Government of India v. Cook Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 January 1978
• Docket Number: No. 74,D,74
• Citation: 569 F.2d 737
• Parties: The GOVERNMENT OF INDIA and The Food Corporation of India, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COOK INDUSTRIES, INC. and Cook and Company, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 76-7618.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 737

569 F.2d 737

The GOVERNMENT OF INDIA and The Food Corporation of India Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COOK INDUSTRIES, INC. and Cook and Company, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 74, Docket 76-7618.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Sept. 15, 1977.

Decided Jan. 13, 1978.

Alvin H. Meadow, New York City (Norman Moloshok, and Delson & Gordon, New York City, on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellants.

Victor S. Friedman, New York City (Jeffrey M. Siger, David M. Glass, and Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York City, on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before MANSFIELD and TIMBERS, Circuit Judges, and DOOLING, District Judge. ^*

TIMBERS, Circuit Judge:

On this appeal from an order entered in the Southern District of New York, Robert J. Ward, District Judge, 422 F.Supp. 1057, the question presented is whether the district court correctly disqualified attorney Frederick W. Meeker and the law firm with which he presently is associated, Delson & Gordon, from representing in the instant action plaintiffs The Government of India and The Food Corporation of India (collectively, "India") on the ground that Meeker, while associated with the law firm of Hill, Rivkins, Carey, Loesberg and O'Brien ("Hill, Rivkins"), in a similar action previously had represented defendants Cook Industries, Inc. and Cook and Company (collectively, "Cook"). We hold that the district court correctly disqualified the attorney and his law firm. We affirm.

I.

In view of the district court's adequate findings of fact which we accept, Fed.R. Civ. P. 52(a), we summarize here only those facts necessary to an understanding of our rulings below on the legal issues presented.

Shortly before Meeker's graduation from law school in June 1972, he became associated with Hill, Rivkins. In 1973 he was assigned to represent Cook in two closely related actions which were commenced in 1973 against Cook in the Southern District of New York (the "Soybean Actions").

In the Soybean Actions plaintiffs alleged that Cook had sent them a shipment of soybeans from Louisiana which, upon arrival at its destination in Taiwan, was found to be 254 tons short of the amount stated on the bills of lading and weight certificates. Plaintiffs, alleging that either Cook or the carrier had failed to perform its contractual obligations, commenced separate actions against each. In the action against the carrier, the latter impleaded Cook, alleging that if there was a shortage it was due to Cook. The two actions were consolidated. On February 20, 1976, Judge Stewart dismissed both of the Soybean Actions.

On April 5, 1976, Meeker, having left Hill, Rivkins, became associated with Delson & Gordon. Within a month he was assigned to represent the India plaintiffs against the Cook defendants in the instant action which was commenced May 3, 1976.

Upon the refusal of Delson & Gordon and Meeker to withdraw as counsel for plaintiffs in the present action at the request of Cook's counsel, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, the motion to disqualify was filed. From the order of November 19, 1976 granting that motion, the instant appeal has been taken.

II.

In the context of this sequence of events, we focus upon those facts which bear upon the relationship between the issues in the respective cases and Meeker's involvement therein.

In the Soybean Actions, the validity of the critical documents had been challenged in the carrier's third-party complaint. They also were contested by plaintiffs and the carrier in opposing Cook's motion for summary judgment. In an affidavit by counsel for the carrier in opposition to that motion it had been asserted that "any fraud which may have been present originated with Cook or its agents." This was in response to Meeker's affidavit in support of Cook's motion for summary judgment which alleged that any shortage had been caused by the carrier's fraudulent bills of lading.

During the three years of Meeker's association with Hill, Rivkins, the firm billed Cook for more than one hundred hours of Meeker's services. Among other services, Meeker prepared answers to the complaints against Cook, a motion for a stay pending arbitration, a request for admissions, a motion for summary judgment and various memoranda in support of these motions. He interviewed a witness with regard to the weight certificates. He attended several pretrial conferences and one settlement conference. Throughout this period he maintained close contact with Cook's general counsel.

In the instant action India alleges, as plaintiffs did in the Soybean Actions, that grain delivered pursuant to contracts with Cook were of "short weight". A central allegation here, as in the earlier actions, is that the amounts of grain actually delivered differed from the amounts stated on the weight certificates. As in the Soybean Actions, it is alleged in the instant action that the documents were fraudulently issued.

Other facts are clearly set forth in the district court's opinion, with which we assume familiarity. 422 F.Supp. at 1059, 1061-63.

III.

Turning to the legal issues presented in light of these facts, we must determine essentially whether the district court was correct in holding that Cook, the former client which made the disqualification motion, sustained its burden of showing (1) that the issues in the prior and present cases were substantially the same, and (2) that Meeker's involvement in the prior case was such that he was likely to have come across relevant privileged information. We hold that the district court was correct in holding that Cook sustained its burden in both respects.

(A) Substantial Relationship Test

Semantics aside, clearly the issues in the prior and present cases were substantially related. The fraud issue in the Soybean Actions required Hill, Rivkins to conduct confidential inquiries as to Cook's loading procedures. The very same information necessarily was the cornerstone upon which India's fraud claim against Cook in the instant case was based. It would be difficult to think of a closer nexus between issues.

In ruling as we do, we are mindful that there is a particularly trenchant reason for requiring a high standard of proof on the part of one who seeks to disqualify his former counsel, for in disqualification matters we must be solicitous of a client's right freely to choose his counsel a right which of course must be balanced against the need to maintain the highest standards of the profession. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753 (2 Cir. 1975); Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 564-65 (2 Cir. 1973). A client whose attorney is disqualified incurs a loss of time and money in being compelled to retain new counsel who in turn have to become familiar with the prior comprehensive investigation which is the core of modern complex litigation. The client moreover may lose the benefit of its longtime counsel's specialized knowledge of its operations. Such considerations have resulted in honing the "substantial relationship" test in this Circuit in practical application to granting disqualification only upon a showing that the relationship between issues in the prior and present cases is "patently clear". Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., supra, 518 F.2d at 754-56. Put more specifically, disqualification has been granted or approved recently only when the issues involved have been "identical" or "essentially the same". E. g., NCK Organization, Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 135-36 (2 Cir. 1976) (concurring opinion); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2 Cir. 1975); Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., supra, 478 F.2d at 572; Motor Mart, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y.1973). ¹

(B) Attorney's Prior Involvement

This does not end our inquiry. Having determined that the district court correctly held that the issues in the prior and present cases were substantially related, we turn to the remaining question whether Meeker's involvement in the prior case was such that he would have had access to relevant privileged information. We hold that the district court correctly held that he did.

On this branch of our inquiry we start with the well established principle that, in order to grant a disqualification motion, a court should not require proof that an attorney actually had access to or received privileged information while representing the client in a prior case. Such a requirement would put the former client to the Hobson's choice of either having to disclose his privileged information in order to disqualify his former attorney or having to refrain from the disqualification motion altogether. Hull v. Celanese Corp., supra, 513 F.2d at 571-72; Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., supra, 478 F.2d at 571; T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros....