Grace Bus., Inc. v. United States
| Decision Date | 27 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | 1:15-cv-2781-WSD |
| Parties | GRACE BUSINESS, INC., d/b/a La Casa, LAILA TEJANI, and NADIR TEJANI, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant United States' ("Defendant") Motion for Dismissal of or alternatively for Summary Judgment on Claims of Nadir Tejani [17] ("Motion to Dismiss").
Plaintiff Nadir Tejani ("Mr. Tejani") is the owner of Supreme Business, Inc. (Compl. ¶ 7). Doing business as Casablanca Food Mart (the "Store"), Supreme Business, Inc. engaged in the retail sale of food products. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 14; [17.3], Attach. 1). In 2007, the Store applied to participate in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP"), which allows approved stores to accept SNAP benefits ("Food Stamps") as payment for food. ([17.3], Attach. 1). Mr. Tejani signed the application, certifying that he "accept[ed] responsibility on behalf of the firm for violations of the Food Stamp Program regulations." ([17.3], Attach. 1, at 7). The application was approved and the Store began participating in SNAP.
In a letter dated August 12, 2013, the Food and Nutrition Service ("FNS") notified Mr. Tejani that it was charging his "firm" with violating certain SNAP regulations. ([17.3], Attach. 2). Mr. Tejani contested the charges. (Id., Attach. 3). On August 29, 2013, the FNS found, after reviewing Mr. Tejani's arguments, that "the violations cited in our charge letter occurred at [Mr. Tejani's] firm." ([17.3], Attach. 4). The FNS told Mr. Tejani that his "firm" was permanently disqualified from SNAP participation. (Id.). The FNS also advised Mr. Tejani that he could seek administrative review of the disqualification decision. (Id.).
On September 5, 2013, Mr. Tejani requested review. ([17.3], Attach. 5). On February 21, 2014, the FNS issued its Final Agency Decision (the "2014 Decision") affirming the decision to permanently disqualify Mr. Tejani's Store. ([17.3], Attach. 6). The letter also provided notice of the right to seek judicial review within thirty (30) days of receipt of the 2014 Decision. (Id.). Mr. Tejani received the 2014 Decision on February 26, 2014. ([17.3], Attach. 7). Neither he, nor his Store, sought judicial review within thirty (30) days.
Plaintiff Laila Tejani ("Mrs. Tejani") is Mr. Tejani's wife. (Compl. ¶¶ 6-7). She owns Grace Business, Inc., which, under the name of La Casa, engages in the retail sale of food products. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6). On February 1, 2015, La Casa applied to participate in SNAP. ([17.3], Attach. 8). On April 29, 2015, the application was denied, including because "Laila S. Tejani, owner of La Casa, is the wife of previously permanently disqualified owner, Nadir Tejani." ([17.3], Attach. 11). La Casa was barred from participating in SNAP for three (3) years. (Id.).
On May 7, 2015, Mrs. Tejani requested administrative review of the decision, noting that her "Husband Nadir Tejani was disqualified for [SNAP] retailer benefits." ([17.3], Attach. 12). On July 9, 2015, the FNS issued its Final Agency Decision ("2015 Decision") affirming the decision to prohibit La Casa from participating in SNAP for three (3) years. ([17.3], Attach. 13). The FNS based its decision on the 2014 permanent disqualification of Casablanca Food Mart and Mr. Tejani. . The FNS found that La Casa had the same address as Casablanca Food Mart, and that La Casa was "attempt[ing] to circumvent a previous SNAP disqualification imposed on Casablanca Food Mart." ([17.3], Attach. 13).
Mr. Tejani alleges that, until La Casa was disqualified from SNAP, he did not know that he personally was disqualified. Mr. Tejani admits that the 2014Decision disqualified his Store, but alleges that "[t]he 2014 Decision did not state, and Nadir Tejani did not understand or believe, that the 2014 Decision imposed on him a permanent disqualification." (Compl. ¶ 15).
On August 6, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint [1], alleging unspecified "Constitutional" violations and asking the Court to "set aside" the 2014 and 2015 Decisions. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-18). On November 6, 2015, the parties filed their Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan [14]. In it, Defendant states that "[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity may deprive this court of jurisdiction over plaintiff Nadir Tejani's claim." ([14] at 14). On November 13, 2015, the Court ordered [15] Defendant to file, on or before December 4, 2015, its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
On December 4, 2015, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss, seeking dismissal of Mr. Tejani's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. The Motion to Dismiss also seeks summary judgment. Defendant asserts that Mr. Tejani's claim is barred by sovereign immunity because he failed to seek judicial review of the 2014 Decision within the thirty (30) day period required by 7 U.S.C. § 2023 ("Section 2023"). Defendant argues, in the alternative, that Mr. Tejani's claim should be dismissed because it is time-barred.
On December 18, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their Response to Motion for Dismissal of or alternatively for Summary Judgment on Claims of Nadir Tejani [18] ("Response").1 In it, Mr. Tejani appears to state that he does not seek judicial review, under Section 2023, of the 2014 Decision. Instead, he argues that his Complaint asserts constitutional claims over which the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) ("Tucker Act"). Mr. Tejani asserts that Defendant violated his procedural due process rights by failing to give him notice of, or opportunity to challenge, his permanent disqualification. (Response at 7-10).2 He also asserts that, to the extent it operated to permanently disqualify him, 7 U.S.C. § 2021(e) is an unconstitutional bill of attainder.3
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). They possess only that power authorized by the Constitution and conferred by Congress. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be either a "facial" or "factual" attack. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). A facial attack challenges subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of the allegations in a complaint, and the district court takes the allegations as true in deciding whether to grant the motion. Id.
Factual attacks challenge subject matter jurisdiction in fact. Id. When resolving a factual attack, the court may consider extrinsic evidence, such as testimony and affidavits. Id. In a factual attack, the presumption of truthfulness afforded a plaintiff under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) does not apply. Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960-61 (11th Cir. 1999). Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)). The plaintiff has the burden to prove that jurisdiction exists. Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2006).
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must "assume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true and give the plaintiff[] the benefit of reasonable factual inferences." Wooten v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 1187, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010). Although reasonable inferences are made in the plaintiff's favor, "'unwarranted deductions of fact' are not admitted as true." Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 408 n.10 (11th Cir. 1996)). The Court is not required to accept as true conclusory allegations or legal conclusions. See Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) ( Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544(2007)); see Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004) .
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Mere "labels and conclusions" are insufficient. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This requires more than the "mere possibility of misconduct." Am. Dental, 605 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The well-pled allegations must "nudge[] [plaintiff's] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Id. at 1289 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and...
To continue reading
Request your trial