Gowran v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Decision Date12 January 1937
Docket NumberNo. 5801.,5801.
Citation87 F.2d 125
PartiesGOWRAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

A. L. Nash, of Manitowoc, Wis., for petitioner.

Robert H. Jackson, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key and Morton K. Rothschild, Sp. Assts. to the Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Will R. Gregg and Allin H. Pierce, both of New York City (Carter, Ledyard & Milburn, of New York City, of counsel), amici curiæ.

Before EVANS, Circuit Judge, and LINDLEY and BRIGGLE, District Judges.

LINDLEY, District Judge.

Petitioner seeks a review of a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals approving respondent's assessment of a deficiency income tax against petitioner for the year 1929.

Throughout 1929 petitioner was a holder of common stock in the Hamilton Manufacturing Company. On July 1st of that year, the corporation declared a dividend on the common stock of $14 per share and paid the same by distribution of shares of the corporation's preferred stock, at the par value of $100 per share. As his dividend, petitioner received 533 shares. Previously he had held only common stock. At the time the dividend was declared the corporate earned surplus was $440,000, against which the total dividend, $261,531, representing 2,615 shares of preferred stock at $100, was charged.

Some three months after receiving the preferred stock, petitioner sold it to the corporation, at $100 per share. Petitioner, in filing his income tax return, apportioned a part of the cost of his common stock to the preferred, treating the cost of the common as the total cost of both, and paid a tax on this basis. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency tax, upon the premise that the completed transaction was essentially a cancellation or redemption of the preferred stock, equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend.

Petitioner filed his petition with the Board of Tax Appeals to set aside the Commissioner's determination. The Commissioner answered and, under date of June 29, 1933, a division of the Board promulgated a memorandum opinion in favor of petitioner and against respondent, holding that the transaction did not amount to cancellation or redemption.

On July 16, 1933, respondent filed with the Board his motions for, (1) reconsideration of the memorandum opinion; (2) review by the Board, as provided by section 906 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1924, as amended by section 1000 of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 106; and (3) judgment in favor of respondent. On July 24, 1933, respondent's motion for review was denied. On January 15, 1934, his motions for reconsideration of the memorandum opinion and for judgment were denied by Division 16. On January 26, 1934, respondent moved for review of the order denying respondent's motions for reconsideration and judgment, and five days later the Board granted the review. Still later, on November 20, 1934, it disapproved the former order and granted respondent's motion for reconsideration of the memorandum opinion of June 29, 1933.

On February 13, 1935, petitioner filed with the Board three motions: (1) That the order of the Board dated November 20, 1934, whereby the Board granted reconsideration of the memorandum opinion of June 29, 1933, be vacated; (2) that respondent's motion for such reconsideration be denied; and (3) that judgment be entered for petitioner in accordance with the prayer of his petition for redetermination. On June 27, 1935, the Board delivered another decision. The opinion of the majority did not overrule the conclusions reached June 29, 1933, wherein it was held that the preferred shares had not been redeemed in such manner as to make the transaction essentially equivalent to a taxable dividend, but held that the original distribution was not a tax-free stock dividend, but constituted taxable income, because of the fact that the issue of the shares resulted in a change in the proportionate corporate interests of the stockholders. The Board at that time denied petitioner's three motions made on February 13, 1935.

On August 9, 1935, the Board entered the decision from which this appeal is taken, approving the deficiency of $5,831.67 in income tax for the year 1929.

The facts are not disputed. The only questions submitted are those of law.

It is contended that the Board was without jurisdiction to decide the case upon a point not urged by the Commissioner. The Board approved the Commissioner's assessment, but did so upon a legal theory different from his. We are of the opinion that the Board acted within its powers. It had a right to grant a rehearing. Washburn Wire Co. v. Commissioner (C.C.A. 1) 67 F.(2d) 658; Helvering v. Continental Oil Co., 63 App.D.C. 5, 68 F.(2d) 750; Griffiths v. Commissioner (C.C.A.) 50 F. (2d) 782; Bankers' Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 308, 313, 53 S.Ct. 150, 77 L.Ed. 325; Burnet v. Lexington Ice & Coal Co. (C.C.A. 4) 62 F.(2d) 906; Helvering v. Louis, 64 App.D.C. 263, 77 F.(2d) 386, 99 A.L.R. 620. There was no abuse of discretion in doing so, for the Board may uphold the Commissioner's decision for a reason different from that set up by the latter in his deficiency notice. This rule is particularly applicable where there is no dispute as to the facts. It is immaterial whether the Commissioner proceeded upon the wrong theory. The burden is upon petitioner to show that the assessment is wrong, upon any proper theory; otherwise he must fail. Crowell v. Commissioner (C.C.A. 6) 62 F.(2d) 51; Beaumont v. Helvering, 63 App.D.C. 387, 73 F.(2d) 110; J. & O. Altschul Tobacco Co. v. Commissioner (C.C.A. 5) 42 F.(2d) 609.

No injury accrued to petitioner in this respect, as the stipulation covered all facts, including a value of $100 per share for the preferred stock. Consequently, there was no surprise of or advantage over petitioner.

The next question confronting us is the character of the distribution. Since the decision of the Board the Supreme Court on May 18, 1936, decided Koshland v. Helvering Commissioner, 298 U.S. 441, 56 S. Ct. 767, 80 L.Ed. 1268, 105 A.L.R. 756, and there held that the issuance of common stock as a dividend upon...

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9 cases
  • Helvering v. Gowran
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • December 6, 1937
    ...being agreed that the fair market value of the stock, both at the date of receipt and at the date of the sale, was $100 a share. Gowran v. Com'r, 87 F.2d 125. Because of the importance of the questions presented in the administration of the revenue laws, certiorari was granted. 301 U.S. 676......
  • Amax Coal Co. v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • December 31, 1996
    ...Commissioner's findings were incorrect; and (2) Amax overpaid its BLET liability by the amount claimed. See, e.g., Gowran v. Commissioner, 87 F.2d 125, 127 (7th Cir.1937), aff'd sub nom., Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 246, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937). The Revenue Ruling, the......
  • Saigh v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue
    • United States
    • U.S. Tax Court
    • May 25, 1961
    ...by the parties, we are, nonetheless, guided by the record before us and not by their unconfirmed prior actions. Cf. Gowran v. Commissioner, 87 F.2d 125 (C.A. 7). The next issue is whether the failure to file a personal holding company return was due to reasonable cause. Petitioners argue th......
  • Little v. CIR, 5536.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • January 15, 1960
    ...which the Tax Court raised on its own motion to dispose of the question of deductibility. The Tax Court has this power. Gowran v. Commissioner, 7 Cir., 1936, 87 F.2d 125 reversed on other grounds, sub. nom. Helvering v. Gowran, 1937, 302 U.S. 238, 58 S.Ct. 154, 82 L.Ed. 224. See Friednash v......
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