Gradford v. Rosas
| Decision Date | 06 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | 1:17-cv-01179-DAD-GSA-PC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | WILLIAM J. GRADFORD, Plaintiff, v. DEPUTY ROSAS, et al., Defendants. |
SCREENING ORDER
(ECF No. 1.)
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND VIOLATION OF RULE 18, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
William J. Gradford ("Plaintiff") is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On September 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action, which is now before the court for screening. (ECF No. 1.)
The in forma pauperis statute provides that "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences," Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations." Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). "[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).
Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.
Plaintiff is presently a state prisoner incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison in Ione, California, in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The events at issue in the Complaint allegedly occurred at the Stanislaus County Safety Center in Modesto, California, when Plaintiff was detained there as a pretrial detainee in the custody ofthe Stanislaus County Sheriff. Plaintiff names as defendants Deputy Rosas, Deputy Meservey, and Deputy Davis (collectively, "Defendants").
A summary of Plaintiff's allegations follows.
On June 2, 2017, Plaintiff asked Deputy Rosas to route his inmate request form to Lt. Kirt [not a defendant]. Lt. Kirt had previously asked Plaintiff to send Plaintiff's requests directly to him (Kirt), and not to file grievances. Deputy Rosas lied and told Plaintiff she routed Plaintiff's request form to Sergeant Torres [not a defendant] who, according to Rosas, refused to directly route the request to Lt. Kirt. Deputy Rosas attempted to stop communication between Plaintiff and Lt. Kirt so she and other deputies could continue to abuse and retaliate against Plaintiff without higher-ranking officers knowing. Plaintiff sometimes thought the deputies would kill him. Plaintiff filed a grievance against Deputy Rosas and found out that there was a Deputy Torres, but not a Sergeant Torres, and Deputy Torres did not receive Plaintiff's inmate request from Deputy Rosas. Deputy Rosas put Plaintiff's safety at great risk. Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Rosas retaliated against him because Plaintiff reported misconduct by Deputy Rosas' co-deputies Teixeira and McCarthy [not defendants] and took them to court. Plaintiff believes that Deputy Rosas was suspended. Plaintiff fears that the retaliation by deputies, and maybe third parties, will continue after he is released from prison as Plaintiff heard from Lt. Kirt that Plaintiff's complaints were reported in the newspapers. Captain Ducan [not a defendant] ordered all abuse and retaliation against Plaintiff to stop, but three of the deputies, including Deputy Rosas, continued to abuse Plaintiff afterward. Plaintiff is desperately seeking help to protect his life, safety, and well-being, and has written to approximately 40 government agencies and organizations across the United States while being abused by the deputies over and over again. Because of Deputy Rosas' actions, Plaintiff has suffered great mental anguish and distress.
Deputy Meservey retaliated against Plaintiff because Plaintiff reported misconduct by Deputies Teixeira and McCarthy [not defendants] and reported other deputies' abuse againstPlaintiff. Plaintiff filed a previous case against Deputy Meservey in the U.S. District Court, Fresno Division, for retaliation against Plaintiff and for placing Plaintiff's safety at risk. Deputy Meservey placed Plaintiff's life in danger by giving another inmate Plaintiff's returned documents to give back to Plaintiff. Deputy Meservey is fully aware of Plaintiff's many complaints and other very important information Plaintiff was writing back and forth to high-ranking officers. Deputy Meservey also attempted to cover up for Deputy Rosas by altering a grievance. Because of Deputy Meservey's actions, Plaintiff fears for his safety, life, and well-being, and suffers from great mental anguish, mental stress, and physical stress.
On June 10, 2017, Deputy Davis opened and read Plaintiff's legal incoming mail from the Board of State Community Corrections, out of Plaintiff's presence and without Plaintiff's permission. Deputy Davis was fully aware not to do so because of an email from a higher-ranking officer. Deputy Davis was prejudiced against Plaintiff by other deputies, and once Davis heard about Plaintiff reporting against other deputies, his demeanor towards Plaintiff changed. Because of Deputy Davis' actions, Plaintiff suffers from mental anguish and great stress.
Plaintiff requests monetary damages as relief.
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. "[Section] 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of LosAngeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, "within the meaning of § 1983, 'if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'" Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). "The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a 'series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict' constitutional harms." Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation "closely resembles the standard 'foreseeability' formulation of proximate cause." Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events at issue. "[P]retrial detainees . . . possess greater constitutional rights than prisoners." Stone v. City of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 857 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). A pretrial detainee's right to be free from punishment is grounded in the Due Process Clause, but courts borrow from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence when analyzing the...
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