Graffam v. Wray

• Court: Maine Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Before McKUSICK; NICHOLS
• Citation: Graffam v. Wray, 437 A.2d 627 (Me. 1981)
• Decision Date: 02 December 1981
• Parties: Maynard L. GRAFFAM et al. v. Daniel E. WRAY et al. Maynard L. GRAFFAM et al. v. Donald H. WHITNEY et al.

Page 627

437 A.2d 627

Maynard L. GRAFFAM et al. v. Daniel E. WRAY et al.

Maynard L. GRAFFAM et al. v. Donald H. WHITNEY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Sept. 2, 1980.

Decided Dec. 2, 1981.

J. Armand Gendron (orally), Sanford, for plaintiffs.

Sheldon D. Skolfield (orally), Portland, for defendants.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and WERNICK ^*, GODFREY, NICHOLS, GLASSMAN ^** , and ROBERTS, JJ.

NICHOLS, Justice.

These consolidated appeals arise out of a schismatic dispute within the Congregational Church of Limington, Maine, over the control of church funds and property.

Cognizant though we are of the wall of separation between church and state, erected by our organic law ¹, we recognize that there are certain circumstances where the courts may intervene in church schisms which affect church property. The cases at bar present such an occasion. ²

A dispute between two groups of members within the unincorporated Congregational Church of Limington resulted in the call of a special church meeting on October 3, 1977, to vote on whether the pastor, Daniel Wray, should be dismissed. Presiding as moderator of that meeting pursuant to a church by-law which provides that "(t)he Minister shall be the standing moderator of the church, presiding unless obviously improper," Pastor Wray overruled an objection to his retention of the chair. No appeal was taken from his ruling although parliamentary rules so permitted.

At this meeting a second motion was made to "debar" 23 church members from voting, in accordance with the Limington Church Manual which states: "Members habitually neglecting the services of the church without approved excuse may be debarred from voting." This motion carried. A third motion was made and carried by the congregation then voting to remove Deacon Horace Hogle from office for having committed a "breach of faith." Several church officers including the acting treasurer then resigned. The meeting was adjourned without having considered the pastor's dismissal.

The following Sunday, October 9, 1977, from the pulpit Pastor Wray called a special meeting to fill the vacant church offices of clerk and treasurer. At this meeting Donald Whitney was elected from the church membership to serve temporarily as treasurer. On December 2, 1977, certain church members instituted one of these suits seeking injunctive relief to restrain Treasurer Whitney from withdrawing church funds held by several banks.

Meanwhile, on January 2, 1978, upon due notice the annual church meeting was held. Pastor Wray, again serving as moderator, called a point of order, stating that the meeting would not proceed until all "non-members" present vacated the premises. Upon their refusal to leave, Wray adjourned the meeting sua sponte and departed with his adherents. The dissident members remained and proceeded to elect their own slate of officers for the 1978 church year.

Four weeks later, the Sunday church bulletin of January 29, 1978, contained the following announcement:

As previously announced to all active members in good standing, there will be a congregational meeting following this morning's service of worship. Because there has been no final resolution of the current suit, no member who participated in the illegal meeting on January 2 will be permitted to participate in today's meeting.

At this meeting, again presided over by Pastor Wray, the active congregation elected its slate of officers and approved the church budget.

On April 4, 1978, the Plaintiffs in the December action instituted the second of these suits, seeking a declaratory judgment naming the true officers for the 1978 church year. They further requested injunctive relief, demanding inter alia that the officers "purportedly" elected at the January 29 meeting be made to account for their handling of church funds during the period of their tenure as "de facto" officers.

Due to procedural problems and several attempts to agree on referees, the consolidated actions ³ were not tried in a non-jury proceeding until February 1 and 2, 1979. On July 1, 1979, the Superior Court dismissed the second suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Final judgment in the earlier action, granting the Plaintiffs permanent injunctive relief, was not entered until March 17, 1980, following our remand after a purported appeal for failure of the Superior Court to enter a final judgment.

In the meantime, at a duly called annual meeting held on January 29, 1980, a full slate of officers was elected for the 1980 church year, including James Glasgow as the new treasurer. Prior to final adjudication of the earlier action, the Defendants, on February 6, 1980, moved to dissolve the injunction on grounds that Donald Whitney was no longer the treasurer. This motion was denied, and the permanent injunction enjoining Whitney from withdrawing any church funds from any bank was entered in the earlier action as a final judgment on March 17, 1980.

Both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants appeal from the judgment granting permanent injunctive relief in the earlier action. For the reasons stated below, we dismiss both the appeal and the cross-appeal as moot. The Plaintiffs also appeal from the Superior Court's dismissal of the second suit. We sustain this appeal and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Earlier Action

As previously noted, on March 17, 1980, final judgment in the form of permanent injunctive relief was rendered in CV-77-577. The "order of judgment" specified in pertinent part:

Defendant Donald H. Whitney, alleged treasurer of the Congregational Church of Limington, be and hereby is permanently enjoined from withdrawing or attempting to withdraw any funds of said Church from any bank or depository thereof, from dealing as such alleged treasurer with any funds of said Church, from otherwise disposing or attempting to dispose of any property of said Church, including but without exclusion any monies or securities which are the property of said Church, except by further order of this Court ....

The order further stated:

The reason for the issuance of this injunction is that said Donald H. Whitney has been found by the Court in this action, as claimed by the plaintiffs, not to be the duly elected treasurer of said Church.

On January 29, 1980, an annual meeting for the election of church officers was held and supervised by an executive committee for the Maine Association of Congregational-Christian and Community Churches, of which the Limington Church was a member. At this meeting a full slate of officers was elected, including James Glasgow as the church treasurer. ⁴

The Defendants argue that the issue concerning the election of Donald Whitney as church treasurer at the October 9, 1977, meeting is mooted by way of the uncontroverted election of officers for 1980.

We agree.

It is a fundamental principle of appellate review that courts will not consider an appeal that has become moot except in the most extraordinary of circumstances. State v. Gleason, Me., 404 A.2d 573, 578 (1979); Cote v. Zoning Board of Appeals, Me., 398 A.2d 419, 420 (1979); Hazzard v. Westview Golf Club, Inc., Me., 217 A.2d 217, 224 (1966). Mootness exists when there is no longer a controversy between the parties due to intervening circumstances. Cote, supra at 420. The underlying policy for the mootness doctrine has been said to be the preservation of flexibility in the law by not creating unnecessary precedent, as well as considerations of judicial economy. E.g., Taylor v. Commissioner of Mental Health & Corrections, Me., 431 A.2d 1304, 1306 (1981); see also Note, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 373, 375-76 (1974). We have also declared that where a decision by our Court would not afford the appellant any effective relief, we will dismiss the appeal on the ground of mootness for purposes of judicial economy. Knowlton v. Rhodes, Me., 413 A.2d 546, 548 (1980).

As a result of the supervening election of James Glasgow as Limington Church Treasurer for 1980, the controversy rising from the order of judgment permanently enjoining Donald Whitney from withdrawing church funds no longer exists. We cannot say that this case has "remained alive" throughout the course of litigation so as to sustain our jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings. See Marden v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 576 F.2d 576, 581 (5th Cir. 1978); C. Wright, A. Miller & Cooper, 13 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 263, 292-93 (1975). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and cross-appeal of CV-77-577 as moot.

The Second Suit

At the annual meeting on January 29, 1978, officers were elected and a budget approved for the 1978 church year. Only the Defendants were in attendance at this meeting. The legal significance of this meeting was the critical issue arising from the Plaintiffs' complaint in CV-78-178, seeking declaratory judgment for, inter alia, an accounting and reimbursement of monies alleged to have been wrongfully appropriated by the Defendants.

We hold that the Superior Court's dismissal of this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on grounds that the meeting dealt solely with ecclesiastical affairs, constituted error.

For centuries judicial tribunals have been reluctant to intervene in controversies arising out of religious disputes. Likewise, the trial courts have been cautioned repeatedly not to delve into the resolution of ecclesiastical doctrinal controversies. See Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of New Jersey v. Graves, 83 N.J. 572, 576, 417 A.2d 19, 22 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131, 101 S.Ct. 954, 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981).

Disputes over church property, however, may be resolved in the civil courts. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 606, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969), "Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of...