Grady v. St. Louis Transit Co.

• Decision Date: 05 April 1909
• Docket Number: 2,514.
• Citation: 169 F. 400
• Parties: GRADY v. ST. LOUIS TRANSIT CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

169 F. 400

GRADY v. ST. LOUIS TRANSIT CO.

No. 2,514.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

April 5, 1909

Ford W Thompson (W. B. Thompson, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

Thomas M. Pierce (Boyle & Priest and G. T. Priest, on the brief) for defendant in error.

Before SANBORN and HOOK, Circuit Judges, and RINER, District Judge.

RINER District Judge.

This was an action brought in the Circuit Court by the plaintiff in error, hereafter called the 'plaintiff,' against the defendant in error, hereafter called the 'defendant,' to recover damages for personal injuries in the sum of $35,000. The trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff alleges in his petition: That on the 25th of April, 1904, he was a passenger on a street car operated by the defendant, on Olive street, in the city of Saint Louis; that said car was west bound; that he boarded the car at the corner of 18th and Olive streets, going west on Olive street to Vandeventer avenue, which intersects Olive street. He further alleges that when the car was stopped at Vandeventer avenue, and while passengers were leaving the car in front of him and plaintiff was awaiting his turn to leave the car, believing and having good and sufficient reason to believe that the car was stopped for the purpose of discharging passengers, and while he was in the act of alighting and was stepping down upon the street, and before he had been given a reasonable time to alight defendant's servants in charge of the car negligently and carelessly caused the car to be suddenly started forward, thereby throwing plaintiff violently into the street, whereby he sustained the injuries for which he seeks to recover damages.

The defendant answered, first, by a general denial, and, second, alleged that whatever injuries the plaintiff sustained were caused by his own negligence, in carelessly and negligently attempting to alight from a moving car at a place other than a regular stopping place for the purpose of discharging passengers, and after having been warned by the conductor in charge of the car not to alight therefrom until the car should be stopped at a regular stopping place.

The plaintiff and some of his witnesses testified that the car stopped on the east side of Vandeventer avenue, while witnesses for the defendant, including the conductor and motorman, gave evidence: That the car did not stop, but merely slowed down; that the regular stopping place was on the west side of Vandeventer avenue; that the reason for slowing down on the east side of Vandeventer avenue was for the purpose of ascertaining, as they expressed it, 'whether Vandeventer avenue was clear,' there being a car line upon that street which the Olive street line crossed, at right angles. There was no evidence that there was any sudden increase in the speed or movement of the car while it was moving. The only evidence was that after the car had stopped, and while the plaintiff was in the act of alighting, the car started with a sudden jerk, and threw the plaintiff to the street.

The court instructed the jury that the law required of a common carrier the utmost practicable care and diligence in transporting passengers, and that it would be liable for the smallest carelessness, either upon its part or upon the part of its servants, if any injury resulted directly from such carelessness. The court further said to the jury:

'If, from all the evidence before you, you find and believe that the car in question came to a stop at or near the east side of Vandeventer avenue before proceeding westward and crossing that avenue, and remained stopped for a sufficient length of time to permit passengers to leave the car at that point, and that defendant's servants in charge and in control of the car saw passengers leaving the car at that point while said car was stopped, or by the exercise of that degree of care which they owed to passengers, as hereinbefore explained, might have seen the passengers who left the car, or who might with reasonable probability attempt to leave the car at that point while the same was stopped, and that defendant's servants or agents either saw plaintiff leaving the car and in the act of departing therefrom, or by the exercise of the degree of care already mentioned could have seen him leaving the car or in the act of departing therefrom, and that by holding the car still and permitting the plaintiff to alight before starting the car forward plaintiff would not have been injured, and that they nevertheless started it forward, and that in so starting the defendant failed in its duty, and that as a

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