Graham v. Friedlander

• Decision Date: 04 February 2020
• Docket Number: SC 20243
• Citation: 223 A.3d 796,334 Conn. 564
• Parties: Kimberly H. GRAHAM et al. v. Janie R. FRIEDLANDER et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

334 Conn. 564

223 A.3d 796

Kimberly H. GRAHAM et al.

v.Janie R. FRIEDLANDER et al.

SC 20243

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 16, 2019

Officially released February 4, 2020

Angelo A. Ziotas, with whom was Jennifer B. Goldstein, Stamford, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Tadhg Dooley, with whom was Aaron S. Bayer, Hartford, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

Robinson, C.J., and D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Vertefeuille, Js.

D'AURIA, J.

The plaintiffs,¹ the parents of four school-age children, individually and on behalf of their children, brought this action against the Board of Education of the City of Norwalk (board) and three of its members,² in their official capacities (board defendants), the city of Norwalk (city), and Spectrum Kids, LLC, and its owner, Stacy Lore.³ On appeal, we are asked to determine whether the claims alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint seek relief for a failure to provide special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (act), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., thus triggering an administrative exhaustion requirement contained in that act and within General Statutes § 10-76h, or whether the plaintiffs' action seeks relief for something other than the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE), thereby relieving the plaintiffs of the exhaustion requirement. To decide this issue at this stage in the litigation—on review of the trial court's decision to grant the board defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of a failure to exhaust administrative remedies—we must confine our inquiry to the allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint.⁴ On the basis of those allegations, we conclude that the plaintiffs seek relief for something other than the denial of a FAPE and were, therefore, not obligated to exhaust their administrative remedies. Accordingly, we agree with the plaintiffs that the trial court improperly dismissed their action on the ground that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies. As an alternative ground for upholding the granting of the motion to dismiss, the defendants ask us to determine that the board defendants acted as agents of the state in providing special education services, therefore entitling them to sovereign immunity. We agree with the trial court that the board defendants were acting under the control of, and as an agent of, the municipality rather than the state, and were not entitled to sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's denial of the board defendants' motion to dismiss on the sovereign immunity ground.

I

The following facts, as alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint, and procedural history are relevant to our review of these claims. The board and the city hired Lore and Spectrum Kids, LLC, "to provide autism

related services to children in the school district with an autism or related diagnosis." Lore represented at the time she was hired that she had received various master's degrees and was a board certified behavior analyst. None of the defendants ever performed a background check on Lore or confirmed her alleged credentials. We note that, in a criminal action, Lore was charged with larceny, to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three years in prison and five years of probation. See State v. Lore , Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CR-10-0125486-T (September 2, 2010).

The four minor plaintiffs were pupils enrolled in the Norwalk public schools and had been diagnosed with autism

spectrum disorder. The plaintiffs alleged that between November, 2007, and May, 2008, Lore and Spectrum Kids, LLC, were retained to provide the minor plaintiffs with autism

related services within the Norwalk public schools. The plaintiffs brought state law claims against the board defendants, the city, Lore, and Spectrum Kids, LLC, in connection with the hiring of Lore and Spectrum Kids, LLC, and the services, or lack thereof, that were provided. The complaint consists of eighty-four counts. As to the board defendants, in counts one through sixty, the plaintiff parents allege that the board defendants' negligent and careless hiring and supervision of Lore proximately caused permanent and ongoing injuries and losses to their four children and to them individually as parents.⁵

The board defendants moved to dismiss counts one through sixty of the plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, the board defendants claimed that the doctrine of sovereign immunity mandated the dismissal of the claims. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The trial court denied the board defendants' motion to dismiss as to their claim that sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs' action. The plaintiffs and the city filed motions to reargue. The trial court allowed the parties to present additional arguments and held a hearing but denied the parties relief in the form of a modification of the court's previous decision. The plaintiffs then timely appealed to the Appellate Court. The appeal was transferred to this court. See General Statutes § 51-199 (c) ; Practice Book § 65-1.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that they did not have to exhaust administrative remedies because their complaint advances a state law claim that does not allege a violation of the act. They further allege that they do not seek relief for the denial of a FAPE but, rather, assert common-law claims of negligent hiring and supervision, loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress—all falling outside the exhaustion requirements contained in the act. The board defendants contend that, although, on the face of the complaint, the plaintiffs do not allege a violation of the act, the complaint in fact seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE. They further contend that, regardless of whether the plaintiffs' complaint alleges a violation of the act or some other common-law claim, the act and state law mandate the exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to the filing of a complaint, as long as the crux of the complaint is the denial of a FAPE. Alternatively, they contend that this court should affirm the trial court's judgment on the ground that the board defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity as agents of the state.

Applicable to both the exhaustion analysis and the sovereign immunity analysis is our standard of review for a court's decision on a motion to dismiss and principles of statutory interpretation. Our review of the trial court's determination of a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss is de novo. State v. Samuel M. , 323 Conn. 785, 794–95, 151 A.3d 815 (2016). "In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.... In undertaking this review, we are mindful of the well established notion that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Metcalf v. Fitzgerald , 333 Conn. 1, 7, 214 A.3d 361 (2019), cert. denied, 88 U.S.L.W. 3222, ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 854, 205 L.E.2d 460, 2020 WL 129583 (2020) (No. 19-490). To the extent that we are called upon to engage in statutory interpretation, our review is plenary and guided by General Statutes § 1-2z. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. O & G Industries, Inc. , 322 Conn. 291, 302–303, 140 A.3d 950 (2016).⁶

II

To reach the question of whether the plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies, we first must determine whether the act's exhaustion requirement applies to state law claims, not brought under the act, that allege a violation of a FAPE. In the event that the act's exhaustion requirement does not apply to state law claims, we must then determine whether state law, like the act, mandates exhaustion prior to filing a claim in Superior Court seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE. Finally, if the state statutory scheme does require exhaustion, we must examine the plaintiffs' complaint to determine whether the complaint in fact alleges the denial of a FAPE, which is subject to exhaustion, or some other claim that is not subject to exhaustion.

The act is a federal statute that "ensures that children with disabilities receive needed special education services." Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 743, 748, 197 L. Ed. 2d 46 (2017) ; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (d) (2012). "The [act] offers federal funds to [s]tates in exchange for a commitment: to furnish a ‘free appropriate public education’ [FAPE] ... to all children with certain physical or intellectual disabilities." Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools , supra, at 748. Once a state accepts the act's financial assistance, eligible children acquire a " ‘substantive right’ " to a FAPE. Id., at 749. The primary vehicle for providing each eligible child with a FAPE takes the form of an individualized special education plan. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d) (2012) ; Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools , supra, at 749.

Disputes often arise over whether the special education services provided to children with physical or intellectual disabilities are sufficient to satisfy a child's individual education plan. To resolve these disputes, the act requires state or local agencies to establish and maintain procedures to "ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education by such agencies." 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (a) (2012) ; see Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools , supra, 137 S. Ct. at 748. "[A]...