Grabinski v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty.
| Decision Date | 11 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | 1-19-1267 |
| Citation | 2020 IL App (1st) 191267,186 N.E.3d 987 |
| Parties | Roger GRABINSKI, Special Administrator of the Estate of Jonathan Grabinski, Deceased, and Sandra Denardo-Melant, Special Administrator of the Estate of Salvatore Melant, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT OF COOK COUNTY, Commonwealth Edison Company, and Intren, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Jennifer L. Barron, of Barron Legal, Ltd., and Lynn D. Dowd, both of Naperville, and Frank J. Olavarria, of Chicago, for appellants.
Robert L. Baker, of Forest Preserve District of Cook County, of Chicago, for appellee Forest Preserve District of Cook County.
Dawn M. Gonzalez, of Stone & Johnson, Chtrd., of Chicago, for appellee Commonwealth Edison Company.
Aleen R. Tiffany, Jamie Rein, and Sarah B. Jansen, of HeplerBroom, LLC, of Crystal Lake, for other appellee.
¶ 1 The circuit court of Cook County dismissed a wrongful death action brought by the plaintiffs-appellants, Roger Grabinski, special administrator of the estate of Jonathan Grabinski, deceased, and Sandra Denardo-Melant, special administrator of the estate of Salvatore Melant, deceased (Estates), against the defendants-appellees, the Forest Preserve District of Cook County (Forest Preserve), Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd), and Intren, Inc. (Intren). The Estates now appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 3 This case arises out of a fatal car accident that occurred on March 5, 2016, in the 9400 block of Archer Avenue (road) in Willow Springs, Illinois. The Forest Preserve owns the property adjacent to the road where the accident occurred, but it is undisputed that the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) owns, operates, and maintains the road, its right-of-way,1 and its drainage system. According to the Estates, 17-year-old Jonathan Grabinski was driving a car on the road with 18-year-old Salvatore Melant as his passenger when water on the road caused the car to hydroplane and hit a tree. Both teenagers suffered fatal injuries.
¶ 4 On March 3, 2017, the Estates filed a wrongful death action against several governmental entities, including IDOT and the Forest Preserve, alleging that each governmental entity "owned, controlled, maintained, possessed, and/or managed the road, adjacent ditch and/or adjacent terrain where" the accident occurred. The Estates eventually voluntarily dismissed all of the governmental entities as defendants except the Forest Preserve.2
¶ 5 In response, the Forest Preserve filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 2-619(a)(9) (West 2016)). The motion argued that the Forest Preserve did not own, operate, or control the road or its drainage system, as it was all under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of IDOT. In support of its motion, the Forest Preserve attached IDOT's response to the Forest Preserve's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2016)) request, which contained documents demonstrating IDOT's exclusive ownership of the road, including a 66-foot right-of-way and the road's drainage system. The FOIA documents included IDOT's guidelines, which define "highway" to include "rights of way, bridges, drainage structures, signs, guardrails, and all other appurtenances necessary for vehicular travel."
¶ 6 On December 15, 2017, the Forest Preserve filed a supplement to its motion to dismiss. Its supplement cited to deposition testimony from three witnesses: John Sterenberg, surveyor for land use compliance for the Forest Preserve; John McCabe, director of resource management for the Forest Preserve; and James Stumpner, bureau chief of maintenance for IDOT. All three witnesses testified consistently that the road is an IDOT roadway for which IDOT, and not the Forest Preserve, has jurisdiction and control; including removing any debris that may build up in the road's drainage system. The Forest Preserve's supplement also raised three governmental tort immunities: (1) no liability for failure to inspect the property of others ( 745 ILCS 10/2-105 (West 2016) ), (2) no liability for the effects of weather on roadways ( 745 ILCS 10/3-105(a) (West 2016)), and (3) no liability for failure to install warning signs ( 745 ILCS 10/3-104 (West 2016) ).
¶ 7 On March 2, 2018, the Estates filed an amended complaint, modifying the claims against the Forest Preserve and adding several new defendants, including ComEd and Intren.3 The amended complaint alleged that "on or about late 2014 to 2015, the Forest Preserve commissioned the construction of Camp Bullfrog," which was adjacent to the road and "in an area in close proximity to" the location of the accident. The amended complaint further alleged that, as part of the Camp Bullfrog construction project, ComEd "commissioned, directed and/or installed the electric poles and powerlines" and its subcontractor, Intren, "engaged in the installation of electric poles and powerlines * * * including the cutting of trees, stumps and debris" along the road. In the amended complaint, the Estates alleged that the work completed on the Camp Bullfrog construction project by the Forest Preserve, ComEd, and Intren created debris that was never removed. According to the Estates, the debris eventually migrated into the adjacent road's drainage system, causing it to be "obstructed and [filled] with soil and debris, in effect closing the ditch and drainage system and making it useless, and allowing water and run-off onto the road."4 The Estates asserted that the Forest Preserve, ComEd, and Intren all "had a duty to exercise ordinary care to not obstruct, alter, damage and/or hinder the adjacent ditch and drainage system," and that they were negligent in allowing the road's drainage system to become obstructed with debris from the Camp Bullfrog construction project.
¶ 8 The trial court allowed the Forest Preserve's original motion to dismiss, as well as its supplement, to stand as its response to the amended complaint. On July 27, 2018, Intren filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code. And on October 5, 2018, ComEd filed its own section 2-619 motion to dismiss. Both Intren and ComEd's motions joined in the argument asserted by the Forest Preserve that IDOT was solely responsible for the road and its drainage system.
¶ 9 On May 21, 2019, the trial court entered an order granting all three motions to dismiss. The order stated that "the uncontroverted evidence shows that IDOT has exclusive jurisdiction over the road." Citing Dixon v. City of Chicago , 101 Ill. App. 3d 453, 56 Ill.Dec. 950, 428 N.E.2d 542 (1981), and section 4-203 of the Illinois Highway Code (Highway Code) ( 605 ILCS 5/4-203 (West 2016) ), the trial court held that neither the Forest Preserve, ComEd, nor Intren had a concurrent duty to maintain the road or its drainage system. The trial court additionally held that the governmental tort immunities raised by the Forest Preserve protected it against allegations that it conducted activities on its property which allowed water to collect on the adjacent road. The trial court accordingly dismissed the Estates' amended complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed.
¶ 11 We note that we have jurisdiction to consider this matter, as the Estates filed a timely notice of appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); R. 303 (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 12 The Estates present the following issue: whether the trial court erred in dismissing its amended complaint against the Forest Preserve, ComEd, and Intren. The Estates argue that the Highway Code cited by the trial court is inapplicable because their claim is that all three defendants owed a duty to remove debris from the Camp Bullfrog construction project and not allow it to clog the adjacent road's drainage system. Specifically, the Estates claim that the three defendants breached their duty by cutting down trees and digging up dirt and not cleaning up the leftover debris. And over a year later, all that debris migrated into the adjacent road's drainage system, allowing water to pool on the road and causing the accident.
¶ 13 A motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code admits the legal sufficiency of the pleadings but asserts certain defects or defenses. Duncan v. FedEx Office & Print Services, Inc. , 2019 IL App (1st) 180857, ¶ 10, 429 Ill.Dec. 190, 123 N.E.3d 1249. When considering a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint must be accepted as true. Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center , 2015 IL App (1st) 133735, ¶ 35, 391 Ill.Dec. 647, 31 N.E.3d 323. We review a trial court's order dismissing a complaint under section 2-619 de novo . Id.
¶ 14 In this case, the trial court dismissed the Estates' wrongful death action on the basis that none of the defendants owed a duty of care to the decedents since the road and its drainage system were owned and maintained solely by IDOT. In a wrongful death action, as in any negligence action, it is the plaintiff's burden to prove three essential elements: (1) that the defendants owed a duty; (2) that the defendants breached the duty they owed; and (3) that the breach proximately caused the injury. Stanphill v. Ortberg , 2018 IL 122974, ¶ 33, 432 Ill.Dec. 624, 129 N.E.3d 1167. "Unless a duty is owed, there can be no negligence." Rozowicz v. C3 Presents, LLC , 2017 IL App (1st) 161177, ¶ 12, 420 Ill.Dec. 181, 95 N.E.3d 1277. Whether a duty exists in a particular case is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. In determining whether a duty of care exists, the court considers whether there is a relationship between the parties such that a legal obligation is placed upon one party for the other party's benefit. Id. ¶ 13. The factors a court considers...
To continue reading
Request your trial