Grae-El v. City of Seattle
| Decision Date | 26 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | C21-1678JLR |
| Parties | ZION T. GRAE-EL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
Before the court is Defendants Seattle Children's Hospital, Dr Hannah Deming, Dr. Stanford Ackley, and Brenda Aguilar's (collectively, the “Children's Defendants”) motion to dismiss the amended complaint. [1]) Pro se Plaintiffs Zion T. Grae-El and Caprice Strange oppose the motion. (Resp. (Dkt. # 79).) The court has considered the submissions of the parties, the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised,[2] the court GRANTS the Children's Defendants' motion to dismiss.
This case arises from a report of suspected child abuse made by an employee of Seattle Public Schools (“SPS”) to Child Protective Services (“CPS”), a component of the Washington State Department of Children, Youth & Families (“DCYF”), regarding Ms. Strange's child, A.S.[3] (See Am. Compl. at 7.) Staff at A.S.'s school, Dunlap Elementary (“Dunlap”), became concerned that A.S. had been abused after observing markings on his face and after he told them that his step-father, Mr. Grae-El, had hit him. (See id.) Natalie Long, an SPS employee at Dunlap reported these concerns to Annaliese Ferreria at DCYF on November 28, 2018. (Id.)
Accompanied by officials from the Seattle Police Department (“SPD”), Ms. Ferreria visited Plaintiffs' home that evening to conduct a safety assessment of Plaintiffs' children, but did not remove any of the children at that time. (See id. at 9.) The following morning, however, Ms. Ferreria “arrived at Dunlap and called for SPD to place children in [protective custody], further noting that it, ‘should have been done last night.'” (Id. at 11.) SPD arrived at Dunlap later that afternoon and placed all five of Plaintiffs' children into protective custody. (See id.) Later that evening, “[a]ll 5 children were transported to Seattle Children's for initial health screens,” which began around 7:30 p.m. on November 29, 2018 and lasted until approximately 4:00 a.m. on November 30, 2018. (See id. at 23.) Plaintiffs were not permitted to attend the examinations, although at some point while the children were at the hospital A.G. was able to speak with Ms. Strange by telephone. (See id. at 23-24.) The examinations involved photographing markings on the children's bodies, taking X-rays, and drawing samples of their blood for testing. (See id.) This process-and the absence of their parents- allegedly caused great distress for the children. (See id.)
As part of this process, the children “were questioned in a group throughout the several hours that they were at [Children's] by” at least Dr. Deming, Dr. Ackley, and Ms. Aguilar. (See id. at 24-25.) Although some statements were recorded, “[s]pecific notes were not taken” such that the resulting reports did not consistently show “who made each statement.” (See id.; see also id. at 25 ().) Prior to interviewing and examining the children, the Children's Defendants obtained some case background details-including “the nature of the allegations” of abuse-from the DCYF social workers who brought the children in for their initial health screening. (See id. at 28.) Plaintiffs allege that these methods were “an improper way to conduct interviews with children regarding allegations of abuse.” (Id. at 25.)
The examinations were conducted “[u]nder the orders of [Dr. Ackley],” an attending physician at Children's, “who saw all five children.” (Id. at 23-24.) Dr. Ackley “was assisted . . . by several residents who were training to be either pediatricians or emergency physicians,” including first-year resident, Dr. Deming. (Id.) Neither Dr. Ackley nor Dr. Deming are members of Children's Safe Child and Adolescent Network (“SCAN”) team, or had specialized training in “child abuse pediatrics.” (Id. at 24, 26-27 (emphasis omitted).) The SCAN team was aware of the situation, however, and recommended that Ms. Aguilar, a social worker on the SCAN team, meet with the children to “conduct a protection assessment.” (See id. at 25 (quotation marks omitted).) Ms. Aguilar is a social worker who is “a trained mandated reporter” and “an abuse expert.” (See id. at 30.)
“Medical notes” taken during the examinations documented that the children were experiencing the following: A.G. and E.M.D. had headaches; A.S. had “a closed head injury” in the form of a “black eye of left side”; E.A.D. had an “acute headache”; and Z.A.G. experienced “vomiting” and had observable bruising on his trunk. (See id. at 26.) A.S. also allegedly disclosed that he had been “whacked and smacked on the face with [Mr. Grae-El's] hand, and with a belt . . . a long time ago,” and A.G. “had minor marks that she attribute[d] to falling episodes.” (Id. at 29.) The children also allegedly told the Children's Defendants during their examination that “they love each other and their parents,” although this statement was not included in the reports to DCYF. (Id.) Based on these observations, as well as the interviews with the children, Dr. Deming determined that “all 5 children ‘ha[d] physical signs or symptoms compatible with abuse or neglect'” and then reported those findings on “foster care initial health screens.” (Id. at 24.) Ms. Aguilar also made a report to DCYF in which she concluded that all five children had possibly been physically abused by Plaintiffs. (See id. at 28.)
Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Deming, Dr. Ackley, and Ms. Aguilar employed substandard interview techniques with the children-including by questioning the children in a group setting and poorly documenting which statements were attributable to which child-which resulted in erroneous reports of abuse being relayed to DCYF. (See id. at 24.) They conclude that “[t]he entire visit was an . . . attempt to discover evidence favorable to or manipulable by DCYF.” (Id. at 26 (emphasis omitted).)
After receiving the reports of suspected abuse from Dr. Deming and Ms. Aguilar, DCYF initiated a dependency action against Plaintiffs, which resulted in removal of the children from Plaintiffs' custody and their subsequent placement in foster care. (See Id. at 50.) Plaintiffs were also charged with criminal offenses, and ultimately pled guilty to multiple counts of assault. (Id. at 35.)
Plaintiffs initiated this action in King County Superior Court on or about November 19, 2021. Plaintiffs alleged that the Children's Defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association; conspired to violate that right; and also committed medical negligence and malpractice. (See Compl. at 25, 45-47; see also 3/1/22 Order (Dkt. # 57) at 5.) Defendants the City of Seattle, SPD, Officer Ryoma Nichols, and Daina Boggs removed this matter from King County Superior Court on December 16, 2021. (See NOR at 1.) The Children's Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the court ultimately granted in part. (See 1st MTD (Dkt. # 10); 3/1/22 Order (Dkt. # 57).) The court dismissed each of Plaintiffs' claims without prejudice and with leave to amend. (See 3/1/22 Order at 11, 17; 4/21 Order (Dkt. # 74) at 6-7; 4/22/22 Order (Dkt. # 75) at 5-6.)
Plaintiffs timely filed an amended complaint on May 22, 2022, which adds nearly 40 pages of allegations, attaches hundreds of pages of exhibits, and re-asserts a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association, as well as state law tort claims for medical negligence, medical malpractice, gross negligence, and corporate negligence. (See Am. Compl. at 49 (capitalization omitted).) The Children's Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint followed shortly thereafter. (See Mot.)
The Children's Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have once again failed to state claims under federal or state law, and ask the court to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (See generally Mot.) After setting out the legal standard that applies to a motion to dismiss, the court turns to consider whether Plaintiffs' amended complaint should be dismissed and, if so, whether dismissal with prejudice is warranted.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal when a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In evaluating a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005), and must do so liberally where the nonmovant is proceeding pro se, see Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
The Children's Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment familial association claim fails because Plaintiffs do not adequately allege that the Children's Defendants are state actors amenable...
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