Gowen Oil Co. v. Abraham
| Decision Date | 30 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | CV 210-157 |
| Parties | GOWEN OIL COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff, v. BIJU ABRAHAM; GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP; GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A.; JOSEPH WEINGARD; and JONATHAN WILLIAMS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
Presently before the Court is Defendants Greenberg Traur LLP and Greenberg Traurig P.A.'s (collectively "Greenberg") Motion for Attorneys' Fees. Dkt. No. 192. Also before the Court is Greenberg's Motion for Costs Pursuant to Federal Rul of Civil Procedure 54. For the reasons stated below, Greenberg's Motion for Attorneys' Fees is GRANTED and Greenberg's Motion for Costs is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff Gowen Oil Company Inc., ("Gowen") sued Greenberg based on legal work done for a client, Biju Abraham. Specifically, Gowen claimed that Greenberg participated in a conspiracy with Abraham to undermine Gowen's alleged contractual rights to purchase a number of filling stations. Gowen claimed that Greenberg tortiously interfered with Gowen's right of first refusal with regards to the sale of the filling stations. In part, Gowen's claims were based on violations of Georgia's Bulk Transfer Act. Defendants removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction.
The ensuing litigation was complex, involving extensive discovery and substantial motion practice. Both parties sought extended discovery due to the large number of parties, the large number of witnesses, the complex factual issues, and the need for discovery outside the United States. Dkt. No. 76. Gowen relied on numerous expert witnesses and sought to depose up to fifteen other individuals. Dkt. No. 21, 22, 23, 24. Ultimately, Gowen sought $35,543,940.17 in compensatory damages as well as punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. Dkt. No. 175, at 15-17.
On March 31, 2010, while discovery was still open, Greenberg sent an offer of settlement to Gowen pursuant to O.C.G.A § 9-11-68(a). Dkt. No. 192, Ex. A. Gowen neither accepted nor rejected the offer.
On May 26, 2010, Greenberg filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 124. On September 3, 2010, this Court granted Greenberg's motion for summary judgment on all of Gowen's claims. Dkt. No. 185. On October 21, 2010, Greenberg filed a motion for attorneys' fee and expenses pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68. Dkt. No. 192. The Court entered final judgment in favor of Greenberg on all of Gowen's claims against Greenberg on January 13, 2011. Dkt. No. 214.
Greenberg's motion for attorneys' fees, the motion now before the Court, seeks attorneys' fees and expenses incurred between May 4, 2010 and November 7, 2010. See Dkt. No. 211-1 (). Greenberg claims it is entitled to $272,031.90 in attorneys' fees and $9,230.25 in litigation expenses, totaling $281,262.15. Id. Greenberg asserts that it is actually entitled to attorneys' fees and expenses up until the entry of final judgment on January 13, 2011, however Greenberg has not sought to supplement its original motion to recover the additional fees and expenses. Greenberg is seeking fees generated by thirteen individuals: Richard H. Sinkfield (SeniorPartner); Brett A. Rogers (Partner); James W. Beverage (Of Counsel); Catherine M. Bennett (Of Counsel); Kristina M. Jones (Associate); Fischer Reed (Associate); Leah A. Epstein (Associate); Stephanie H. Jackman (Associate); Aisha N. Witted (Litigation Support); Debra L. Livingston (Paralegal); Patricia G. Benjamin (Paralegal); Robyn D. Garcia (Paralegal); and Casey R. White (Paralegal).
Greenberg also filed its bill of costs and a motion for costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54. Dkt. Nos. 203; 254. Gowen objected to Greenberg's bill of costs, but did not file a response to Greenberg's motion for costs. Dkt. No. 204. Gowen's objection to Greenberg's bill of costs is based on a single argument: Gowen claims that a portion of the costs sought are for videotaping witness depositions. Id. Gowen claims that Greenberg is not entitled to recover these costs because it was unnecessary to videotape the depositions.
DISCUSSION
Greenberg seeks attorneys' fees and expenses under Georgia's offer of settlement statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68. The Georgia statute provides an award of attorneys' fees and expenses to a defendant who makes a valid offer of settlement that is rejected, and the final judgment is one of no liabilityor less than 75 percent of the defendant's offer.2 An award of attorney's fees is mandatory under the offer of settlement rule when the rule's conditions are met. Cohen v. Alfred and Adele Davis Acad., Inc., 714 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). In order for a party to recover attorney's fees under Georgia's offer of settlement rule, the party must make an offer of settlement that complies with O.C.G.A. § 9-ll-68(a). Greenberg made an offer of settlement to Gowen on March 31, 2010. The offer complied with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(a). Moreover, Gowen has not disputed the validity of Greenberg's settlement offer.
Gowen failed to respond to Greenberg's offer of settlement. Under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(c), a valid offer of settlement remains open for thirty days. Further, "[a]n offer that is neither withdrawn nor accepted within 30 days shall be deemed rejected." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(c). Accordingly, Greenberg's offer was deemed rejected on April 30, 2010.3 Gowen does not dispute the date of rejection of the offer.
Although Gowen appears to concede that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 applies in this diversity suit,4 and that Greenberg has satisfied the basic requirements of the statute, Gowen challenges the amount and nature of the fees Greenberg requests.5 Dkt. Nos. 226, 240, 257. Gowen argues generally that the rates and hours that form the basis of Greenberg's request are unreasonable.
The Court begins its analysis by defining the actual attorney's fees Greenberg incurred and now requests. Greenberg's calculation of its attorneys' fees warrants some explanation. Greenberg determined that during the relevant period its attorneys spent 1,176.2 hours on this case resultingin $400,318 in fees.6 Due to the relationship between Greenberg and its attorneys, Greenberg negotiated two discounts on its fees. First, Greenberg received an overall 10% discount on all fees incurred in this case. Consequently, Greenberg's fees were reduced from $400,318 to $360,268.20. Additionally, Greenberg received a $150,000 cap on certain fees, for example, on briefing Greenberg's motion for summary judgment. The cap resulted in another $89,932.75 discount to Greenberg, thus reducing the total fees to $274,353.45. Finally, Greenberg voluntarily choose not to seek recovery of fees for employees whose total billing was less than $1,000. That reductioneliminated another $2,321.55 in fees, thus reducing the request to $272,031.90.
Greenberg has submitted extensive support for its requested fees and costs. In particular, Greenberg has produced affidavits from all but one of the individuals who performed work on this case. Dkt. No. 211, Exs. 1, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24. Additionally, Greenberg has provided detailed itemized bills documenting every action performed on behalf of its attorneys, and background summaries or resumes for each staff member claiming to have worked on the case. See generally Dkt. No. 211. Importantly, Greenberg submitted the affidavit of Phillip R. Taylor as an expert on the reasonableness of Greenberg's request. Id. Greenberg also submitted the affidavit of Wallace E. Harrell, counsel for another defendant in this suit, and Richard G. Garrett, Greenberg's Chief Legal Officer. Id. The Court also points out that it conducted a hearing on the issue of attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs at which counsel for both sides presented extensive argument on the disputed fees. Accordingly, Greenberg has provided ample and specific evidence demonstrating the actual fees it incurred.
"The starting point for calculating a reasonable attorney's fee is 'the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate' for the attorneys' services." ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999). "The product of these two figures is the lodestar and there is a 'strong presumption' that the lodestar is the reasonable sum the attorneys deserve." Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2008). While the fee applicant bears the burden "of establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and hourly rates," the opponent must be reasonably precise in his objections and proof opposing the award. Norman v. Housing Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988).7
Gowen challenges the reasonableness of the fees Greenberg requests. Dkt. Nos. 226, at 2; 257, at 4-8. Specifically, Gowen contends that the rates that form the basis of Greenberg's fee request are not reasonable based on the local market, which Gowen contends is Brunswick, Georgia. Dkt. No. 257, at 5. Moreover, Gowen contends that Greenberg has not shown that its fee request is reasonable in relation to fees charged in similar cases. Id. at 6-7. Gowen also contends that the number of hours expended by Greenberg's counsel is unreasonable and should be reduced. Dkt. No. 226, at 4.
"A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation." Norman, 826 F.2d at 1299. "Evidence of rates may be adduced through direct evidence of charges by lawyers under similar circumstances or by opinion evidence." Id. (emphasis added). Further, the rate an attorney ordinarily charges "is powerful, and perhaps the best evidence of his market rate." Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 213 F.3d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir. 2000).
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