Graham v. Illinois Racing Bd.
| Decision Date | 19 September 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 51621,51621 |
| Citation | 394 N.E.2d 1148,31 Ill.Dec. 771,76 Ill.2d 566 |
| Parties | , 31 Ill.Dec. 771 Jerry GRAHAM, Appellee, v. The ILLINOIS RACING BOARD, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago , for appellant.
Kenneth R. Siegan, Chicago (J. Graham Carpio and Joel D. Weisman, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
Defendant, the Illinois Racing Board, appealed from the order of the circuit court of Cook County enjoining and restraining it from proceeding with any hearing against the plaintiff, Jerry Graham, "utilizing any tests or specimens involved in this instant chancery action." Pursuant to Rule 302(b) (58 Ill.2d R. 302(b)), we allowed defendant's petition for direct appeal to this court.
In his original complaint, filed December 15, 1978, plaintiff alleged in count I that he was in the business of owning, training, and driving harness racing horses. He alleged further that the Board, pursuant to statutory authority (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 8, par. 37-9(b)), had promulgated the following rules:
Plaintiff alleged that although he had conformed with the Board's rules, including Rule 21.19, the Board had violated its Rule 21.13 by not requiring racetrack operators to provide a separate guard to remain on duty until the specimens had been delivered to the laboratory. Plaintiff alleged further that in hearings recently held a chief urine collector for the Board had testified that Rule 21.13 had frequently been violated in that "sign-in" entries were falsely made, and that there were numerous improprieties in the manner in which the samples were collected and delivered; that the Board's failure to preserve properly the chain of custody of the specimens inadequately protected owners, trainers, and drivers from the possibility of the specimens' adulteration by other persons and from their being unjustly accused of violations of the Board's rules.
It was also alleged that despite its failure to comply with its own rule, the Board had charged plaintiff with various rules violations and had scheduled a hearing for December 18, 1978, at which time the Board proposed to introduce testimony, test results, and documents concerning the specimens that were "kept, transported, and delivered" in violation of Rule 21.13. Plaintiff alleged that if the Board held its hearing he would be irreparably harmed in that his reputation and earning capacity would be severely damaged; that he had no adequate remedy at law; and that the Board would suffer no injury should an injunction issue. In his prayer for relief plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction ordering the Board to comply with Rule 21.13, a temporary restraining order enjoining the Board from proceeding with any hearing involving the alleged existence of drugs in horses, a preliminary injunction enjoining the Board from proceeding with a hearing involving the alleged existence of drugs in plaintiff's horses, a temporary restraining order enjoining the Board from utilizing as evidence any specimen taken where a guard was not present from the time it was collected until the time it was delivered to the laboratory, and a hearing to determine whether the evidence intended to be used by the Board was illegally gathered. Plaintiff also prayed that upon a final hearing the injunctions should be made permanent.
In count II plaintiff incorporated the allegations of count I, adding that the Board would not be harmed by a postponement of the hearing since the relevant events occurred as long ago as July 1978. The prayer for relief in count II was substantially identical to that contained in count I.
On the day that plaintiff's complaint was filed, the circuit court ordered that both the Board hearing and the hearing on the temporary restraining order be continued to December 19, 1978. On that date the Board filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that under the Administrative Review Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 8, par. 37-46; Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110, par. 264 Et seq.) plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law; that plaintiff had failed to show irreparable injury; and that he had failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. After a hearing the circuit court entered an order denying the Board's motion to dismiss and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Board from proceeding with any hearing against plaintiff. The Board filed notice of interlocutory appeal to the appellate court; after this court allowed the Board's motion for direct appeal the two appeals were ordered consolidated.
On December 28, 1978, the Board filed its answer to plaintiff's complaint, denying the material allegations and alleging that any evidence used against plaintiff would be "based upon a nationally recognized, secure procedure for preserving the chain of evidence." The Board then pleaded as affirmative defenses the same matters that had been raised in its motion to dismiss, adding that the harm caused to the Board and to the public by an injunction would greatly outweigh the harm to plaintiff, and that plaintiff would have an opportunity at the administrative hearing "to cross-examine witnesses regarding the chain of evidence" used to protect the specimens.
At the hearing before the circuit court the Board's executive secretary, a Board chemist, and the two chief urine collectors who had taken the specimens involved, testified as to the procedure employed in collecting and testing the urine samples from plaintiff's horses. After a race the horse was bathed, watered, and taken to a detention barn attended by a guard. There, a urine taker assigned by his supervisor would, in the presence of the owner, trainer, or his representative, take a urine sample. The sample was then taken to the supervisor, who split the sample into two jars a "laboratory" sample for testing purposes and "referee" sample for additional use should the test for drugs prove positive. The owner, trainer, or his agent would sign the ticket, indicating that the specimen was taken from his horse. The ticket, which was divided into the upper and lower parts with each containing an identifying number, was cut; the upper part was attached to the "referee" jar, while the lower part (containing the witness' signature and other pertinent information) was put into an envelope. The blood and urine samples from an entire afternoon or evening of racing were then collected into a metal box; also put into the box were the sealed envelope containing the tickets on all the specimens and a master sheet containing the same information as the various tickets. The metal box was then locked, with the lock's combination unknown to the supervisor; a tape seal was also attached to the opening of the box, its number having been recorded on the master sheet inside the box. The box was then taken to the Board laboratory usually by the supervisor, but occasionally by another Board employee-and put into a locked freezer.
A chemist-laboratory supervisor at the Board's laboratory testified that, after removing the box from the freezer, the laboratory technician would inspect the box's exterior to see if the seal were intact and the lock were closed. The box would then be opened and the number on the box's seal checked against the number on the master sheet inside the box. If it appeared that the box or samples had been tampered with a notation was made on the master sheet. The specimens were then removed and the laboratory samples analyzed.
On January 9, 1979, after the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from proceeding with any hearing against plaintiff that would utilize the tests or specimens involved in the present case. The court also found that plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law, that he would be irreparably harmed if the injunction were not granted, and that the probability of damage to the Board as a result of the injunction was remote.
Plaintiff had filed an amended complaint on January 4, 1979, and on January 10, 1979, filed a second amended complaint. The amended complaints were substantially identical to the original complaint except for the additional allegation that the Board had violated its Rule 25-3B, which provided:
"A guard shall be hired from the Race Track Police to stand watch at the State Detention Barn and to transport samples to the State Testing Laboratories."
The Board contends that plaintiff's suit for an injunction was barred by the...
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