Grabe v. Hokin

Decision Date17 November 2021
Docket NumberSC 20432
Parties Laura GRABE v. Justin HOKIN
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

Scott T. Garosshen, Hartford, with whom were Kenneth J. Bartschi and, on the brief, Michael T. Meehan, Bridgeport, for the appellant (defendant).

Charles D. Ray, Hartford, with whom were Angela M. Healey, David W. Griffin and, on the brief, Dyan M. Kozaczka, Westport, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

KAHN, J.

The issue before us in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly determined that the enforcement of a prenuptial agreement executed by the plaintiff, Laura Grabe, and the defendant, Justin Hokin, was not unconscionable at the time of the dissolution of their marriage. Shortly before the parties’ marriage in 2010, they executed a prenuptial agreement in which each party agreed, in the event of a dissolution action, to waive any claim to the other's separate property, as defined in the agreement, or to any form of support from the other, including alimony. The agreement also provided that a party who unsuccessfully challenged the enforceability of the agreement would pay the attorney's fees of the other party. In 2016, the plaintiff brought this action seeking dissolution of the marriage and enforcement of the prenuptial agreement. The defendant filed a cross complaint in which he claimed, inter alia, that the agreement was unenforceable because it was unconscionable at the time of the dissolution under General Statutes § 46b-36g (a) (2).1 After a trial to the court, the court concluded that, with the exception of the attorney's fees provision, enforcement of the terms of the prenuptial agreement that the parties entered into was not unconscionable, even in light of certain events that had occurred during the marriage. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment dissolving the marriage and enforcing the terms of the prenuptial agreement, with the exception of the provision requiring the party who unsuccessfully challenged the enforceability of the agreement to pay the attorney's fees of the other party. On appeal,2 the defendant contends that the trial court incorrectly determined that the occurrence of the unforeseen events found by the trial court did not render the enforcement of the entire agreement unconscionable at the time of the dissolution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts that were found by the trial court or that are undisputed. Shortly before the parties’ marriage on October 2, 2010, they entered into a prenuptial agreement. The agreement provided that it would be "governed and construed in accordance with the Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act, [General Statutes] § 46b-36a et seq. ..." Under the agreement, each party waived any claim to the property of the other during the marriage. In the event of a marital dissolution, each party agreed to waive "all claims and rights to any equitable distribution of [s]eparate [p]roperty [of the other party, as defined in the agreement]," and to "any claim for temporary or permanent maintenance, support, alimony, [attorney's] fees (including [pendente] lite [attorney's] fees) or any similar claim ...." In addition, each party agreed that, if either party "unsuccessfully seeks to invalidate all or any portion of [the] [a]greement or seeks to recover alimony (other than pendente lite [attorney's] fees) or property in a manner which deviates from the terms of [the] [a]greement, then the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all reasonable and necessary [attorney's] fees and other costs incurred in successfully defending his or her rights under [the] [a]greement." The agreement also contained a severability provision stating that, "[i]n case any provision of [the] [a]greement should be held to be invalid, such invalidity shall not affect, in any way, any of the other provisions herein, all of which shall continue in full force and effect, in any country, state or jurisdiction in which such provisions are legal and valid." In addition, the agreement provided that "[n]o change in circumstances of the parties shall render [the] [a]greement unconscionable if enforcement hereof is sought at any time in the future."

At the time that the parties executed the prenuptial agreement, the plaintiff's annual income was $1,312,225, and her net worth was $12,319,380. The defendant's estate had a fair market value of $5,150,295,3 and he disclosed income of $97,719.06 over the previous six months. The primary sources of the defendant's income were a director's fee of approximately $60,000 per year from an entity known as Intermountain Industries and guaranteed payments ranging from $80,000 to $100,00 per year from an entity known as 4H, LLC Family Partnership (4H, LLC).4 The defendant received no other income from employment.

Before their marriage, both the plaintiff and the defendant would frequently stay out all night socializing and drinking with friends. The plaintiff changed her behavior when she became pregnant shortly after the marriage, but the defendant did not. After the parties’ oldest daughter was born in late 2011, the defendant continued to neglect his responsibilities to his family. For example, ten months after his daughter's birth, the defendant left the plaintiff at home alone with her while Hurricane Sandy struck their neighborhood, and the plaintiff was forced to seek shelter at her parents’ home.

After the parties’ second daughter was born in 2013, the defendant's family planned an intervention for him, as his drinking was out of control and he was being completely unproductive. The intervention never occurred, and the defendant continued to stay out all night, sleep most of the day and ignore the needs of his wife and children.

In August, 2014, the plaintiff contacted a divorce lawyer. Two weeks later, the house in Norwalk where the parties resided, which the defendant owned, was completely destroyed by a fire. The parties then leased another residence in Norwalk. In November, 2014, the plaintiff filed an action for the dissolution of the marriage, but she later withdrew it. In 2015, the parties’ third daughter was born.

During this period, the plaintiff started building a house in the Rowayton neighborhood of Norwalk. In March, 2016, the plaintiff separated from the defendant and moved into the Rowayton house with their three young daughters. Several weeks later, she filed this action seeking the dissolution of the marriage and enforcement of the prenuptial agreement. In February, 2017, the defendant filed an amended answer and cross complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the prenuptial agreement was unenforceable under § 46b-36g (a) (2) because it was unconscionable when enforcement was sought.5

Thereafter, in September, 2017, a yacht club in the Caribbean known as the Bitter End Yacht Club (Yacht Club), which was owned by the defendant's family and in which the defendant had an indirect, fractional ownership interest, was destroyed by Hurricane Irma. Also in 2017, Intermountain Industries failed due to a downturn in the price of crude oil. As a result, it no longer paid the defendant a director's fee, and its guaranteed payments to 4H, LLC were discontinued.

Evidence presented at trial showed that, since the execution of the prenuptial agreement, the defendant's assets had decreased in value from $5,150,295 to $2.1 million. A note on the defendant's financial affidavit dated February 11, 2019, which was introduced as an exhibit at trial, indicated that $1,845,000 of these assets were held in the Justin Hokin Grantor Trust, representing the trust's ownership interests in other assets, "primarily [4H, LLC]," and that "[t]he most significant asset in [4H, LLC], is [the Yacht Club], which was destroyed by Hurricane Irma in the summer of 2017." The note also indicated that the trust was "wholly illiquid" and that its value was not "accessible" to the defendant. The defendant had liabilities of $1,351,262, more than $1 million of which was debt owed to his father and to 4H, LLC, for "legal fees ...." The affidavit showed that the defendant had no significant income.6

The defendant contended in his posttrial brief to the trial court that the births of the parties’ three children, the destruction of his house by fire, the destruction of the Yacht Club by Hurricane Irma and the failure of Intermountain Industries were not contemplated when the prenuptial agreement was signed and that enforcement of the agreement would be unconscionable in light of these unforeseen events. Accordingly, the defendant requested that the trial court not enforce the agreement and, instead, order a property division "[that] ... would permit the defendant to purchase a home in close proximity [to the plaintiff's home] to provide the minor children a comparable quality of life between both parent households."

The plaintiff contended before the trial court that, to the contrary, the events cited by the defendant were not beyond the contemplation of the parties when they executed the prenuptial agreement. She also referred to evidence presented at trial that would support findings that, after the defendant received insurance proceeds for the destruction of his house, paid off two mortgages on the house and sold the land, he retained net proceeds of $775,587.73, as compared with equity of $20,309.58 at the time that the prenuptial agreement was executed; the value of the Yacht Club property on December 31, 2017, was $14,900,000, $3,000,000 more than its value on the date that the prenuptial agreement was executed; and the defendant's family was responsible for the failure of Intermountain Industries. Accordingly, the plaintiff argued that, even if the events were not contemplated, it would not be unconscionable to enforce the prenuptial agreement, in part because it would be unfair to require the plaintiff bear...

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3 cases
  • Velasco v. Comm'r of Corr.
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • September 6, 2022
    ......, would make, on the one hand, and which no fair and honest [individual] would accept, on the other." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grabe v. Hokin , 341 Conn. 360, 371, 267 A.3d 145 (2021). "Substantive unconscionability focuses on the content of the contract, as distinguished from ......
  • Velasco v. Comm'r of Corr.
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • September 6, 2022
    ...... fair and honest [individual] would accept, on the. other." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grabe v. Hokin, 341 Conn. 360, 371, 267 A.3d 145 (2021). "Substantive unconscionability focuses on the content of. the contract, as ......
  • Moy v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • March 7, 2022
    ...... well.[3] It is not the Court's role to guess at. the motivations or interests of a regulatory authority. See, e.g., Grabe v. Hokin, 267. A.3d 145, 157 n.21 (2021) (“It is not the role of this. court to create public policy in this highly regulated. ......

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