Goyco v. Progressive Ins. Co.

• Docket Number: 088497
• Decision Date: 14 May 2024
• Citation: 257 N.J. 313,313 A.3d 877
• Parties: DAVID GOYCO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

257 N.J. 313

313 A.3d 877

DAVID GOYCO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

A-12 September Term 2023

088497

Argued January 29, 2024—Decided May 14, 2024

On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.

Christian C. LoPiano argued the cause for appellant(LoPiano Law Firm, attorneys; Christian C. LoPiano Hoboken, of counsel and on the briefs).

Patricia A. Holden argued the cause for respondent(Cipriani & Werner, attorneys; Patricia A. Holden and Robert A. Maren(Vella & Maren), on the briefs).

David J. Karbasian argued the cause for amicus curiaeNew Jersey Association for Justice(Law Offices of David J. Karbasian, attorneys; David J. Karbasian and Jason S. Walker, on the brief).

Nicole R. Cassata argued the cause for amicus curiaeNew Jersey Defense Association(Chasan Lamparello Mallon & Cappuzzo, attorneys; Nicole R. Cassata, on the brief).

Mark M. Tallmadge submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiaeNew Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association(Bressler, Amery & Ross, attorneys; Mark M. Tallmadge and Siena Carnevale, on the brief).

JUSTICE SOLOMONdelivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we are called upon to decide whether the operator of a low-speed electric scooter (LSES) is entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35, commonly known as the No-Fault Act.

The No-Fault Act requires insurance companies to provide PIP benefits to insured individuals in two circumstances: (1) when the covered individual is "occupying, entering into, alighting from or using an automobile"; or (2) when the covered individual is a pedestrian.N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.The No-Fault Act defines "pedestrian" as "any person who is not occupying, entering into, or alighting from a vehicle propelled by other than muscular power and designed primarily for use on highways, rails and tracks."N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(h).

The parties do not dispute that plaintiffDavid Goyco’s insurance policy with defendantProgressive Insurance Company(Progressive) must comply with those mandatory statutory provisions.What the parties contest is whether plaintiff was a "pedestrian" within the meaning of the No-Fault Act and, by extension, the policy.Plaintiff argues that LSES riders should be deemed "pedestrians" entitled to PIP benefits under the No-Fault Act in light of the 2019enactment of N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g), which provides that an LSES should be considered equivalent to a bicycle except in statutory provisions that clearly do not apply to an LSES.

For the reasons that follow, we hold that an LSES rider does not fall within the definition of "pedestrian" for purposes of the No-Fault Act because the LSES is "a vehicle propelled by other than muscular power and designed primarily for use on highways, rails and tracks."N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(h).Therefore, Goyco is not entitled to PIP benefits, and we affirm as modified the judgment of the Appellate Division.

I.

On November 22, 2021, an automobile struck and injured Goyco while he was operating a "Segway Ninebot KickScooter Max" in Elizabeth, New Jersey.The "Segway Ninebot KickScooter Max" is an LSES that has two wheels connected by a floorboard, as well as handlebars, a headlight, brake light, and speedometer.Pursuant to its owner’s manual, the LSES is designed to be operated using its rechargeable battery, which powers its electric motor.

Goyco sustained injuries from the accident and incurred medical expenses.At the time of the accident, Goyco was the named insured under a personal automobile policy with Progressive.Goyco reported the accident and made a claim for PIP benefits under the policy, which provided -- in terms that track N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 -- that the insured could receive PIP benefits for injuries sustained in an accident "1. while occupying, entering into, alighting from, getting on, getting off of, loading, unloading, or using an automobile; or 2. as a pedestrian, caused by an automobile or by an object propelled by or from an automobile."The policy defines "automobile" in terms that track N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a), and it defines "pedestrian" as "any person who is not occupying a vehicle propelled by other than muscular power and designed primarily for use on highways, rails and tracks."(emphasis added).That language similarly tracks the No-Fault Act.SeeN.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(h).The policy does not define "vehicle."

Progressive denied Goyco’s claim for PIP benefits.Progressive concluded that the LSES Goyco operated at the time of the accident did not meet the definition of an "automobile," and Goyco could not be considered a "pedestrian" because he was "driving" the LSES at the time of the accident.

Goyco filed a verified complaint and an order to show cause, asking the trial court to direct Progressive to pay all reasonable medical expenses incurred to treat his injuries.At oral argument, Goyco asserted that an LSES is akin to a bicycle pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g) and that, under New Jersey case law, bicycle riders are considered "pedestrians" within the meaning of the No-Fault Act.Goyco argued that an LSES is akin to a bicycle, and therefore he was a "pedestrian" for purposes of PIP benefits.In opposition, Progressive argued that an LSES is not an "automobile" under the No-Fault Act and Goyco does not qualify as a "pedestrian" because the LSES is motorized.

The trial court determined that an LSES is not an automobile under the statute or the policy.In addition, the court concluded that Goyco could not rely on N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g) to support the contention that an LSES is like a bicycle for purposes of PIP benefits because that provision is not part of the No-Fault Act.The trial court noted further that the No-Fault Act contains no mention of "bicycles," and any reference to bicycles in N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g) or any other provisions of Chapter 4 has no impact on Chapter 6A, which houses the No-Fault Act.Finally, the trial court determined that "[t]he plain language and nature of the definition of a ‘pedestrian’ in accordance with [the No-Fault Act] clearly has no application to an [LSES]."The trial court thus denied relief to Goyco.

Goyco appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment.First, the Appellate Division found that Goyco was not a "pedestrian" within the plain language of the No-Fault Act because an LSES is a "vehicle propelled by other than muscular power" that meets the definition of a "[l]ow-speed electric scooter" in N.J.S.A. 39:1-1.The Appellate Division also rejected the argument that N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g) likens an LSES operator to a bicyclist.Relying on the text of N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g), the Appellate Division found that the statute’s exception overcame Goyco’s argument: "all statutes … rules, and regulations applicable to bicycles … shall apply to [an LSES]except those provisions which by their very nature may have no application to … [an LSES]."(emphasis added).

We granted Goyco’s petition for certification, 255 N.J. 429, 302 A.3d 1176(2023), as well as the motions of the New Jersey Association for Justice(NJAJ), the New Jersey Defense Associa- tion (NJDA), and the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association(NJPLIGA) to appear as amici curiae.

II.

A.

Goyco urges this Court to apply N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g) and interpret "pedestrian" to include an LSES operator, just as it includes bicyclists.Goyco first argues that N.J.S.A 39:4-14.16(g) supports the assertion that an LSES is akin to a bicycle because it provides, in part, that "all statutes … rules and regulations applicable to bicycles … shall apply to [an LSES]."Second, Goyco contends that the Appellate Division misapplied the exception in N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g), which excludes "those provisions which by their very nature may have no application to … [an LSES]."

Amicus curiae NJAJ agrees with Goyco that N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g) should apply here.In addition, NJAJ argues that the NoFault Act’s definition of "pedestrian" requires that the LSES be "propelled by other than muscular power and designed primarily for use on highways, rails, and tracks."(emphasis added)(quotingN.J.S.A 39:6A-2(h)).Arguing that an LSES does not meet the second part of that definition, NJAJ argues that an LSES operator falls within the definition of "pedestrian" and is entitled to PIP benefits.

B.

Progressive claims that N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g) does not apply here because it explicitly excludes "those provisions which by their very nature may have no application to … [an LSES]" and that the definition of "pedestrian" in the No-Fault Act, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(h), is such a provision.Turning to extrinsic evidence, Progressive claims that N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16 is inapplicable to the No-Fault Act because it was implemented to combat climate change -- not to expand the applicability of PIP benefits in the No-Fault Act.

Amici NJDA and NJPLIGA agree with and largely reiterate Progressive’s arguments, asserting that the trial court and the Appellate Division’s application of N.J.S.A 39:6A-2(h) to bar Goyco’s claim for PIP benefits was consistent with the terms of the statute and the Legislature’s intent.In addition, NJDA and NJPLIGA express concern that expanding N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(h) to include LSES operators will increase the cost of automobile insurance premiums, which would ultimately defeat the Legislature’s intent in passing the No-Fault Act.

Amicus curiae NJPLIGA notes that the exception in N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g) precludes application to statutory provisions like N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(h), because N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g) has no relevance to an LSES, as evidenced by the fact that the No-Fault Act makes no reference to "bicycles."In addition, NJPLIGA argues that it is outside this Court’s authority to utilize a provision from another chapter to expand the definition of "pedestrian" in the No-Fault Act to include an LSES.

III.

Enacted...