Graff v. Motta

• Decision Date: 10 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 94-744-A,94-744-A
• Citation: 695 A.2d 486
• Parties: John P. GRAFF v. Francis T. MOTTA et al. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 486

695 A.2d 486

John P. GRAFF v. Francis T. MOTTA et al.

No. 94-744-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 10, 1997.

Kevin McAllister, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Lauren E. Jones, Marc DeSisto Providence, for Defendant.

Before WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER and FLANDERS, JJ.

OPINION

BOURCIER, Justice.

These are appeals by the city of Warwick and one of its police officers from final judgment entered against them in the Superior Court following jury verdicts for the plaintiff. The plaintiff also appeals from the final judgment reflecting the rejection by the jury of his claim for violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and also the failure of the judgment to provide for the joint and several liability of the defendants.

The plaintiff is John P. Graff (Graff), and the defendants are the city of Warwick (city) and William DeFeo (Captain DeFeo), a captain in the Warwick police department. On April 24, 1990, Graff commenced a civil action in the Superior Court against the city and a John Doe designated defendant, seeking both compensatory as well as punitive damages for malicious prosecution (count 1), abuse of process (count 2), violation of civil rights--42 U.S.C. § 1983 (count 3), and false arrest (count 4). Later, on April 10, 1992, Graff amended his complaint by substituting the defendant Captain DeFeo for the previously designated John Doe defendant. His complaint remained otherwise unchanged.

I Facts and Travel

Graff's complaint had its origins in an incident that occurred in the early morning hours of June 1, 1987. On that date, while Graff was operating his 1980 Harley Davidson motorcycle on West Shore Road in Warwick, Officer Charles R. Blackmar, Jr. (Officer Blackmar), a Warwick police officer, observed the motorcycle traveling approximately fifty-five miles per hour in an area designated a thirty-five-mile-per-hour zone. Officer Blackmar also noticed that in addition to exceeding the speed limit, the motorcycle was lacking a taillight. Officer Blackmar exited the parking lot in which he had been parked and began following the motorcycle. While Officer Blackmar was pursuing the motorcycle, it accelerated to approximately seventy-five to eighty miles per hour. While traveling at that high rate of speed, the motorcycle had to negotiate two difficult curves in the road. When Officer Blackmar came around the second curve, he noticed that the motorcycle had just been involved in a head-on collision with another motor vehicle.

As he approached the scene of the collision, Officer Blackmar found a body, later identified as the plaintiff Graff, approximately fifteen to twenty feet from the motorcycle. Graff had sustained what appeared to be life-threatening injuries. An ambulance was called, and Graff was eventually taken to Rhode Island Hospital where he remained for some two months and underwent three rounds of surgery. As a result of the medical treatment he received, Graff survived the collision.

The operator of the car that was involved in the collision with Graff's motorcycle, Brian D. Fontaine (Fontaine), gave a statement to the police soon after the incident. In that statement Fontaine explained that as he was driving on West Shore Road, he observed Graff's motorcycle traveling toward him in his lane of travel at a high rate of speed. Fontaine was unable to maneuver his car to avoid the motorcycle before impact. Fontaine's witness statement, along with the police report written by Officer Blackmar, a criminal complaint, a police summons, and an unsigned affidavit were all made part of the Warwick police record maintained on the June 1, 1987 collision. The summons, which charged Graff with eluding a police officer, was not issued to Graff immediately after the accident, however, because it was not clear whether Graff would survive. Because Graff's future was uncertain, the entire police record of the incident was put aside.

Graff's recollection regarding the events of the collision on June 1, 1987, differed, however, from that of Fontaine and of Officer Blackmar. Graff contended that he was forced to cross the center line of the road when a police officer's cruiser suddenly appeared behind him on his right side. He believed that he was only traveling thirty-five miles per hour and that the collision occurred because he was forced across the road by the police cruiser as he came around the curve.

In March of 1988, Graff, apparently intending to file a civil negligence action against the city stemming from the June 1, 1987 collision and aware that G.L.1956 § 9-31-2 limited his potential recovery to $100,000, had his attorney request introduction of a special act in the General Assembly that would permit him to recover up to $500,000 in his intended civil action. That special act was introduced and enacted by the General Assembly.

According to Graff, the introduction of the special act in the General Assembly did not go unnoticed, however, and served to trigger the events that would later culminate in the litigated case that is presently before us in this appeal. Although the appeal before us is not Graff's originally intended June 1, 1987 collision damage claim, Graff contends it is first cousin to it.

Graff asserts in the appeal before us, as he did in his Superior Court trial, that shortly after the introduction of his special act in the General Assembly in April 1988, its introduction was brought to the attention of the chief of the Warwick police department, Wesley Blanchard (Chief Blanchard). Chief Blanchard was thereby reminded of the Graff collision case and pending criminal charge, which as of April 1988 was still undisposed of, and he asked the then chief prosecution officer Captain DeFeo, to examine the Graff file to determine its current status. After reviewing the file and examining the police report, the witness statement, the summons, and an unsigned affidavit contained therein, Captain DeFeo felt there was sufficient probable cause to support the charge of eluding a police officer, and he then sought an arrest warrant from a District Court judge. A warrant was issued, and Graff was soon thereafter arrested, on October 1, 1988, on the charge of eluding a police officer. Graff alleges that he was taken to the Warwick police station and that while he was in police custody, Officer Blackmar, who would be a defendant in the 1987 collision claim, told Graff that he should "make it easy on [himself] and drop it." Graff interpreted that remark as a reference to his intention to file a civil suit arising out of the 1987 collision against the city of Warwick. The eluding a police officer charge was later dismissed by the District Court for failure on the part of the city to issue the summons in a timely manner. The merits of that criminal action were never reached.

Graff's basic contention at the trial below was that the eluding a police officer criminal complaint was filed in retaliation for his having introduced the special bill that permitted him to file a personal injury action against the city for the collision that occurred on June 1, 1987. The jury apparently believed Graff's contentions and awarded him $1,000 in compensatory damages on each of his false arrest/imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process claims. They also awarded him $75,000 in punitive damages against the city.

II Punitive Damages

The first claim of error raised by the city and Captain DeFeo in their appeal is that punitive damages cannot be awarded against a municipality. Historically, under the common law, the state, as well as a municipality, enjoyed sovereign immunity, which could be waived only by the state's deliberate and explicit waiver. See Mulvaney v. Napolitano, 671 A.2d 312, 312 (R.I.1995). Through G.L.1956 § 9-31-1, enacted in 1970, the General Assembly, however, explicitly provided that the State of Rhode Island and any political subdivision thereof could be held "liable in all actions of tort in the same manner as a private individual or corporation." Section 9-31-2 provided further that liability for governmental actions, those being actions normally performed by a governmental body, would be limited to $100,000. ¹ Liability for proprietary actions, those being actions normally performed by private individuals, however, was unlimited.

Although § 9-31-1 purports broadly to waive the immunity of the state in all tort actions, we have always strictly construed that statute. "We therefore presume that the Legislature did not intend to deprive the State of any sovereign power 'unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed or arises by necessary implication from the statutory language.' " In re Sherman, 565 A.2d 870, 872 (R.I.1989)(quoting Andrade v. State, 448 A.2d 1293, 1295 (R.I.1982)). In Sherman, Andrade, and Mulvaney, supra, this Court was concerned with the award of interest in actions brought against the state. In those cases we concluded that § 9-31-1 did not contemplate an award of interest against the state because the language of § 9-31-1, although seemingly broad and unlimited, did not expressly address the issue of interest. Similarly, we now conclude that § 9-31-1 does not contemplate an award of punitive damages against the state because the language of § 9-31-1 also does not expressly address the issue of punitive damages. This conclusion is consistent with the holdings in the vast majority of other states that have decided the same issue.

In Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 56 N.Y.2d 332, 452 N.Y.S.2d 347, 437 N.E.2d 1104 (1982), the New York court was concerned with New York's waiver of immunity statute that, much like the Rhode Island waiver of immunity statute, employed extremely broad language. The New York statute provided that "[t]he state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to...