Grabinski v. St. Francis Hosp.

• Citation: 63 N.W.2d 693,266 Wis. 339
• Parties: GRABINSKI et ux. v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL.
• Decision Date: 06 April 1954
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 693

63 N.W.2d 693

266 Wis. 339

GRABINSKI et ux. v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

April 6, 1954.

The plaintiff Dorothy Grabinski seeks damages for personal injuries resulting from a fall within the hospital operated by the defendant. Verdon L. Grabinski, her husband, seeks to recover for medical expenses and for loss of his wife's services and society. His recovery depends on the success of his wife's action. Thus it will only be necessary to refer to her action, and she will be referred to as the plaintiff.

At about 2:30 p. m. on September 9, 1951, the plaintiff entered defendant's hospital by a door known as the ambulance entrance. Inside the door is a rectangular entranceway or lobby, from which people enter the elevator or use the stairs leading to the first floor. The floor thereof is surfaced with burnt clay tile. Plaintiff testified that it had been raining; that rain water, blown in whenever the door was opened, had accumulated on the tile floor to such an extent that it was slippery; that she slipped because of said condition and was injured by falling upon the floor.

The defendant is a charitable organization. The complaint alleged violations of sec. 101.06, Stats., known as the safe-place statute. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital was both a public building and place of employment within the meaning of that statute and that the violations thereof by the defendant consisted of a failure (1) to provide adequate lighting in said entranceway; (2) to provide warning signs of the slippery condition of said tile floor; (3) to provide a non-skid tread on said tile floor; and (4) to mop up and remove the water that had accumulated on said slippery tile floor, of which wet and slippery condition the defendant knew or should have known.

At the close of the testimony the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant and a judgment was entered on July 3, 1953, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs appealed.

Hale, Skemp, Nietsch, Hanson & Schnurrer, La Crosse, for appellants.

Johns, Roraff, Pappas & Flaherty, La Crosse, for respondent.

BROADFOOT, Justice.

Prior decisions of this court have established that a charitable institution is immune from tort liability within this state, except that such an institution is liable to the same extent as any private individual or corporation for a violation of the safe-place statute, St.1951, § 101.06. Wilson v. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Reformation, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W. 708; Bachman v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751, 30 A.L.R. 448; Waldman v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 227 Wis. 43, 277 N.W. 632.

The differences in scope between the duties of employers and owners of public buildings under the safe-place statute are pointed out in Jaeger v. Evangelical Lutheran Holy Ghost Congregation, 219 Wis. 209, 262 N.W. 585, and cases there cited. Under these decisions it is apparent that the defendant is not an employer as defined in the safe-place statute, nor is its hospital such a place of employment as referred to therein. It is, however, the owner of its hospital, which is a public building. The duty of the defendant as an owner of a public building to maintain the same has no application to temporary conditions unrelated to the structure of the building or the material of which it is composed. Waldman v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, supra. Jaeger v. Evangelical Lutheran Holy Ghost Congregation, supra; Holcomb v. Szymczyk, 186 Wis. 99, 202 N.W. 188.

Upon an appeal from a judgment based upon a directed verdict our review of the record requires us to consider the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff and to give her the benefit of every favorable inference which can reasonably be drawn therefrom.

All of these rules were before us in making our review of the record herein. Our search of the record reveals no claim of any defects in the floor itself, no claim is made that it was other than level, or that it was improperly constructed or surfaced in any manner. There is no claim that anything was on the floor except some rain water. However, the water upon the floor, so far as the record shows, was a temporary condition unrelated to the structure of the building or the material of which it was composed.

The safe-place statute, as it relates to a public building, does not require the owner to post signs warning of a temporary slippery condition, to provide a non-skid tread because of a temporary condition, or to mop up and remove water created by a natural hazard, such as a rainstorm. It has been held, however, that failure to provide adequate lighting in a public building is a violation of the safe-place statute. Wilson v. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Reformation, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W. 708; Heiden v. City of Milwaukee, 226 Wis. 92, 275 N.W. 922, 114 A.L.R. 420; Zimmers v. St. Sebastian's Congregation, 258 Wis. 496, 46 N.W.2d 820. If there was evidence from which it might reasonably be inferred that the entranceway was inadequately lighted, a jury question was presented and the defendant's motion for a directed verdict should not have been granted.

The record discloses that the accident happened in mid-afternoon on September 9, 1951. The record further discloses that there is a window in the east wall of the entranceway and a pane of glass of undisclosed size in the upper part of the door. The testimony of the plaintiff with respect to whether or not the areaway was dark is as follows:

Direct Examination

'Q. Now September 9th, 1951, when you were going to the hospital with your husband as you have testified, what kind of a day was it, Mrs. Grabinski? A. It was a dark, rainy day and there was a continuous rain, but it wasn't just what you would call a thunder storm, it was a continuous rain, a dark day.

'Q. And how about the condition of light as you went in the entrance? A. There wasn't any light other than what came in the window, but ordinarily that isn't place that is especially dark.

'Q. Now I don't remember whether I asked you whether or not there was any artificial light in the entranceway such as an electric light when you entered there? A. When I entered there I didn't see any light.'

Cross-Examination

'Q. I believe you stated on direct examination you knew this entranceway as well as this whole hall, is that right? A. Yes.

'Q. So that insofar as your conduct on this day, you could have gone in that entranceway up the stairs without even looking? A. Yes.

'Q. And it made no difference to you whether it was light or dark? A. No.

'Q. You weren't looking to see where you were going because you knew where you...