Gracia v. Sigmatron Int'l, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-1526,19-1526
• Citation: Gracia v. Sigmatron Int'l, Inc., 986 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2021)
• Parties: Maria N. GRACIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SIGMATRON INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

986 F.3d 1058

Maria N. GRACIA, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.SIGMATRON INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-1526

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 16, 2020

Decided February 3, 2021

Hall Adams, III, Attorney, Law Offices of Hall Adams LLC, Kathryn E. Korn, Attorney, Kathryn E. Korn Law Office, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Tiffany Carpenter, Attorney, Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC, Chicago, IL, Michael O. Fawaz, Attorney, Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC, Royal Oak, MI, for Defendant-Appellee SigmaTron International, Inc.

Tiffany Carpenter, Attorney, Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees Gary Fairhead, Linda Frauendorfer.

Before Easterbrook, Manion, and Scudder, Circuit Judges.

Scudder, Circuit Judge.

Thirteen years ago, Maria Gracia's former employer SigmaTron International, Inc. fired her after she filed a sexual harassment and hostile work environment complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Gracia's fortunes improved when she prevailed in a 2014 trial against SigmaTron on a Title VII retaliation claim and found new work at a different company.

This appeal stems from SigmaTron's decision in 2015 to describe Gracia's earlier litigation against the company in public filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Gracia responded to SigmaTron's SEC disclosures with a second lawsuit advancing a new Title VII retaliation claim, along with claims for retaliation under the Illinois Human Rights Act, defamation, and invasion of privacy. The district court dismissed Gracia's defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims, and later granted SigmaTron's motion for summary judgment on the Title VII and Illinois Human Rights Act claims.

We conclude that Gracia failed at summary judgment to present the district court with specific facts to show any injury in fact. The failure stems from Gracia's express admission that SigmaTron's disclosures in no way have affected her current employment, which she explained she is content with. This admission left the district court without subject matter jurisdiction—without the authority to consider the Title VII claim on the merits. As for Gracia's state law claims, while she pleaded enough to clear the Article III standing hurdle, the district court was right to conclude that the allegations failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

I

A

The adversarial relationship between Maria Gracia and her former employer SigmaTron International, Inc. dates to 2008. It was then that Gracia filed complaints with the EEOC and the Illinois Department of Human Rights alleging sexual harassment and a hostile work environment. SigmaTron learned of the complaints on November 19, 2008 and fired Gracia two weeks later. That action led to Gracia's first Title VII lawsuit, alleging that SigmaTron fired her in retaliation for filing the complaints. The case proceeded to trial and a jury found in Gracia's favor. We affirmed the judgment on appeal. See Gracia v. SigmaTron Int'l, Inc. , 842 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2016) (" Gracia I "). In the meantime, Gracia found new employment at a company called Imagineering. She continues to work there and testified that she is content with her job and has no interest in leaving the company.

Gracia I is final. This appeal arises from and relates solely to SigmaTron's decision—following the Gracia I trial and denial of the company's post-judgment motions—to disclose Gracia's name and provide its own explanation for her termination in its July 24, 2015 Form 10-K filing with the SEC:

In November 2008, the company received notice of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") claim based on allegations of discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation filed by Maria Gracia, a former employee. On December 5, 2008, Ms. Gracia's employment as an assembly supervisor was terminated after she knowingly permitted an assembly line to run leaded boards in a lead-free room with lead-free solder, contrary to the customer's specifications and prohibited by Company policy. The use of lead-free solder for leaded components can lead to devices that fail and significant penalties to the Company and its customers from regulatory bodies. The parts were quarantined and were not shipped. Ms. Gracia openly admitted to permitting this to take place.

After learning from her counsel of SigmaTron's disclosure, Gracia filed a second EEOC complaint on September 2, 2015.

She alleged that the company's disclosure constituted further retaliation and falsely questioned her competency. What followed was a second lawsuit in which Gracia advanced a new Title VII retaliation claim, a related claim under the Illinois Human Rights Act, and claims for defamation per se and false light invasion of privacy. SigmaTron moved to dismiss each claim.

B

Ruling on SigmaTron's motion to dismiss, the district court first observed that Illinois courts assessing retaliation claims under the Illinois Human Rights Act have adopted the framework governing Title VII retaliation claims. See Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc. , 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016). Under the Title VII framework, a plaintiff must plausibly allege three elements: a statutorily protected activity, a materially adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the two. See Cervantes v. Ardagh Grp. , 914 F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 2019).

SigmaTron contended that Gracia suffered no adverse employment action and alleged no plausible causal link between her first EEOC complaint and the company's SEC disclosures. The district court disagreed, relying on our decision in Greengrass v. International Monetary Systems Limited , where we held that listing a plaintiff's name in a public SEC filing can constitute a materially adverse employment action. See 776 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2015). As the district court saw the new complaint, Gracia alleged enough to support a causal inference of retaliatory harm because SigmaTron did not name her in its disclosures until after the company lost its post-trial motions in Gracia I . So the district court denied the motion to dismiss, and the retaliation claims proceeded to discovery.

But the district court did dismiss Gracia's Illinois defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims. Under Illinois law, a defamatory statement is not actionable if reasonably capable of an innocent construction. See Chapski v. Copley Press , 92 Ill.2d 344, 65 Ill.Dec. 884, 442 N.E.2d 195, 199 (1982). The district court determined that SigmaTron's statements in its SEC filings could be understood as ones either on Gracia's job performance or the company's litigating position in Gracia I . And when a false light invasion of privacy claim follows an unsuccessful defamation claim, the false light claim must also fail, leading the court to dismiss both claims. See Madison v. Frazier , 539 F.3d 646, 659 (7th Cir. 2008).

C

Following discovery, SigmaTron moved for summary judgment on Gracia's Title VII and related state law retaliation claims. This time the district court focused on the presence or absence of any adverse employment action taken against Gracia, turning again to Greengrass . See 776 F.3d 481. There we observed that "naming EEOC claimants in publicly available SEC filings could ‘dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination’—the essence of a materially adverse employment action." Id. at 485 (alteration in original). SigmaTron sought to distinguish Greengrass on the ground that the statements in its SEC disclosures did nothing to affect Gracia's employment at Imagineering and indeed only notified investors of Gracia I ’s status—information otherwise publicly available.

The district court agreed and entered summary judgment for SigmaTron. Unlike the plaintiff in Greengrass , who offered evidence that she "struggled to find and maintain regular employment" following the challenged SEC disclosure, id. at 485, the record here showed that "Gracia has been steadily employed, that she is happy in her job and has no plans to change jobs, and that her employer is satisfied with her job performance and expects the employment relationship to continue." The district court concluded that no reasonable jury viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Gracia could conclude that she suffered an adverse employment action.

Gracia now appeals, challenging the district court's entry of summary judgment on her Title VII claim and dismissal of her state law claims.

II

What stood out from our review of the parties’ briefs was a substantial question about whether Gracia had demonstrated the requisite Title VII "adverse employment action." See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53, 67–68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). This question arose because Gracia testified in her deposition that she is pleased with her work at Imagineering and has no plans to change jobs. All the more, Gracia added that she could not think of any damages she could be seeking from SigmaTron as a result of the company's SEC disclosures.

While these admissions may doom Gracia's Title VII claim on the merits, they also raise a threshold question of Article III standing—whether we even have a justiciable controversy before us. We sought supplemental briefing on the question. And we did so knowing the question inhered with the additional layer of complexity that Gracia's state law claims were resolved on the pleadings while the Title VII claim was dismissed on summary judgment. The difference matters because each element of Article III standing "must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e. , with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). In short, Gracia's burden to demonstrate standing...