Graham v. Comm'r of Transp., SC 19867
Decision Date | 20 November 2018 |
Docket Number | SC 19867 |
Citation | 195 A.3d 664,330 Conn. 400 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Barry GRAHAM v. COMMISSIONER OF TRANSPORTATION |
Lorinda S. Coon, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).
Ralph J. Monaco, with whom, on the brief, was Eric J. Garofano, New London, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Palmer, McDonald, Robinson, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Vertefeuille, Js.*
In this appeal, we consider whether the waiver of sovereign immunity under General Statutes § 13a-144,1 the state's highway defect statute, extends to a claim that the state police failed to close a bridge before a crew from the Department of Transportation (department) could arrive to address an icy surface on that bridge. The defendant, the Commissioner of Transportation (commissioner), appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification,2 from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the commissioner on the ground that the personal injury action brought by the plaintiff, Barry Graham, was barred by sovereign immunity. Graham v. Commissioner of Transportation , 168 Conn. App. 570, 611, 148 A.3d 1147 (2016). On appeal, the commissioner asks us to overrule this court's decision in Lamb v. Burns , 202 Conn. 158, 520 A.2d 190 (1987), to the extent that it expands the waiver of sovereign immunity under § 13a-144 to include actions of the state police. We decline to overrule Lamb , and conclude that the waiver of sovereign immunity under § 13a-144 extends to the actions of state employees other than those employed by the commissioner, but only to the extent that they are performing duties related to highway maintenance and the plaintiff proves that a relationship exists between the commissioner and the state employee such that the commissioner can be found to have breached his statutory duty to keep the highways, bridges, or sidewalks in repair. We further conclude that, in the present case, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the requisite relationship existed between the commissioner and the state police. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history. "In the plaintiff's original complaint dated July 5, 2012, as later revised on May 29, 2014 ... he alleged that the [commissioner] has a statutory duty to keep and maintain all highways and bridges within the state highway system in a reasonably safe condition, and that that duty extends to Interstate 95, a public highway in that system. He further alleged that, in the early morning hours of December 12, 2011, employees, representatives and agents of the department became aware that the surface of Interstate 95 on the Gold Star Memorial Bridge had become icy and unreasonably dangerous, based upon reports they had received from the state police of numerous ice related accidents on the bridge that morning. The plaintiff alleged that later that morning, at 6:38 a.m., as he was driving his pickup truck in the northbound lanes of the bridge about one-tenth of one mile south of the New London-Groton town line, it slid on black ice, rolled over on its side and collided with a bridge structure, causing him serious injuries. The plaintiff alleged that the cause of his accident and resulting injuries [were due to the commissioner's] breach of his statutory duty to keep the bridge in a reasonably safe condition by failing to take adequate measures, in response to the notice he had received of its dangerous condition, either by treating its icy surface, placing or utilizing warning signs in the area to warn travelers of that dangerous condition, or closing the bridge entirely until that dangerous condition could be remedied. Finally, the plaintiff alleged that he had provided timely written notice to the [commissioner] of his intent to sue in connection with his accident and injuries within ninety days of their occurrence, as required by § 13a-144.
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