Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair

Decision Date15 June 2015
Docket NumberNo. A-53 September Term 2013.,A-53 September Term 2013.
Citation115 A.3d 815,221 N.J. 536
PartiesRichard GRABOWSKY, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. TOWNSHIP OF MONTCLAIR, Planning Board of the Township of Montclair, Fountain Square Development, LLC, and Montclair Kensington Urban Renewal, LLC, Defendants–Respondents.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Jonathan T. Guldin argued the cause for appellant (Clark Guldin, attorneys).

Thomas J. Trautner, Jr., West Orange, argued the cause for respondents Montclair Kensington Urban Renewal, LLC and Fountain Square Development, LLC (Wolff & Samson, attorneys).

Celia S. Bosco, Newark, argued the cause for respondent Township of Montclair (Genova Burns, attorneys; Angelo J. Genova, Newark, of counsel).

Arthur M. Neiss, Montvale, argued the cause for respondent Planning Board of the Township of Montclair (Beattie Padovano, attorneys).

Opinion

Justice PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we review a trial court's summary dismissal of a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs and apply statutory and common law standards to determine whether two municipal officials had disqualifying conflicts of interest when they voted on an application to amend a zoning ordinance.

Plaintiff Richard Grabowsky filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs against the Township of Montclair. He challenged the validity of an ordinance adopted by the Township to permit the construction of an assisted living facility on a site located next to the Unitarian Universalist Congregation Church of Montclair (Unitarian Church). Plaintiff asserted that a statement made by Township Mayor Jerry Fried, a member of the Township Council and Planning Board, demonstrated that Fried had a direct personal interest in the development and that he should have been disqualified from voting on the zoning issue. He also alleged that Fried and a second member of the Council, Nick Lewis, shared a disqualifying indirect personal interest in the development project because of their membership in the Unitarian Church. The Township, its Planning Board and the developers seeking the opportunity to build the assisted living facility denied the existence of any conflict.

Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction barring the Township and Planning Board from considering or approving development applications for the assisted living facility. Although no party filed a motion for any form of dispositive relief, the trial court sua sponte granted summary disposition, and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. An appellate panel concluded that the trial court's summary disposition was procedurally improper under Rule 4:67–1, but concurred with the court's determination that the two Township officials had no conflict of interest, and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims.

We agree with the Appellate Division that the trial court improperly granted summary disposition on an application for a preliminary injunction in which neither side sought dispositive relief. We do not concur with the panel's conclusion that, on the limited record developed in the trial court, plaintiff's claim was properly dismissed because the Unitarian Church was neither an applicant nor an objector in the redevelopment application at issue. Applying the statutory standards set forth in the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D–1 to –163 (MLUL), and the Local Government Ethics Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:9–22.1 to –22.25 (LGEL), as well as established common law authority, we hold that when a church or other organization owns property within 200 feet of a site that is the subject of a zoning application, public officials who currently serve in substantive leadership positions in the organization, or who will imminently assume such positions, are disqualified from voting on the application.

We reverse the Appellate Division's judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for limited discovery on Fried's alleged statement and the leadership roles assumed by Fried and Lewis in the Unitarian Church, and for a determination on the merits.

I.

The property at the center of this case is a 0.8 acre, single-parcel redevelopment area1 located at 63–65 Church Street in Montclair. Formerly used as a parking lot, the parcel is known as the “Church Street Lot.” The Unitarian Church, located at 67 Church Street, sits on a property adjacent to the western boundary of the Church Street Lot.

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Fried and Lewis were members of the Unitarian Church during the relevant period. According to documents submitted to the trial court by plaintiff, Fried and Lewis have not only been members of the Unitarian Church, but have served in positions of leadership in its organization. Fried's website identified him as an active member of the Church who has “delivered lay sermons ... has taught Religious Education, and has chaired several committees.” Church records submitted by plaintiff indicate that Fried was elected as a Trustee at Large on May 20, 2012. It appears, but is not clear from the limited record, that Fried served as a trustee prior to that date. These records also reflect that Lewis was elected a member of the Board of Trustees on May 20, 2012, and that he chaired the Unitarian Church's Membership Committee in 2011 and 2012. Because no answer filed by any defendant is part of the record, it is unclear whether defendants admit or deny plaintiff's allegations concerning the respective roles of Fried and Lewis in the Unitarian Church.

On March 14, 2012, defendant-intervenor Fountain Square Development, LLC (Fountain Square) submitted a proposal for the development of an eighty-eight-unit assisted living facility on the Church Street Lot. Fountain Square's proposal required three amendments to the Township's redevelopment plan: first, the addition of the proposed facility as a permitted use on the Church Street Lot; second, an increase from five to six stories in the maximum height permitted for a building on the property; and third, a parking requirement of one-half space per residential unit in the facility. Six days later, Fountain Square presented its proposal to the Township of Montclair Council (Council), which consisted of Fried, Lewis and five other members. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A–7, the Council referred the amendments to defendant Planning Board of the Township of Montclair for its consideration and recommendation.

On April 3, 2012, while Fountain Square's three proposed amendments to the redevelopment plan were pending before the Planning Board, the Council introduced Ordinance 0–12–28 (Ordinance), which included the amendments. Thereafter, the Planning Board met to consider the proposed Ordinance. By letter to the Township Manager, the Planning Board endorsed two of the three amendments to the Ordinance: the addition of an assisted living facility as a permitted use for the Church Street Lot and the parking space allocation. The Planning Board advised the Township Manager that it lacked sufficient information to address the third amendment regarding the maximum height allowed for a structure on the property. It specifically recommended that the Council ascertain “the impact of the increase in height on the adjoining church” and other properties surrounding the Church Street Lot. Plaintiff alleges that Fried, as a member of the Planning Board, voted in favor of the Board's recommendation to the Council.

According to plaintiff, at “one of the public hearings” Fried “made a comment ... that an assisted living facility would benefit him because he could admit his mother to the facility.” The record does not reveal the timing of this alleged statement, and the parties disputed the nature and content of the statement at oral argument before the trial court.

On May 1, 2012, at a public Council meeting presided over by Fried, Fountain Square presented its proposal for an assisted living facility. Several residents stated concerns and objections to the proposal. Lewis suggested an amendment to the Ordinance limiting any assisted living facility to a height of five stories, rather than the six stories proposed by Fountain Square. A motion by another Council member to postpone adoption of the Ordinance was defeated by a margin of four to three. Lewis's amendment limiting the building height to five stories was adopted by a vote of six to one, and the Ordinance was revised in accordance with that amendment. Fried then moved to adopt the amended Ordinance, and his motion passed, four to three. Fried, Lewis and two other Council members voted in support of the amended Ordinance, and the remaining three Council members opposed it.

Following the passage of the Ordinance, defendant-intervenor Montclair Kensington Urban Renewal, LLC (Montclair Kensington), an affiliate of Fountain Square, purchased the Church Street Lot from its previous owner. On May 22, 2012, Montclair Kensington was formally designated as the redeveloper of the Church Street Lot. One month later, Montclair Kensington submitted to the Planning Board an application for site plan approval to construct the proposed assisted living facility.

II.

This action commenced with the filing of a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs by plaintiff, described in the complaint as “a citizen of Montclair and an owner and developer of numerous commercial properties” in its downtown area. Plaintiff initially sued only the Township, but later amended his complaint to name the Planning Board as a defendant.

Plaintiff challenged the validity of the Ordinance on two grounds. First, he claimed that the Ordinance was invalid because it was inconsistent with the Township's Master Plan for redevelopment, and the procedures followed by the Council in adopting the amendments to that plan had therefore violated N.J.S.A. 40A:12A–7 and N.J.S.A. 40:49–2. Second, plaintiff claimed that Fried had a direct personal interest because of his alleged statement about his mother, and that Fried and Lewis had...

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