gould, Inc. v. Chafee, 71-1305.

Decision Date30 June 1971
Docket NumberNo. 71-1305.,71-1305.
PartiesGOULD, INC. and Eltra Corporation, Appellants, v. John H. CHAFEE, Secretary of the Navy ESB, Inc., Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Robert L. Ackerly, Washington, D. C., was on the pleadings for appellants. C. Stanley Dees, Washington, D. C., entered an appearance on behalf of appellants.

Messrs. Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty., and John A. Terry, Robert M. Werdig, Jr. and Joseph M. Hannon, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the oppositions for appellee Chafee.

Messrs. Eldon H. Crowell and Gerald P. Johnston, Washington, D. C., were on the oppositions for appellee ESB, Inc.

Before LEVENTHAL, MacKINNON and WILKEY,* Circuit Judges.

LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge:

Appellants and appellee ESB, Inc. were originally awarded contracts for the provision of several lots of industrial batteries to the U. S. Navy. After a protest by ESB, the Assistant Comptroller General determined that ESB was low bidder on all the lots. The Navy terminated appellants' contracts and awarded a new contract for all the batteries to ESP. Appellants then sued in District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent performance of the new contract awarded to ESB, and to reinstate their original contracts. The District Court dismissed appellants' complaint without indicating reasons for its action, and this appeal followed. After the dismissal in the District Court, the Acting Comptroller General issued a new opinion apparently indicating that the original split award to appellants and ESB was correct. This Court now has before it appellants' motions (a) for summary reversal of the District Court's dismissal, and for expedited oral argument thereon, and (b) to supplement the record with the new opinion of the Acting Comptroller General.

At the time when the District Court dismissed appellants' complaint, the Navy's action in terminating appellants' contracts was based on an at least apparently reasonable opinion by the Assistant Comptroller General indicating that ESB was low bidder on all the batteries. It seems unlikely that the Navy's action, whether based on agreement with that opinion or on acquiescence to avoid conflict, could have been found arbitrary and capricious, so that the District Court should have granted the relief requested under Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859 (1970). This Court has previously indicated the need for employment of expeditious and economical means for terminating those challenges to procurement actions, over which the District Court has jurisdiction by virtue of the Scanwell decision, which are nonmeritorious. See Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 31, 35, 433 F.2d 1137, 1141 & n. 4 (1970). However, we are concerned that the District Court's action rests on an erroneous legal premise.

The District Court granted the Government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Yet appellants' complaint makes at least the bare allegations of a claim on the merits under Scanwell that is within the District Court's jurisdiction, and that would entitle appellants to relief if they could substantiate their assertion that the termination of their contracts and the award to ESB were arbitrary because of errors in the determination of certain costs by contracting authorities and the Comptroller General's office.

The Government's argument for dismissal rested in substantial measure on the assertion that appellants have an adequate remedy at law. But it is questionable whether appellants' legal remedies as aggrieved bidders and contractors are adequate enough to justify dismissal of their suit for want of equity. See Keco Industries, Inc. v. United States, 192 Ct.Cl. 773, 784-785, 428 F.2d 1233, 1240 (1970); John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 163 Ct.Cl. 381, 325 F.2d 438 (1963).

It may be that the District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the facts before the court conclusively demonstrated that the Government's actions were not arbitrary, and hence it was entitled to a favorable decision on the merits. Since the parties presented some affidavits and additional material other than pleadings, the District Court's action may be supportable as a summary judgment if the record before it was adequate for a decision on the merits. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12, 56; Richardson v. Rivers, 118...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • BUSINESS EXECUTIVES'MOVE FOR VIETNAM PEACE v. FCC
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • August 3, 1971
    ... ... Post-Newsweek Stations, Capital Area, Inc., Intervenor ... DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, Petitioner, ... FEDERAL ... ...
  • Gordon v. National Youth Work Alliance
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • April 2, 1982
    ...be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.See also Gould, Inc. v. Chafee, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 206, 208, 450 F.2d 667, 669 (1971); Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826, 95 S.Ct. 44, 42 L.Ed.2d 50 (197......
  • Mazaleski v. Treusdell
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • June 27, 1977
    ...to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).19 But cf. Gould, Inc. v. Chafee, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 206, 450 F.2d 667, 669 (1971) (refusal to treat grant of motion to dismiss as summary judgment because no reasons given and some bases for order "would ......
  • Doe v. U.S. Dept. of Justice
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • February 1, 1985
    ...to such a motion by Rule 56."); see also Gordon v. National Youth Work Alliance, 675 F.2d 356, 360 (D.C.Cir.1982); Gould Inc. v. Chafee, 450 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C.Cir.1971). The record in this case does not indicate that the district court gave the plaintiff any such notice and opportunity to ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT