Graft's Adoption, In re, 3--672A9

• Citation: 288 N.E.2d 274,153 Ind.App. 546
• Decision Date: 26 October 1972
• Docket Number: No. 3--672A9,3--672A9
• Parties: In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF Infant Male, William James GRAFT by Millie Goodwin, Appellant (Petitioner Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 274

288 N.E.2d 274

153 Ind.App. 546

In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF Infant Male, William James GRAFT by Millie Goodwin, Appellant (Petitioner Below).

No. 3--672A9.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.

Oct. 26, 1972.

Hugo E. Martz, Fort Wayne, for appellant.

STATON, Judge.

STATEMENT ON THE APPEAL: Millie Goodwin's petition to adopt four year old William James Graft was denied at the conclusion of an ex parte proceeding in the Allen Superior Court. She filed her 'Motion to Correct Errors' which raises these issues for our consideration on this appeal:

'I. Whether Mrs. Goodwin has met all the requirements for adoption set out in Burns Ind.Ann.Stat. § 3--121.

'II. Whether an adoption can be denied because the adopting parent refuses to relinquish Aid to Dependent Children benefits.

'III. Whether Mrs. Goodwin was denied due process of law since the reasons for denial of her adoption petition were not made known, and the decision could have been based on evidence or presumptions which she had no opportunity to refute or rebut.'

We affirm the Allen Superior Court's judgment denying the petition for adoption in our opinion which follows.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: William James Graft is a four year old interracial child. Hiw white unwed mother consented to his adoption. For the last two years, William Graft has lived with Millie Goodwin. William Graft's natural mother has married someone other than Millie Goodwin's son. Paternity has not been established, but the Welfare Report indicates that the Petitioner's son is the father.

Millie Goodwin filed her petition for the adoption of William James Graft on April 27, 1971. An ex parte proceeding was held upon her petition on June 7, 1971. Millie Goodwin testified that she is forty-six years of age and the mother of six children. Three of these children now live at home, and their ages are ten, twelve and seventeen years respectively. She is unemployed. Her sole source of income is from social security and Aid to Dependent Children. She receives $342.00 social security benefits monthly for her minor children now living at home and $109.00 from Aid to Dependent Children which gives her a total income of $451.00 a month. William James Graft's natural mother received $115.00 per month in Aid to Dependent Children benefits; however, Millie Goodwin testified that she only received $31.00 per month for William James Graft. A letter from a welfare caseworker stated that she did not feel 'that Mrs. Goodwin took this child for A.D.C. benefits.' The Welfare Report recommended the adoption of William James Graft by Millie Goodwin. After the hearing, the court took the petition under advisement. The petition was denied on January 7, 1972, and Millie Goodwin filed her motion to correct errors on March 1, 1972 which raised the issues set forth below:

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES: The first issue is based upon a statute, I.C.1971, 31--3--1--8; Ind.Stat.Ann. § 3--121 (Burns Supp.1972). This issue is presented by Millie Goodwin from the viewpoint that the evidence submitted by her is susceptible to only a favorable finding. The statute referred to above is as follows:

'Whenever the court shall find (a) that the adoption prayed for is for the best interest of the child; (b) that the adopting parent or parents are of sufficient ability to rear the child and furnish suitable support and education; (c) that the report of such investigation and recommendation has been filed; and (d) that proper consent, if any be necessary, to the adoption has been given, the court shall grant such petition and shall enter a decree of adoption.

'If (In) such decree the court shall, if such child be a ward of any guardian or agency or department of public welfare, provide for the custody of such child.

'From and after such adoption such child shall take the name prayed for in the adoption petition, if new name is given therein.

'If the court dismisses the petition, the court shall determine the person who should have custody of the child.'

Millie Goodwin's statement of the issue in her brief is:

'I. Whether Mrs. Goodwin has met all the requirements for adoption set out in Burns Ind.Ann.Stat. § 3--121.'

The second issue springs forth from the assumption that the trial court has created a pre-condition which is not required by the statute and is, therefore, contrary to law. Millie Goodwin has stated this issue as follows:

'II. Whether an adoption can be denied because the adopting parent refuses to relinquish Aid to Dependent Children benefits.'

The third issue contends that due process was not given the petitioner since no reason was given by the trial court for its negative judgment on the evidence presented. Millie Goodwin sets forth this issue in her brief as follows:

'III. Whether Mrs. Goodwin was denied due process of law since the reasons for denial of her adoption petition were not made known, and the decision could have been based on evidence or presumptions which she had no opportunity to refute or rebut.'

STATEMENT OF LAW: The trial court's negative judgment appears to have confounded Millie Goodwin. Her petition was heard ex parte and the Welfare Report recommended the adoption. Yet, the trial court denied her petition for adoption. Her argument upon the first issue amounts to a disagreement with the trial court's judgment as to what the evidence shows. The evidence was uncontradicted, but even uncontradicted evidence is sometimes capable of supporting conflicting inferences. This is especially true where additional evidence is offered in support of facts in evidence and a broad contention is being urged. The perceptual inferences to a trial judge are not available from the lifeless, written record before us. Nevertheless, it is the uncontradicted evidence in the record that we must examine for multiple inferences to decide the question now before us.

This court stated in Haynes v. Brown (1949), 120 Ind.App. 184, 190, 88 N.E.2d 795, 797 that:

'. . . (U)ncontradicted evidence will sometimes support conflicting inferences, and when that is the case, the inferences drawn by the trier of the facts will prevail.'

No reason was given by the trial court for denying the petition. ¹ We must examine the entire record before us to ascertain whether the trial court's judgment denying the petition for adoption is sustainable upon any theory. Only the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom which are most favorable to sustaining the theory will be discussed. The general rule that we have referred to here is set forth in Lewis v. Burke (1968), 143 Ind.App. 696, 697, 242 N.E.2d 382:

'The general rule of law is well settled that on appeal all reasonable presumptions are indulged in favor of the rulings and judgment of the trial court. Cenerally speaking, if the action of the trial court is sustainable upon any theory, it must be affirmed. In support of this general rule, our Supreme Court in the case of Ross et al. v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division (1962) 243 Ind. 61, 65, 182 N.E.2d 585, stated:

'As long as there is any substantial ground upon which the decision of the lower tribunal may be sustained on appeal, the judgment will not be reversed.

The reviewing court may examine the entire record to sustain the lower court's action. The court does not search the record to reverse, although it may do so in order to affirm. State ex rel Tittle v. Covington, etc., Schools (1951) 229 Ind. 208, 96 N.E.2d 334; City of Ft. Wayne v. Bishop (1950) 228 Ind. 304, 92 N.E.2d 544; 2 I.L.E. Appeals, § 461, pp. 332, 333; F.W. & H Ind.Tr. and App.Prac.1961 Pocket Supp., § 2783, p. 134.'

'See also Snauffer (Snouffer) v. Peoples Trust and Savings Co. (1965) 140 Ind.App. 491, 212 N.E.2d 165.'

The trial court was concerned with Millie Goodwin's 'sufficient ability to rear the child and furnish suitable support and education;' which is required by the statute. We find the court asking these questions of Millie Goodwin regarding her ability to provide suitable support and education:

'Q. Did I understand that you are not working anyplace?

'A. No, I am not.

'Q. Just getting Social Security?

'A. Yes, I am.

'Q. How much do you get there a month, Social Security?

'A. Social Security is approximately $370.00.

'Q. How would you get along if you were minus the $67.00 support for young Willie on your Aid to Dependent Children, could you get along on that Social Security only?

'A. With or without the A.D.C.?

'Q. Yes.

'A. Why without you mean?

'Q. Without it?

'A. I think I could get along.

'Q. See, adoptions are granted for several reasons but one is predicated on the fact that you are financially able to take care of a child and if you are getting Aid for Dependent Children it doesn't appear that financially you have the assets with which to take care of him, and it is the responsibility then of the community instead of your responsibility to take care of him.'

Social Security benefits would be reduced as her three children living at home reached their majority or became emancipated. This prevailing condition coupled with Millie Goodwin's capacity to earn a sufficient income to care for herself and William James Graft in later years as well as in the present would have been a sufficient reason for denying the petition. An additional investigation was made concerning Aid to Dependent Children payments. Our Supreme Court concluded in Johnson v. Smith (1931), 203 Ind. 214, 221, 176 N.E. 705, 707:

'The trial court, in a case like this involving the custody of a minor of tender age, is not limited in its investigation to the showing the parties may choose to make. It may, on its own motion, make such further investigation as the necessity of the case may warrant. This court reviews the record of the trial court with the presumption that it is free from harmful error to the losing party. We must assume that the court, in the instant case, in giving the custody of the child to appell...