Gouldblum v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:16-cv-00936-KGB
• Parties: SANDRA GOULDBLUM PLAINTIFF v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al. DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

SANDRA GOULDBLUM PLAINTIFF v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al. DEFENDANTS

Case No. 4:16-cv-00936-KGB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION

March 30, 2018

ORDER

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by plaintiff Sandra Gouldblum¹ (Dkt. No. 6). Defendants Arkansas Department of Human Services ("DHS"), Cindy Gillespie, in her official capacity as director of DHS, Steven Little, individually and in his official capacity as director of finance of DHS, filed the motion to dismiss. On May 15, 2017, Ms. Gouldburn filed a response to the motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 10). For the reasons explained below, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

At this stage of the litigation, the Court takes the facts as alleged in the complaint as true. Ms. Gouldburn is a "black and Hispanic female" who is from the country of Panama (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 9). Ms. Gouldburn alleges that she was treated differently from her similarly situated white co-workers and that she was retaliated against after she asserted her rights. Ms. Gouldburn filed a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of her national origin, retaliated against, and denied equalpay (Dkt. No. 6-1, at 1). She asserted continuing action discrimination and retaliation (Id.). The EEOC issued her a right to sue letter (Dkt. No. 1, at 9).

Ms. Gouldburn filed her complaint with this Court on December 30, 2016 (Dkt. No. 1). In her complaint, Ms. Gouldburn makes the following claims: (1) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her national origin; (2) in violation of Title VII, defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her race;² (3) in violation of Title VII, defendants retaliated against her; (4) in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her race; (5) in violation of § 1981, defendants retaliated against her; (6) in violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act ("ACRA"), Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-101 et seq., defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her national origin³; (7) in violation of the ACRA, Mr. Little, in his individual capacity, retaliated against her (Dkt. No. 1, at 5-6). Per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), defendants have moved to dismiss Ms. Gouldburn's claims.

Defendants argue that their motion to dismiss should be granted because: (1) Ms. Gouldburn failed to state allegations sufficient to meet notice pleading requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2); (2) the Title VII and ACRA discrimination and retaliation claims against Mr. Little in his individual capacity are barred; (3) Ms. Gouldburn's claims for racial discrimination are barred because these claims were not administratively exhausted; (4) Ms.Gouldburn's discrimination claims under § 1983 and ACRA against DHS and the individual defendants in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity; (5) qualified immunity bars any claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Mr. Little in his individual capacity.

II. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Specific facts are not required; the complaint simply must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The complaint must include enough factual information to provide the grounds on which the claim rests and to raise a right to relief above a speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56; Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008). When ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, "a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56.

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings, but it may consider matters of public and administrative record referenced in the complaint, as well as materials that are "necessarily embraced by the pleadings." Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). The court may also consider documents referred to in a complaint and central to a plaintiff's claim without converting the filing to a motion for summary judgment. See Nixon v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir. 1999).

III. Analysis

For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses Ms. Gouldburn's §§ 1981, 1983, and ACRA claims against DHS. The Court also dismisses Ms. Gouldburn's §§ 1981, 1983, and ACRA claims for money damages against Ms. Gillespie and Mr. Little in their official capacities. The Title VII claims against Mr. Little in his individual capacity are dismissed. The ACRA discrimination claim against Mr. Little in his individual capacity is dismissed. Ms. Gouldburn's remaining claims survive.

Defendants attach to their motion to dismiss Ms. Gouldburn's EEOC charge (Dkt. No. 6-1). The Court has considered the charge in evaluating the sufficiency of Ms. Gouldburn's complaint and the merits of defendants' motion to dismiss.

A. Sufficiency Of The Complaint

The Court has reviewed all of the claims and allegations made in Ms. Gouldburn's complaint and accompanying documents (Dkt. Nos. 1, 6-1). The Court finds that she has made allegations sufficient to put defendants on notice of the claims against them. Specifically, in regard to retaliation, in her seven-page, single spaced, typed EEOC charge, she includes a subheading regarding retaliation and a narrative supporting that claim; the narrative includes dates of alleged protected conduct and discriminatory acts she maintains followed her complaints. She alleges hostile work environment harassment, among other forms of discrimination and retaliation. The Court denies defendants' motion to dismiss based upon Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 8(a)(2).

B. Title VII And ACRA Discrimination And Retaliation Claims Against Steven Little In His Individual Capacity

Defendants argue that Ms. Gouldburn's Title VII and ACRA claims against Mr. Little in his individual capacity should be dismissed. Defendants are correct that Mr. Little is shielded fromindividual liability under Title VII. "[I]ndividual employees cannot be personally liable under Title VII." McCullough v. Univ. of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, 559 F.3d 855, 860 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Cent.-Everly Cmty. Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 466, 447 (8th Cir. 1997)); see Clegg v. Ark. Dept. of Correction, 496 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2007) ("supervisory employees are not individually liable under Title VII"). Ms. Gouldburn concedes this point (Dkt. No. 10, ¶ 7).

The Court also agrees that Mr. Little is not liable in his individual capacity for discrimination claims under the ACRA. Mr. Little is a supervisor, and supervisors do not meet the definition of an "employer" as defined by the ACRA. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-102(5) ("'Employer' means a person who employs nine (9) or more employees in the State of Arkansas in each of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the current or proceeding calendar year"). Therefore, Ms. Gouldburn's discrimination claims under the ACRA against Mr. Little in his individual capacity are barred. See Marrow v. City of Jacksonville, 941 F. Supp. 816, 820 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (holding that supervisors are not "employers" under ACRA"). Ms. Gouldburn also concedes this point (Dkt. No. 10, ¶ 10).

Ms. Gouldburn's retaliation claim under the ACRA against Mr. Little in his individual capacity survives defendants' motion to dismiss. The Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action under the ACRA for retaliation against a supervisor in his individual capacity. Calaway v. Practice Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2010 Ark. 432 (2010); see McLeod v. Cavenaugh Ford Lincoln, LLC, No. 3:12-CV-00260-SWW, 2013 WL 4402499, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 14, 2013) (supervisors may be sued for retaliation in their individual capacities under the ACRA). Furthermore, Ms. Gouldburn exhausted her administrative remedies as to this claim by checking "retaliation" on her EEOC charge. Defendants had notice of the retaliation claim against them.See Duncan v. Delta Consol. Indus., Inc., 371 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2004) (the charged party must have notice of the claims against it to benefit from the EEOC's process), abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011). Therefore, Ms. Gouldburn's retaliation claim against Mr. Little in his individual capacity should not be dismissed.

The Court, therefore, dismisses Ms. Gouldburn's Title VII discrimination, Title VII retaliation, and ACRA discrimination claims against Mr. Little in his individual capacity. Also, for the reasons stated above, Ms. Gouldburn's ACRA retaliation claim against Mr. Little in his individual capacity is not dismissed.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 And Title VII Race Discrimination Claims

Race discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against state actors may only be brought pursuant to § 1983. See Artis v. Francis Howell North Bank Booster Ass'n. Inc., 161 F.3d 1178, 1181 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989) (holding that § 1983 "provides the sole exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor.")); see also Washington v. Brooks, No. 4:06-cv-0883-JMM, 2006 WL 3334473, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 16, 2003) (claims against state actors in their individual capacities may be brought under § 1983, not § 1981). Here, Ms. Gouldburn cites § 1981...