Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg.
Decision Date | 13 June 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 04-603.,04-603. |
Citation | 545 U.S. 308,125 S. Ct. 2363,162 L. Ed. 2d 257 |
Parties | GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
The Internal Revenue Service seized real property owned by petitioner (hereinafter Grable) to satisfy a federal tax delinquency, and gave Grable notice by certified mail before selling the property to respondent (hereinafter Darue). Grable subsequently brought a quiet title action in state court, claiming that Darue's title was invalid because 26 U. S. C. § 6335 required the IRS to give Grable notice of the sale by personal service, not certified mail. Darue removed the case to Federal District Court as presenting a federal question because the title claim depended on an interpretation of federal tax law. The District Court declined to remand the case, finding that it posed a significant federal-law question, and it granted Darue summary judgment on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, and this Court granted certiorari on the jurisdictional question.
Held: The national interest in providing a federal forum for federal tax litigation is sufficiently substantial to support the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction over the disputed issue on removal. Pp. 312-320.
(a) Darue was entitled to remove the quiet title action if Grable could have brought it in federal court originally, as a civil action "arising under the ... laws ... of the United States," 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Federal-question jurisdiction is usually invoked by plaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by federal law, but this Court has also long recognized that such jurisdiction will lie over some state-law claims that implicate significant federal issues, see, e. g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180. Such federal jurisdiction demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one. And the jurisdiction must be consistent with congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts governing § 1331's application. These considerations have kept the Court from adopting a single test for jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in state-law claims between nondiverse parties. Instead, the question is whether the state-law claim necessarily stated a federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing a congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities. Pp. 312-314.
(b) This case warrants federal jurisdiction. Grable premised its superior title claim on the IRS's failure to give adequate notice, as defined by federal law. Whether Grable received notice is an essential element of its quiet title claim, and the federal statute's meaning is actually disputed. The meaning of a federal tax provision is an important federal-law issue that belongs in federal court. The Government has a strong interest in promptly collecting delinquent taxes, and the IRS's ability to satisfy its claims from delinquents' property requires clear terms of notice to assure buyers like Darue that the IRS has good title. Finally, because it will be the rare state title case that raises a federal-law issue, federal jurisdiction to resolve genuine disagreement over federal tax title provisions will portend only a microscopic effect on the federal-state division of labor. This conclusion puts the Court in venerable company, quiet title actions having been the subject of some of the earliest exercises of federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims. E. g., Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U. S. 486, 490-491. Pp. 314-316.
(c) Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804, is not to the contrary. There, in finding federal jurisdiction unavailable for a state tort claim resting in part on an allegation that the defendant drug company had violated a federal branding law, the Court noted that Congress had not provided a private federal cause of action for such violations. Merrell Dow cannot be read to make a federal cause of action a necessary condition for federal-question jurisdiction. It disclaimed the adoption of any bright-line rule and expressly approved the exercise of jurisdiction in Smith, where there was no federal cause of action. Accordingly, Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety as treating the absence of such cause as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the "sensitive judgments about congressional intent" required by § 1331. Id., at 810. In Merrell Dow, the principal significance of this absence was its bearing on the consequences to the federal system. If the federal labeling standard without a cause of action could get a state claim into federal court, so could any other federal standards without causes of action. And that would mean an enormous number of cases. A comparable analysis yields a different jurisdictional conclusion here, because state quiet title actions rarely involve contested federal-law issues. Pp. 316-320.
377 F. 3d 592, affirmed.
Eric H. Zagrans argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs was Charles E. McFarland.
Michael C. Walton argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John M. Lichtenberg, Gregory G. Timmer, and Mary L. Tabin.
Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General O'Connor, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, and Gilbert S. Rothenberg.*
The question is whether want of a federal cause of action to try claims of title to land obtained at a federal tax sale precludes removal to federal court of a state action with nondiverse parties raising a disputed issue of federal title law. We answer no, and hold that the national interest in providing a federal forum for federal tax litigation is sufficiently substantial to support the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction over the disputed issue on removal, which would not distort any division of labor between the state and federal courts, provided or assumed by Congress.
In 1994, the Internal Revenue Service seized Michigan real property belonging to petitioner Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc., to satisfy Grable's federal tax delinquency. Title 26 U. S. C. § 6335 required the IRS to give notice of the seizure, and there is no dispute that Grable received actual notice by certified mail before the IRS sold the property to respondent Darue Engineering & Manufacturing. Although Grable also received notice of the sale itself, it did not exercise its statutory right to redeem the property within 180 days of the sale, § 6337(b)(1), and after that period had passed, the Government gave Darue a quitclaim deed, § 6339.
Five years later, Grable brought a quiet title action in state court, claiming that Darue's record title was invalid because the IRS had failed to notify Grable of its seizure of the property in the exact manner required by § 6335(a), which provides that written notice must be "given by the Secretary to the owner of the property [or] left at his usual place of abode or business." Grable said that the statute required personal service, not service by certified mail.
Darue removed the case to Federal District Court as presenting a federal question, because the claim of title depended on the interpretation of the notice statute in the federal tax law. The District Court declined to remand the case at Grable's behest after finding that the "claim does pose a `significant question of federal law," Tr. 17 (Apr. 2, 2001), and ruling that Grable's lack of a federal right of action to enforce its claim against Darue did not bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction. On the merits, the court granted summary judgment to Darue, holding that although § 6335 by its terms required personal service, substantial compliance with the statute was enough. 207 F. Supp. 2d 694 (WD Mich. 2002).
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 377 F. 3d 592 (2004). On the jurisdictional question, the panel thought it sufficed that the title claim raised an issue of federal law that had to be resolved, and implicated a substantial federal interest (in construing federal tax law). The court went on to affirm the District Court's judgment on the merits. We granted certiorari on the jurisdictional question alone,1 543 U. S. 1042 (2005), to resolve a split within the Courts of Appeals on whether Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804 (1986), always requires a federal cause of action as a condition for exercising federal-question jurisdiction.2 We now affirm.
Darue was entitled to remove the quiet title action if Grable could have brought it in federal district court originally, 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a), as a civil action "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," § 1331. This provision for federal-question jurisdiction is invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by federal law (e. g., claims under 42 U. S. C. § 1983). There is, however, another longstanding, if less frequently encountered, variety of federal "arising under" jurisdiction, this Court having recognized for nearly 100 years that in certain cases federal-question jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that implicate significant federal issues. E. g., Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U. S. 486, 490-491 (1917). The doctrine captures the commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers...
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