Grabowski v. Bristol
| Citation | 64 Conn. App. 448,780 A.2d 953 |
| Decision Date | 24 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | (AC 21206) |
| Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
| Parties | LOUISE GRABOWSKI ET AL. v. CITY OF BRISTOL ET AL. |
Foti, Flynn and Peters, JS. Frank B. Cochran, with whom, on the brief, was Peter B. Cooper, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Ann T. Baldwin, assistant corporation counsel, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
James Ziogas, Jr., for the appellee (defendant Forestville Little League, Inc.).
Mark Ziogas, for the appellee (defendant Fleet Bank, N.A.).
This case arises out of a testamentary charitable trust that conveyed a designated parcel of property to the city of Bristol. In compliance with the will, the city has used the property for park or recreational purposes. The question before us is whether the city violated a clause in the will precluding use of the conveyed property for recreational purposes if the conveyed property was contiguous to other city owned property that was being used for recreational purposes. The trial court held that this provision was satisfied by extensive fencing of the conveyed property. We agree.
The plaintiffs, Louise Grabowski and Mary Mikulak, brought this action against the defendant city of Bristol and others1 to obtain injunctive relief from the defendants. In the plaintiffs' amended complaint, they alleged, inter alia, that the defendants had failed to comply with certain provisions of Constant Y. Peck's will (Peck will) that related to the establishment of the charitable Constant Y. Peck trust and of the recreational facility now known as Peck Park.2 Specifically, the plaintiffs maintained that the city's use of adjacent property for three Little League baseball fields made it impermissible for the city to permit Little League baseball in Peck Park.
Before the merits of the plaintiffs' amended complaint could be reached, the court, Holzberg, J., denied a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Fleet Bank, N.A. The motion alleged that the court had no subject matter jurisdiction over this case because the plaintiffs did not have standing to pursue their claims. See In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 217, 764 A.2d 739 (2001); Fish Unlimited v. Northeast Utilities Service Co., 254 Conn. 21, 31, 755 A.2d 860 (2000); Community Collaborative of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Ganim, 241 Conn. 546, 552-53, 698 A.2d 245 (1997).
Although the issue has not been raised again in the defendants' appellate briefs, we must undertake an independent review of the question of standing. Appellate courts, as well as trial courts, must examine an issue implicating subject matter jurisdiction. The question of standing may be raised by any of the parties, or by the court, sua sponte, at any time during judicial proceedings. In re Michelle G., 52 Conn. App. 187, 190, 727 A.2d 226 (1999), and cases therein cited. In denying the motion to dismiss filed by Fleet Bank, N.A., the court ruled that the plaintiffs had standing under the circumstances of this case. Ordinarily, it is the attorney general who has the responsibility to monitor charitable trusts. In his absence, the court determined that the allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint demonstrated that the plaintiffs had a special interest in Peck Park because, unlike members of the general public, their property adjoined Peck Park.3 We agree.
After an evidentiary hearing, the court, Hon. Julius J. Kremski, judge trial referee, decided the case on its merits and found for all the defendants on all the counts of the amended complaint. With respect to the claim that the defendants' use of Peck Park violated the Peck will, the court recognized that the plaintiffs had suffered some adverse consequences as a result of the Little League baseball games. It held, nonetheless, that the plaintiffs could not prevail because, as a matter of law, the defendants had complied with the terms of the Peck will. The court had no occasion to, and did not, address any independent basis for the plaintiffs' alleged right to equitable relief.4 The plaintiffs have appealed from the adverse judgment of the court.
The proper construction of the Peck will is the only question before us in this appeal. The plaintiffs' principal claim is that the court improperly construed the noncontiguity clause in the Peck will. Our standard of review of such a question is well established. "The construction of a will presents a question of law to be determined in light of facts which are found by the trial court or are undisputed or indisputable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Canaan National Bank v. Peters, 217 Conn. 330, 335, 586 A.2d 562 (1991). The plaintiffs do not dispute the facts found by the court. We, therefore, undertake plenary review of the plaintiffs' legal claim that Peck Park's use for Little League baseball games is forbidden by the provision in the Peck will that Peck funded property should "not be contiguous" with other city property that is used "for recreational or park purpose[s]."5
The court's memorandum of decision and the record provide the factual foundation for our analysis. The court made only two findings that are relevant to the plaintiffs' claims regarding the construction of the Peck will. One is that each of the plaintiffs owns a separate residence that adjoins Peck Park. The other is that Peck Park adjoins three city owned baseball fields that are separated from Peck Park property only by a chain-link fence.6 In deciding that the plaintiffs could not prevail, the court relied principally on a 1977 decision by the Bristol Probate Court. Pursuant to General Statutes § 51-164s, in the absence of claims of fraud, the Probate Court decision was binding on the court. See Lundborg v. Lawler, 63 Conn. App. 451, 776 A.2d 519 (2001).
In 1977, the Bristol Probate Court approved the establishment of an endowment for a new park in memory of two members of the Peck family. Although the Probate Court made a number of rulings with respect to the management of Peck Park's endowment,7 only one ruling is relevant at this juncture.
The Probate Court specifically addressed the noncontiguity clause in article IV (B) (4) of the Peck will. It concluded that this clause would be satisfied if the city, at its own expense, erected a chain-link fence around the contemplated park and placed an identifying marker at the entrance to the park. The Probate Court further concluded that, if these measures were taken, the defendant Forestville Little League, Inc., had authority, under the Peck will, to install a baseball field in Peck Park as long as the city retained control over the property. No appeal was taken from the judgment of the Probate Court.
Although the defendant city duly established Peck Park, fenced in Peck Park and built the contemplated marker, the defendant Forestville Little League, Inc., did not proceed immediately. It was not until 1992 that the defendant board of park commissioners approved the construction of a Little League baseball field in Peck Park. The defendant Forestville Little League, Inc., together with the city's park department, then installed the Little League baseball field on Peck Park property.
In their appeal from the court's decision construing the Peck will, the plaintiffs argue, in effect, that the 1977 Probate Court decision is no longer binding because of a change in circumstances. They claim that the court should have taken a fresh look, under the present circumstances, at whether Forestville's installation of the Little League baseball field in Peck Park violated the noncontiguity provision in the Peck will.8 The court undertook such an inquiry, but it found that the 1977 Probate Court decision was still applicable.
On appeal, as they did at trial, the plaintiffs focus on the fact that the city property abutting Peck Park...
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