Gould v. Barton

• Decision Date: 27 May 1971
• Docket Number: No. 19225,19225
• Citation: 181 S.E.2d 662,256 S.C. 175
• Parties: Paul Raymond GOULD and Everett Clarence Gourlay, individually an representing the taxpayers and property owners of the Recreation District in Richland County, and Irmo-Chapin Recreation District in Lexington County, Respondents-Appellants, v. Donald F. BARTON et al., Appellants-Respondents, and Frank W. Schmitt, individually and representing the taxpayers and propertyowners of the City of Columbia, South Carolina, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 662

181 S.E.2d 662

256 S.C. 175

Paul Raymond GOULD and Everett Clarence Gourlay individually an representing the taxpayers and property owners of the Recreation District in Richland County, and Irmo-Chapin Recreation District in Lexington County Respondents-Appellants, v. Donald F. BARTON et al., Appellants-Respondents and Frank W. Schmitt, individually and representing the taxpayers and propertyowners of the City of Columbia, South Carolina, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 19225.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

May 27, 1971.

James A. Hutto, Jr., Columbia, and Theodore B. Guerard, of Sinkler, Gibbs, Simons & Guerard, Charleston, and Asst. Atty. Gen. Joel E. Gottlieb, Columbia, for appellants, appellants-respondents.

George H. Davis, Columbia, for respondents-appellants.

LEWIS, Justice.

The issues in this appeal involve the constitutionality of legislation adopted by the General Assembly at its 1969 and 1970 sessions, by which the territory embraced within the counties of Richland and Lexington has been constituted a special purpose district and a political subdivision of the State for the purpose of issuing bonds to establish 'public recreation and zoo facilities' on an area of land located partially in Richland County and partially in Lexington County. The constitutionality of the legislation is attacked upon several grounds, some of which were sustained and others overruled by the lower court. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants have appealed, presenting for review all of the rulings of the lower court. While perhaps unnecessary, we consider all questions presented because of the public interest involved.

The statutes involved include Acts Nos. 323 and 365 of the 1969 Acts of the General Assembly, 56 Stat. 391 and 639; and Act No. 1207 of the 1970 Acts of the General Assembly, 56 Stat. 2599.

The present legislation resulted from efforts by the Greater Columbia Zoological Society, Inc., interested individuals, civic groups, and the City of Columbia to establish a zoological park in the Columbia area. In furtherance of the above aim, the Greater Columbia Zoological Society, Inc., acquired a deed from the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company for a tract of land containing 16.31 acres, with title to revert to the company if the society ever ceased to use the premises 'for zoological purposes.' Similar efforts by the City of Columbia to establish a zoo resulted in the acquisition by it of a twenty-five year lease from the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company for two tracts of land, one in Richland County of 55 acres and the other in Lexington County of 53 acres. The above three tracts of land were in the same vicinity and located where the Broad and Saluda Rivers come together.

The efforts of the various interested groups were apparently coordinated with the adoption by the General Assembly of Acts Nos. 323 and 365, supra. Under these statutes the Riverbanks Parks Commission was formed consisting of seven members, for the purpose of establishing and operating 'public recreation and zoo facilities' within a described area contiguous to the Saluda and Congaree Rivers.

After the Riverbanks Parks Commission was formed, the interests of the Greater Columbia Zoological Society, Inc., and the City of Columbia in and to the above three tracts of land were transferred to the commission. Subsequent to the decision of the lower court, a new lease has been acquired by the commission covering the 55 and 53 acre tracts and this lease has been, by agreement, made a part of the record. The new lease is for a period of 99 years and is granted upon the condition that the lease shall terminate if the premises are 'ever put to any purpose other than a zoological park' together with 'related supportive facilities and amusement equipment.'

Sebsequent to the acquisition by the commission of rights to the foregoing lands, Act No. 1207, supra, was adopted in order to provide funds to enable the commission to perform the functions imposed upon it under the statutes previously adopted (Acts Nos. 323 and 365, supra). Act No. 1207 will be referred to hereafter as the bond act. Under its terms, a special purpose district is created, named the Richland-Lexington Riverbanks Parks District, which is coterminous in area with the territory of Richland and Lexington Counties. The stated special purpose for which the district is created is the same as that previously set forth in the statutes establishing the Riverbanks Parks Commission which is made the governing body of the district. The commission is authorized to issue general obligation bonds in an amount not to exceed $1,500,000.00 to accomplish the purposes for which the district was formed. The full faith, credit and taxing power of the district is pledged to the payment of the bonds so issued and an annual tax is directed to be levied by the Auditors of Richland and Lexington Counties in an amount sufficient to pay the principal and interest on the bonds as they mature.

This action was subsequently instituted to determine the constitutionality of the above mentioned statutes. We find it more convenient to follow the statement of each question presented with our conclusion thereon.

Section 3 of Act No. 323 attempts to delineate the territorial area in which the Riverbanks Parks Commission would operate by authorizing the establishment of public recreation and zoo facilities 'within the territory in the counties of Richland and Lexington contiguous to the Saluda River and the Congaree River from Highway I-26 on the north to the Granby Locks on the south.'

The position is taken that the area described has no eastern and western boundaries and the description is therefore so vague and uncertain as to render it impossible to determine the territorial area over which the commission has jurisdiction. It is for this reason contended that the foregoing portion of Act No. 323 is unconstitutional and the bond act cannot be implemented.

Reasonable certainty in the enactment of statutes is required, and a statute which is so vague or indefinite that it cannot be executed will be declared void. However, as stated in Wingfield v. S.C. Tax Commission, 147 S.C. 116, 144 S.E. 846, quoting from 25 R.C.L. 810: 'The fact, alone that an Act is open to the criticism that it is vague, uncertain, and indefinite in some of its provisions does not render it void, so long as it does not infringe some constitutional provision and is capable of execution in its more essential provisions.' If the legislative intent can be determined with reasonable certainty, the statute will not be declared inoperative.

The delineation in Act No. 323 of a territorial area did not attempt to define the area over which the commission would necessarily have jurisdiction, but was for the purpose of locating the facilities to be established. The legislative intent was to require that the authorized recreation and zoo facilities be located Within the area described.

There is nothing to indicate that the description is so vague and indefinite as to make it impossible to determine the location of the facilities in accord with the legislative intent. The project, according to the statute, is to be located on land contiguous to (adjoining) the Saluda River and the Congaree River and between Highway I--26 on the north to the Granby Locks on the south. If the project is located between, Highway I--26 and the Granby Locks and on land contiguous to the Saluda and Congaree Rivers, it will be located within the area prescribed by statute.

Assuming however that the statutory description of the location is vague, such has been removed by the recitals in the bond act. Section 1 of the bond act, after reciting the above description contained in Act No. 323 states:

'The General Assembly further finds that the commission has acquired a tract of land consisting of one hundred sixteen acres on the Saluda River, but is without funds with which to proceed with the development of the facilities contemplated by Act No. 323 of 1969.'

Therefore, when the General Assembly adopted the bond act, it was familiar with the site upon which the zoological park is to be constructed and the bond act was obviously enacted for the purpose of authorizing the issuance of general obligation bonds to construct the project on the site which had been previously acquired. This constituted legislative approval of the location of the project, removing any previous ambiguity thereabout. The fact that the bond act refers to the acreage in the tract acquired by the commission as containing 116 acres when it actually contains approximately 124 acres is of no consequence. The record is clear that the property now owned by the commission is the same as that referred to in the bond act.

The challenge of the statute because of vagueness in the description of the territorial area within which the project is to be located is without merit.

In view of the negotiation by the commission, since the decision of the lower court, of a lease for the 53 and 54 acre tracts of land for a period of 99 years, the next question to be determined is whether the construction of the proposed zoological park upon property leased for a term of 99 years from a private corporation would violate the provision of Article X, Section 6, of the South Carolina Constitution.

Article X, Section 6 provides:

'The credit of the State shall not be pledged or loaned for the benefit of any individual, company, association or corporation; * * *.'

The prohibitions of Article X, Section 6, extend to political subdivisions of the State and would be applicable to the district created by the present legislation. Elliott v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421.

Under Section 3 of Act No. 323, supra, the commission is granted the authority to acquire property 'by gift, deed, easement, lease or otherwise.' The power of eminent domain is not granted. Pursuant to the authority granted, the...