Grady v. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Bd., 91
| Decision Date | 11 November 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 91,91 |
| Parties | Albert F. GRADY, Jr. v. UNSATISFIED CLAIM AND JUDGMENT FUND BOARD. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Robert J. Thieblot, Baltimore (Donald C. Allen and Allen, Thieblot & Alexander, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
Argued before HAMMOND, C. J., and BARNES, FINAN, SINGLEY and DIGGES, JJ.
Appellant Grady was a rear seat passenger in an automobile which was forced off the road in Anne Arundel County on March 28, 1969, by an oncoming 'phantom motor vehicle.' Testimony indicated that the appellant and two former Army friends were driving northbound on Whiskey Bottom Road near Laurel, about three-fourths of a mile from Route No. 198. At the point where there is a sharp left curve in the road they were forced to swerve to the right to avoid an oncoming vehicle. The car in which Grady was a passenger came to an abrupt halt upon striking a tree and a pole, and Grady was immediately rendered unconscious; he suffered lacerations and two broken vertebrae in his neck as the result of the accident.
Trooper R. E. France of the Maryland State Police was summoned to the scene by radio, and arrived approximately one-half hour after the accident. When he arrived, the appellant, the driver and the front seat passenger were being removed to the hospital by the Laurel Rescue Squad, so that the trooper was unable to speak to any of them at that time. Trooper France testified at the hearing below that he conducted an investigation at the scene 'as to witnesses and so forth, anyone that had seen the accident or seen anything which could give me any information as to another vehicle, and I was unable to locate anything.' (It should be noted at this juncture that Judge Childs, presiding in the lower court, stated that he believed the appellant's testimony concerning the unidentified automobile, and we assume that such an automobile did exist for the purposes of this decision.) Trooper France also noted that the area surrounding the scene of the crash was a residential one, and that there were approximately four houses 'back off the roadway' at the curve in the road.
After the investigation at the scene of the accident Trooper France proceeded to the hospital and interviewed the driver and front seat passenger, who were unable to provide any description of the other vehicle. France was unable to interview the appellant in the hospital, as he was undergoing treatment at the time. Subsequently, Grady was released and returned home to New Jersey without ever having contacted the Maryland State Police.
Grady filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to allow suit against the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board (Fund), and after a hearing and submission of authorities by counsel, Judge Childs denied Grady permission to sue on the ground that he had not made 'all reasonable efforts' to identify the phantom vehicle and its owner and driver as required by the Maryland Code.
The appellant contends that, where the police question witnesses at the scene and are unable to obtain a description of the vehicle or make further efforts at identifying that vehicle, the statutory requirement of making 'all reasonable efforts' has been met, and the suit against the Fund should be allowed. In effect, appellant would urge that where there is an unfruitful cursory police investigation the statute does not require the claimant to make any efforts on his own behalf. We disagree, and affirm the ruling of the lower court.
Our Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law (Maryland Code (1967 Repl.Vol.) Art. 66 1/2, §§ 150-179) provides protection for the blameless victims of accidents caused by uninsured or irresponsible drivers. The reason for its enactment was stated by this Court in Maddy v. Jones, 230 Md. 172, at 179, 186 A.2d 482, at 485 (1962) as follows:
'* * * It seems obvious that the Legislature intended, in enacting this statute, primarily to protect its own citizens, particularly those least able financially to bear the loss or injury inflicted by irresponsible or unidentified motorists many of whose victims would otherwise require medical and welfare attention at public cost.'
Our statute is patterned after New Jersey's (NJSA, Title 39, Chapter 6, §§ 61-91), and for this reason appellant Grady, a resident of New Jersey, is a 'qualified person' under the terms of our statute. 1
This Court has many times stated that, in view of the remedial nature of the statute, it should be construed liberally in order to give effect to its beneficial purpose. At the same time we have consistently stressed the importance of protecting the Fund from fraud or abuse. See Hawks v. Gottschall, 241 Md. 147, 215 A.2d 745 (1966); Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board v. Holland, 241 Md. 294, 216 A.2d 525 (1966); Mundey v. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board, 233 Md. 169, 195 A.2d 720 (1963).
The particular provision of the Code with which we are concerned in the case at bar is Article 66 1/2, § 167. That section outlines procedures under which the victim of a hit and run accident may recover from the Fund. As a condition precedent to its allowing an action against the Fund, the court must be satisfied that:
'(f) All reasonable efforts have been made to ascertain the identity of the motor vehicle and of the owner and operator thereof and either that the identity of the motor vehicle and the owner and operator thereof cannot be established, or that the identity of the operator, who was operating the motor vehicle without the owner's consent, cannot be established.' Code (1967 Repl.Vol.), Art. 66 1/2, § 167(f).
The above provision was enacted for the protection of the Fund, and it would therefore appear that the considerations which may dictate a liberal interpretation of the statute as a whole would not necessarily compel the same liberal interpretation of this particular subsection. As we have previously stated in Mundey v. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board, supra, wherein we were called upon to interpret the notice requirements of the statute:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Kiriakos v. Dankos
...maximum working hours standard across all industries, we unequivocally decline to do so.”) (citing Grady v. Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd., 259 Md. 501, 505, 270 A.2d 482 (1970) ) (“The question of [creating] social policy ... is peculiarly appropriate for legislative, not judicial, ......
-
Barclay v. Briscoe
...policy is normally the function of the legislative branch of government.” (citation omitted)); Grady v. Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd., 259 Md. 501, 505, 270 A.2d 482, 484 (1970) (“The question of [creating] social policy ... is peculiarly appropriate for legislative, not judicial, d......
-
Brown v. United Services Auto. Ass'n
...of the statutory burden placed on the petitioner in an unsatisfied claim fund state. See also, Grady v. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Bd., 259 Md. 501, 270 A.2d 482 (1970), holding that unfruitful police investigation did not relieve a person with a broken neck from duty to make his own ...
-
Kiriakos v. Dankos
...maximum working hours standard across all industries, we unequivocally decline to do so.") (citing Grady v. Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd., 259 Md. 501, 505 (1970)) ("The question of [creating] social policy . . . is peculiarly appropriate for legislative, not judicial, determination......