Graham v. City of Charlotte
| Decision Date | 19 September 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. C-C-85-439-P.,C-C-85-439-P. |
| Citation | 644 F. Supp. 246 |
| Parties | Dethorne GRAHAM, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE, M.S. Connor, R.B. Townes, T. Rice, Hilda P. Matos, and M.M. Chandler, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
Edward G. Connette, Harper, Connette & Stovall, Charlotte, N.C., for plaintiff.
Frank B. Aycock, III, Charlotte, N.C., for defendants.
This is an action by Plaintiff brought under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Charlotte and the individual police officers for damages for denial of Plaintiff's civil rights as a result of the alleged use of excessive force by the police officers in restraining the Plaintiff on November 12, 1984. The Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants unlawfully assaulted Plaintiff, unlawfully restrained him, constituting false imprisonment and intentionally inflicted mental and emotional distress on Plaintiff in violation of the common law of North Carolina. The Plaintiff also alleges that the actions of the City of Charlotte in not properly training its officers to identify and respond to medical emergencies violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title 29 U.S.C. § 794, and North Carolina General Statute § 168-2.
At the close of the Plaintiff's evidence all of the Defendants moved for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court, of course, in ruling on the Motion must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Galloway v. U.S., 319 U.S. 372, 63 S.Ct. 1077, 87 L.Ed. 1458 (1943); McClure v. Price, 300 F.2d 538 (4th Cir.1962); Phoenix Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 427 F.2d 862 (4th Cir.1970).
The evidence, when reviewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, is that on November 12, 1984, the Plaintiff, who was a diabetic, had an insulin reaction at approximately 1:55 p.m., while doing mechanical work on an automobile at his shop. He asked his friend William Berry to drive him to a convenience store, the Pilot store, in order for him to obtain some orange juice to counteract his insulin reaction.
When they arrived at the store, where the Defendant officer Connor was parked in his patrol car, the Plaintiff rapidly exited or ran into the store and on seeing a line of four or five persons at the counter, did not want to wait and ran or walked rapidly out of the store and returned to Berry's automobile, and told Berry, to take him to his girlfriend's house or pointed in the direction of his girlfriend's house, where the Plaintiff testified he could obtain the orange juice he needed. As Berry drove out of the convenience store parking lot, he was followed by Officer Connor who stopped him approximately one half mile away. Officer Connor observed the Plaintiff in the passenger seat and told Berry he would have to wait until Officer Connor determined what, if anything, Plaintiff had done in the convenience store.
Plaintiff, suffering from his insulin reaction, then exited Berry's automobile and ran around it twice. Berry then asked Officer Connor to help him catch Plaintiff, and suggested that Officer Connor go one way around the car and that he, Berry, would go the other way. On seeing Berry and Connor coming from opposite directions, Plaintiff sat down on the curb and Officer Connor and Berry knelt down to see what was wrong with Plaintiff. The Plaintiff apparently passed out and the next thing he remembered was that he was handcuffed and lying face down on the sidewalk and that in addition to Connor there were four other police officers. These police officers had arrived in response to a call for a back up by Officer Connor.
Meanwhile, a crowd had gathered around and Officer Townes testified that it appeared things were getting out of hand.
The Plaintiff testified that the officers picked him up and with his hands cuffed behind his back placed him against and over the hood of Berry's car. The Plaintiff then tried to reach for his wallet in his hip pocket and lifted his head up to tell the officers that he was a diabetic and wanted his wallet to show his diabetic identification. One of the officers, Matos, shoved his head down and told him to shut up that no one had asked him anything. At some point during the incident, Plaintiff was asked if he wanted medical assistance and he declined.
The officers then attempted to place the Plaintiff in Officer Connor's patrol car and the Plaintiff vigorously resisted this effort, by kicking and otherwise attempting to keep from being placed in the car. The evidence was that two officers were pushing from behind and one entered the vehicle from the other side and pulled on the Plaintiff until he was in the car.
Officer Connor then determined that the Plaintiff had not done anything unlawful while in the convenience store, but was advised by his dispatcher that the Plaintiff was the owner of one or more guns.
The Plaintiff was then immediately driven home and his hands were uncuffed. He again was asked if he wanted medical assistance and he declined.
Plaintiff's witness, Berry, testified that he did not...
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