Graco, Inc. v. Colberg, Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 November 1984 |
| Citation | 208 Cal.Rptr. 465,162 Cal.App.3d 322 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 1986 A.M.C. 1086 GRACO, INC. and Earl's Pump and Supply Company, Inc., Cross-complainants and Appellants, v. COLBERG, INC., Cross-Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 23432. |
Russ & Reynolds, Wilbur J. Russ and Jonathan P. Reynolds, San Francisco, for cross-complainant and appellant, Graco, Inc.
Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon, John W. Crowley and Elliot L. Bien, San Francisco, for cross-complainant and appellant, Earl's Pump and Supply Co., Inc.
Hall, Henry, Oliver & McReavy, Lee H. Cliff and Henry D. Dicum, San Francisco, for cross-defendant and respondent.
The issue in this appeal is whether defendant tortfeasors in a wrongful death action may maintain cross-actions against the employer of the decedent for contribution or indemnity based upon the employer's alleged negligence when the employer has paid death benefits under the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). (33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.) The trial court ruled they could not and consequently entered a judgment dismissing the cross-complaints of Graco, Inc., and Earl's Pump and Supply Company, Inc., after it sustained the demurrers of the employer, cross-defendant Colberg, Inc., without leave to amend. We agree and shall affirm.
The parties have submitted the appeal upon a stipulated joint appendix pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 5.1, and the facts are not in dispute. On October 29, 1980, decedent Robert Corales was employed by Colberg at its Stockton boat works. On that date he was engaged in painting a United States Navy barge and was using an airless spray painter manufactured by Graco and sold to Colberg by Earl's Pump and Supply. Fumes which had accumulated in the work area were ignited by a spark from the spray painter and in the resulting explosion Corales suffered injuries from which he ultimately perished. Colberg's insurance carrier, Industrial Indemnity, paid death benefits to Corales' widow and minor children pursuant to LHWCA.
This litigation commenced when Corales' widow and children filed a complaint in the San Joaquin County Superior Court for damages against Graco and Earl's Pump and Supply. The complaint sought damages for wrongful death based upon causes of action for negligence and for strict products liability. Graco and Earl's Pump and Supply cross-complained against each other. Neither defendant originally sought contribution or indemnity from Colberg. The basis for their failure to proceed against Colberg was the exclusiveness of liability provisions of LHWCA and their acknowledgement that those provisions had been construed to preclude actions against an employer who had paid benefits under LHWCA. 1
In early 1983 the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States (1983) 460 U.S. 190, 103 S.Ct. 1033, 74 L.Ed.2d 911. In that case the Court considered whether the exclusiveness of liability provisions of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) (5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.), which utilizes language similar to LHWCA, precluded a third party tort defendant from seeking indemnity from the governmental employer in an action brought by an injured employee. The Court held that the provisions of FECA do not bar such an action, and in doing so noted the similarity in the FECA and LHWCA provisions. Although the decision in Lockheed involved FECA rather than LHWCA, both Graco and Earl's Pump and Supply assert that the reasoning of the decision is applicable to LHWCA. They were allowed to amend their cross-complaints to seek contribution and/or indemnity from the decedent's employer, Colberg, on the ground that Colberg was negligent in failing to ground the barge on which the decedent was working as a precaution against sparks.
Colberg demurred to the cross-complaints. The trial court found that federal maritime law governs all aspects of the litigation, that maritime law precludes a cross-action for indemnity by third party tortfeasors against an employer who has paid LHWCA benefits, that the decision in Lockheed is not controlling, and that even under state law the cross-actions would be barred by Labor Code section 3864. 2 The court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered a judgment dismissing the cross-actions as to Colberg. This appeal followed.
The parties vigorously dispute whether the issues in this case are controlled by the California law of torts or by federal maritime law. The trial court concluded that maritime law governs all aspects of the case. We must disagree with that conclusion. This appeal involves only the alleged tortious conduct of Colberg as a basis for contribution or indemnity; there are no allegations of implied or express contractual rights at issue. The appellants have simply alleged, in accordance with the decision in American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899, that Colberg's negligence caused the injury to the decedent and therefore Colberg should be required to contribute to the recovery, if any, obtained by the plaintiffs.
The tests for determining whether an action falls within or without the jurisdiction of admiralty differ between actions based upon contracts and those based upon torts. The test whether a contract action is within the jurisdiction of admiralty depends upon the maritime nature of the subject matter of the contract, and neither the place where the contract is made, nor the place where its obligations are to be performed is determinative. "In matters of contract, jurisdiction is governed by the maritime nature of the transaction, irrespective of locality." (1 Benedict on Admiralty (7th ed. 1983) § 141, p. 9-5; see also 2 Am.Jur.2d, Admiralty, § 61, p. 754.) Thus, "[i]f the nature and character of the contract is maritime, that is to say, if the contract is related to a maritime service or a maritime transaction, there is admiralty jurisdiction." (1 Benedict on Admiralty, supra, § 182, p. 11-5, fn. omitted.) In contrast, whether a tort is "maritime" has traditionally depended upon the locality of the wrong. (Executive Jet Aviation v. Cleveland (1972) 409 U.S. 249, 253, 93 S.Ct. 493, 497, 34 L.Ed.2d 454, 458; see also 2 Am.Jur.2d, Admiralty, § 81, p. 765.) A tort committed on navigable water has been considered maritime; a tort committed on land has not. ." (Myhran v. Johns-Manville Corp. (9th Cir.1984) 741 F.2d 1119, 1120.)
In Executive Jet Aviation v. Cleveland (1972) 409 U.S. 249, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454, the United States Supreme Court modified the situs or location test for determining whether a tort is within the jurisdiction of admiralty by holding that in the case of a tort committed on navigable water it must also appear that "the wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity" before admiralty jurisdiction arises. (409 U.S. at p. 268, 93 S.Ct. at p. 504, 34 L.Ed.2d at p. 467.) In short, the high court held in Executive Jet that in tort cases "maritime locality alone was insufficient to invoke admiralty jurisdiction." (Myhran v. Johns-Manville Corp., supra, 741 F.2d at p. 1120.) In doing so, however, the Court supplemented rather than replaced the traditional location requirement. (Harville v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. (11th Cir.1984) 731 F.2d 775, 781.) In order for admiralty jurisdiction to apply to tortious conduct, the tort must still occur at a maritime location. (Ibid.) (Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, A Div. of Litton (5th Cir.1984) 723 F.2d 1173, 1187.)
In this case the barge upon which the accident occurred had been hauled up out of the water on Colberg's marine railway and was not upon navigable water. The claims of the appellants sound in tort, arising as they do solely out of allegations that Colberg's negligence caused the accident. This being so, the situs or location requirement for admiralty jurisdiction, upon which the application of maritime law depends, has not been shown. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in determining that maritime law governs all aspects of this case. (See Victory Carriers v. Law, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 205, 92 S.Ct. at p. 421, 30 L.Ed.2d at p. 387.) 3
This brings us to the determinative question on appeal: whether the exclusiveness of liability provisions of LHWCA preclude a third party from obtaining contribution from an employer who has paid benefits under that Act. Although we have held that maritime law does not control all aspects of this case, it is clear that LHWCA is applicable. The applicability of LHWCA is not coterminous with the limits of admiralty jurisdiction. That this is true is made clear by the history of LHWCA. 4 At first, Congress attempted to give injured employees within admiralty jurisdiction the right to proceed under state compensation laws, but these congressional efforts were declared unconstitutional. (Southern P. Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U.S. 205, 218, 37 S.Ct. 524, 529, 61 L.Ed. 1086, 1099.) Congress then enacted LHWCA in 1927. (44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1927).) As originally enacted, LHWCA excluded employees outside of the...
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