Graham v. Graham (Ex parte Renasant Bank)

Decision Date17 July 2015
Docket Number2140552.
Parties Ex parte RENASANT BANK. (In re James M. Graham III v. Monica Graham and Renasant Bank).
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

Burt W. Newsome of Newsome Law, L.L.C., Birmingham, for petitioner.

William H. Weems, Jr., Birmingham, for respondent.

THOMPSON

, Presiding Judge.

Renasant Bank ("Renasant") petitions this court for a writ of mandamus directing the Domestic Relations Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the divorce court") to dismiss Renasant as a party in the underlying action.

Monica Graham ("Monica") and James M. Graham III ("James") were divorced by an April 2003 judgment of the divorce court entered in case number DR–02–1501. The 2003 divorce judgment is not contained in the materials submitted in support of this petition. However, it is undisputed that the divorce judgment, which incorporated a settlement agreement reached by the parties, provided, among other things, that Monica and James were awarded joint title to their former marital home, with Monica receiving possession of the home and James being responsible for the mortgage-indebtedness payments on the home. According to allegations made in a pleading submitted as an exhibit to Renasant's petition, the divorce judgment provided that Monica and James were to sell the former marital home when their youngest child graduated from high school and to evenly divide the net proceeds of that sale. In addition, the divorce judgment provided that James could refinance the mortgage indebtedness on the former marital home with Monica's cooperation.

On February 7, 2011, James obtained from Renasant a home-equity line of credit in the amount of $265,939.73 that was secured by a mortgage on the former marital home. In the documents he executed in order to obtain that line of credit, James represented that he owned the former marital home in fee simple and that he had possession of the property. A pleading filed by Renasant indicates that $231,624.88 of the proceeds from the line of credit were used to repay an existing mortgage on the former marital home. James received the remaining $34,314.85 from the transaction.

On January 28, 2013, Monica commenced an action against Renasant in the Jefferson Circuit Court, alleging claims of negligence, wantonness, fraud, and slander of title with regard to its execution of the February 7, 2011, equity line of credit and mortgage (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the mortgage"). For the purposes of this opinion, we refer to the court in which that civil action was considered as "the trial court in the civil action." The trial court in the civil action assigned Monica's civil action against Renasant case number CV–13–900310, which is hereinafter referred to as "the civil action." Monica later also asserted claims against James in the civil action. Renasant answered and counterclaimed against Monica, seeking the establishment of an equitable lien or a constructive trust placed against the former marital home and asserting a claim of unjust enrichment.

In the civil action, Renasant also filed a third-party complaint against James, alleging breach of warranty. The third-party complaint filed in the civil action is not contained in the materials submitted to this court; rather, Renasant submitted a copy of its third amended counterclaim, dated May 29, 2013. On July 30, 2013, James answered the third-party complaint and counterclaimed against Renasant, alleging a number of claims, including breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, negligence per se, slander of title, breach of contract, intentional interference with a contractual relationship, breach of loyalty and fair dealing, wantonness, and various fraud claims. James's claims were based, in essence, on his representation that he showed Renasant employees the divorce judgment and that Renasant should have interpreted the divorce judgment as not allowing him to enter into the mortgage transaction.

On September 26, 2014, the trial court in the civil action entered a partial summary judgment in favor of Renasant on James's claims against Renasant. The September 26, 2014, partial-summary-judgment order specifically noted that it was a nonfinal order because other claims of the parties to that action remained pending.1 James filed a notice of appeal from that order. The appeal was assigned appeal number 2140127, and on March 31, 2015, this court dismissed that appeal on the basis that it had been taken from a nonfinal order.2 James petitioned our supreme court for a writ of certiorari, and our supreme court denied that petition.

Ex parte Graham (No. 1140741, May 15, 2015), ––– So.3d –––– (Ala.2015)

(table). This court's certificate of judgment in appeal number 2140127 was issued on May 15, 2015.

The materials submitted to this court indicate that James filed in the divorce court a petition to modify the orders entered in the divorce action and a petition for a rule nisi against Monica; that action, the underlying action, was assigned case number DR–02–1501.03 and is hereinafter referred to as "the domestic-relations action." Renasant has failed to submit to this court materials indicating the date on which James filed those claims against Monica in the domestic-relations action. However, James's pleadings allege that Monica filed a counterclaim in the domestic-relations action alleging that she had been damaged as a result of the transaction in which James obtained the mortgage.

On February 16, 2015, five months after the trial court in the civil action had entered a summary judgment on James's claims against Renasant in that action and one month before this court dismissed the appeal of the September 26, 2014, partial summary judgment on the basis that it had been taken from a nonfinal order, James filed in the divorce court a motion seeking permission to add Renasant as a third-party defendant in the domestic-relations action. James attached to that motion a third-party complaint that is substantially identical to the counterclaim that he had filed against Renasant in the civil action, and he again asserted the various fraud claims and claims of breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, negligence per se, slander of title, breach of contract, intentional interference with a contractual relationship, breach of loyalty and fair dealing, and wantonness that he had asserted against Renasant in the civil action. In his February 16, 2015, third-party complaint filed in the domestic-relations action, James alleged:

"As set forth in [James's] petition to modify and petition for rule nisi, and as further confirmed in [Monica's] responsive pleadings, these same damages are alleged to be at issue by and between these three (3) parties in [the civil action,] as it is currently pending before [the trial court in the civil action], and is also now postured in part before the Court of Civil Appeals [in appeal number] 2140127."

Also in that third-party complaint filed in the domestic-relations action, James alleged that, in an earlier action seeking a modification of the divorce judgment, Monica had been made aware of the February 7, 2011, mortgage transaction.

Renasant filed in the divorce court a response in opposition to James's motion to add it as a third-party defendant. On March 17, 2015, the divorce court entered an order in the domestic-relations action finding that it had jurisdiction over James's claims against Renasant and adding Renasant as a third-party defendant to the domestic-relations action between James and Monica. On March 25, 2015, Renasant filed a motion asking the divorce court to reconsider its March 17, 2015, order. It does not appear that the divorce court entered an order in response to that motion to reconsider. Regardless, Renasant timely filed its petition for a writ of mandamus asking this court to order the divorce court to vacate its March 17, 2015, order.

" "A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it ‘will be issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ " '
"Ex parte Monsanto Co., 862 So.2d 595, 604 (Ala.2003)

(quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173, 176 (Ala.2000), quoting in turn Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.2d 501, 503 (Ala.1993) )."

Ex parte Dean, 137 So.3d 341, 344 (Ala.Civ.App.2013)

.

Renasant asserts before this court a number of arguments to the general effect that the divorce court erred in determining that it had jurisdiction to consider James's claims against Renasant. Renasant argues before this court that those tort and contract claims raised by James were not related to the terms of the settlement agreement incorporated into the judgment that divorced James and Monica and, therefore, that the divorce court could not exercise jurisdiction over those claims. James contends in his response filed in this court that, because the February 7, 2011, mortgage transaction pertained to the former marital home, any dispute concerning the mortgage transaction should be resolved in the divorce court.

In reaching its March 17, 2015, ruling, the divorce court relied on Turenne v. Turenne, 884 So.2d 844 (Ala.2003)

. In that case, the divorce judgment entered by the Domestic Relations Division of the Montgomery Circuit Court ("the Montgomery divorce court") incorporated a settlement agreement reached by the parties, who had jointly owned a number of businesses; the judgment awarded the former wife in that case two nursing homes and it awarded the former husband a pharmacy. As part of the settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce judgment, the parties specified that the nursing homes awarded to the former wife would have certain business dealings with the pharmacy awarded to the former husband. The former husband commenced an action in the Montgomery divorce court, arguing that...

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