Gourneau v. Hamill, DA 13–0210.

• Decision Date: 15 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. DA 13–0210.,DA 13–0210.
• Citation: 372 Mont. 182,311 P.3d 760
• Parties: Dalton Paige GOURNEAU, deceased, by and through his personal representative Roxanne GOURNEAU, and Roxanne Gourneau, individually, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Henry H. HAMILL, in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as a District Superintendent, The Wolf Point School Board/The Board of Trustees, and The State of Montana, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

372 Mont. 182

311 P.3d 760

Dalton Paige GOURNEAU, deceased, by and through his personal representative Roxanne GOURNEAU, and Roxanne Gourneau, individually, Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.Henry H. HAMILL, in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as a District Superintendent, The Wolf Point School Board/The Board of Trustees, and The State of Montana, Defendants and Appellees.

No. DA 13–0210.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Aug. 7, 2013.

Decided Oct. 15, 2013.

For Appellants: Solomon S. Neuhardt; Neuhardt Law Firm, P.C.; Billings, Montana.

For Appellees: Harlan B. Krogh; Crist, Krogh & Nord, LLC; Billings, Montana.

Justice BETH BAKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

[372 Mont. 183]¶ 1 Roxanne Gourneau (Gourneau), acting individually and on behalf of her deceased son, Dalton Paige Gourneau (Dalton), appeals a judgment entered by the Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Roosevelt County, granting summary judgment to the Wolf Point School Board (Wolf Point). The sole issue on appeal is whether Wolf Point is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Gourneau's negligence claims. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 During his senior year at Wolf Point High School in Wolf Point, Montana, seventeen-year-old Dalton committed suicide in his home. Earlier that fall, Dalton had successfully tried out for the Wolf Point varsity wrestling team. Then, on November 23, 2010, a school counselor observed Dalton “putting a can of chew in his pocket.” Students at Wolf Point High School are prohibited from possessing tobacco at the school.

¶ 3 Dalton was familiar with Wolf Point's disciplinary procedures. Dalton's previous three years at Wolf Point High were characterized by recurrent disciplinary problems, including frequent absences, physical altercations, theft, insubordination, and verbal harassment. Wolf Point disciplined Dalton for these infractions with a variety of warnings and suspensions.

¶ 4 The Wolf Point High School Parent/Student Handbook provides the school's policies and procedures for regulating student conduct, including disciplinary provisions. A violation of the prohibition against the “use or possession of drugs and/or paraphernalia, alcohol, or tobacco” constitutes a “level 3 offense,” which at a minimum results in a suspension.

¶ 5 The Wolf Point Wolves Activities handbook provides disciplinary actions for violations of the Athletic Department Training Rules. The Athletic Department's rules prohibit the purchase, use and possession of tobacco, and also prohibit the possession of “devices specifically or reasonably associated with alcohol or tobacco or drug use.” The first violation of the tobacco policy results in a sixty-day suspension from all extracurricular activities, including wrestling. Gourneau does not claim that Dalton was unaware of Wolf Point's disciplinary policies.

¶ 6 Several Wolf Point staff, including Joseph Paine (Wolf Point's Principal), Henry Hamill (Superintendent), and Mike Erickson (the Athletic Director), met with Dalton and notified him that he would be suspended from wrestling because of his possession of the tobacco can. Paine advised Dalton that even if Hamill would not overturn the 60–day suspension, Dalton could still appeal the suspension to the Wolf Point School Board. Dalton became distraught when he realized his suspension from wrestling could prevent him from participating in the State tournament that year. Dalton left the school and went home. Later that afternoon, Dalton committed suicide while alone in his home.

¶ 7 Gourneau, acting individually and on behalf of her deceased son, filed a complaint in 2011 against Wolf Point, the State of Montana, and Henry Hamill, in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as a District Superintendent.¹ Gourneau alleged that Dalton's death was the direct and proximate result of Wolf Point's negligence. Gourneau's complaint also alleged other counts related to her negligence claim, including “respondeat superior,” negligent hiring of Henry Hamill, negligent supervision, negligent training, wrongful death and survivorship claims, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The District Court granted summary judgment to Wolf Point on February 27, 2013. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 We review de novo an appeal from a district court's summary judgment ruling. Poole v. Poole, 2000 MT 117, ¶ 13, 299 Mont. 435, 1 P.3d 936. We apply the same standard as the district court: summary judgment should be granted when the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” M.R. Civ. P. 56. The party seeking summary judgment initially must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Poole, ¶ 13. When the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must “submit evidence of sufficient facts to support a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment in favor of the movant.” Meadow Lake Ests. Homeowners Ass'n v. Shoemaker, 2008 MT 41, ¶ 38, 341 Mont. 345, 178 P.3d 81. If we determine that genuine issues of fact do not exist, we must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Poole, ¶ 13.

¶ 9 Negligence actions ordinarily involve questions of fact. Poole, ¶ 14. But if the moving party establishes that any one element of negligence lacks a genuine issue of material fact, and the non-moving party fails to come forward with proof that a genuine issue exists, summary judgment is proper. Poole, ¶ 14 (quoting Wiley v. City of Glendive, 272 Mont. 213, 216, 900 P.2d 310, 312 (1995)).

DISCUSSION

¶ 10 Negligence requires a legal duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damages. Krieg v. Massey, 239 Mont. 469, 472, 781 P.2d 277, 278–79 (1989) (citing W.L. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 30, 164–65 (5th ed.1984)). Whether a legal duty is owed is a question of law. Poole, ¶ 19. The District Court held that Wolf Point did not have a duty to prevent Dalton's suicide in light of the facts presented by the parties' submissions. Material facts are identified by looking at the substantive law governing a claim. McGinnis v. Hand, 1999 MT 9, ¶ 6, 293 Mont. 72, 972 P.2d 1126.

¶ 11 Gourneau argues that disputed material facts defeat Wolf Point's attempt to establish the absence of a special relationship with Dalton, under which it could be held to a duty to prevent Dalton's suicide. Gourneau argues that fact questions remain regarding whether Dalton actually possessed tobacco, whether Wolf Point generally disciplined its students consistently, whether Wolf Point disciplined Dalton consistently, and whether Wolf Point had knowledge of Dalton's state of mind.

¶ 12 Whether a party owes a legal duty depends largely on whether the allegedly negligent act was foreseeable. Poole, ¶ 20. “As it relates to the existence of a legal duty, foreseeability is ‘measured on a scale of reasonableness dependent upon the foreseeability of the risk involved with the conduct alleged to be negligent.’ ” Poole, ¶ 20 (quoting Lopez v. Great Falls Pre–Release Serv., Inc., 1999 MT 199, ¶ 27, 295 Mont. 416, 986 P.2d 1081). In other words, duty “is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails.” Busta v. Columbus Hosp. Corp., 276 Mont. 342, 363, 916 P.2d 122, 134 (1996). The question is whether the defendants reasonably could have foreseen that their conduct could have resulted in injuries to the plaintiff, though “the specific injury need not be foreseeable.” Hinkle ex rel. Hinkle v. Shepherd Sch. Dist. # 37, 2004 MT 175, ¶¶ 28–30, 322 Mont. 80, 93 P.3d 1239. Without foreseeability of any danger of direct injury or any risk from an intervening cause, no duty exists; “in the absence of duty, there is no negligence.” Poole, ¶ 20.

¶ 13 Generally, a party cannot recover in negligence for the suicide of another “since the act or suicide is considered a deliberate intervening act exonerating the defendant from legal responsibility....” Krieg, 239 Mont. at 471, 781 P.2d at 278. Under some circumstances, a duty to prevent a suicide may exist “when someone is obligated to exercise custodial care over the eventual decedent, is in a position to know about the latter['s] suicidal potential, and is lax with respect to taking preventive measures.” Krieg, 239 Mont. at 471, 781 P.2d at 278. We noted in Krieg that “[t]hese situations typically involve hospitals or prisons.” Krieg, 239 Mont. at 473, 781 P.2d at 279.

¶ 14 Even in a custodial context, we have held that a duty does not arise unless the custodian knows or should know of the suicidal tendencies of a prisoner. Pretty On Top v. Hardin, 182 Mont. 311, 317, 597 P.2d 58, 61–62 (1979). For example, in Pretty On Top, after a prisoner committed suicide, the prisoner's wife claimed that the prison had a duty to prevent the suicide. Pretty On Top, 182 Mont. at 314, 597 P.2d at 60. This Court affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment for the prison because the suicide was not foreseeable where the prisoner “did not have a history of mental disease or emotional disturbances, nor had he attempted suicide previously.” Pretty On Top, 182 Mont. at 314, 318, 597 P.2d at 60, 62. This Court held that “the District Court was required to follow the general rule that suicide is an intentional act and grant defendant's motion for summary judgment.” Pretty On Top, 182 Mont. at 318, 597 P.2d at 62.

¶ 15 We held in Krieg that this general rule applies “even more forcefully” where no custodial or special relationship exists. Krieg, 239 Mont. at 472, 781 P.2d at 279. In Krieg, this Court affirmed summary judgment for a landlord when a tenant committed suicide because no duty could be established absent a custodial or special relationship. We also agreed with the District Court's conclusion that no genuine issues of material fact existed...