Graham v. John Deere Co.

• Decision Date: 21 February 1966
• Docket Number: 43,COLGATE-PALMOLIVE,Nos. 11,37,s. 11
• Citation: 86 S.Ct. 684,148 USPQ 459,383 U.S. 1,15 L.Ed.2d 545
• Parties: William T. GRAHAM et al., Petitioners, v. JOHN DEERE COMPANY OF KANSAS CITY et al. CALMAR, INC., Petitioner, v. COOK CHEMICAL COMPANY.COMPANY, Petitioner, v. COOK CHEMICAL COMPANY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

383 U.S. 1

86 S.Ct. 684

15 L.Ed.2d 545

William T. GRAHAM et al., Petitioners,

v JOHN DEERE COMPANY OF KANSAS CITY et al.

CALMAR, INC., Petitioner,

v. COOK CHEMICAL COMPANY.

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY, Petitioner,

v. COOK CHEMICAL COMPANY.

Nos. 11, 37, 43.

Argued Oct. 14, 1965.

Decided Feb. 21, 1966.

[Syllabus from pages 1-2 intentionally omitted]

No. 11:

Orville O. Gold, Kansas City, Mo., for petitioners.

S. Tom Morris, Amarillo, Tex., for respondents.

Nos. 37, 43:

Dennis G. Lyons, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.

Gordon D. Schmidt, Kansas City, Mo., for respondent.

Mr. Justice CLARKdelivered the opinion of the Court.

After a lapse of 15 years, the Court again focuses its attention on the patentability of inventions under the standard of Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and under the conditions prescribed by the laws of the United States.Since our last expression on patent validity, Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 71 S.Ct. 127, 95 L.Ed. 162(1950), the Congress has for the first time expressly added a third statutory dimension to the two requirements of novelty and utility that had been the sole statutory test since the Patent Act of 1793.This is the test of obviousness, i.e., whether 'the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.'§ 103 of the Patent Act of 1952,35 U.S.C. § 103(1964 ed.).

The questions, involved in each of the companion cases before us, are what effect the 1952 Act had upon traditional statutory and judicial tests of patentability and what definitive tests are now required.We have concluded that the 1952 Act was intended to codify judicial precedents embracing the principle long ago announced by this Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248, 13 L.Ed. 683(1851), and that, while the clear language of § 103 places emphasis on an inquiry into obviousness, the general level of innovation necessary to sustain patentability remains the same.

I.

The Cases.

(a). No. 11, Graham v. John Deere Co., an infringement suit by petitioners, presents a conflict between two Circuits over the validity of a single patent on a 'Clamp for vibrating Shank Plows.'The invention, a combination of old mechanical elements, involves a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks as they plow through rocky soil and thus to prevent damage to the plow.In 1955, the Fifth Circuit had held the patent valid under its rule that when a combination produces an 'old result in a cheaper and otherwise more advantageous way,' it is patentable.Jeoffroy Mfg., Inc. v. Graham, 219 F.2d 511, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 826, 76 S.Ct. 55, 100 L.Ed. 738.In 1964, the Eighth Circuit held, in the case at bar, that there was no new result in the patented combination and that the patent was, therefore, not valid.333 F.2d 529, reversingD.C., 216 F.Supp. 272.We granted certiorari, 379 U.S. 956, 85 S.Ct. 652, 13 L.Ed.2d 553.Although we have determined that neither Circuit applied the correct test, we conclude that the patent is invalid under § 103 and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Eighth Circuit.

(b). No. 37, Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co., and No. 43, Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chemical Co., both from the Eighth Circuit, were separate declaratory judgment actions, but were filed contemporaneously.Petitioner in Calmar is the manufacturer of a finger-operated sprayer with a 'hold-down' cap of the type commonly seen on grocers' shelves inserted in bottles of insecticides and other liquids prior to shipment.Petitioner in Colgate-Palmolive is a purchaser of the sprayers and uses them in the distribution of its products.Each action sought a declaration of invalidity and noninfringement of a patent on similar sprayers issued to Cook Chemical as assignee of Baxter I. Scoggin, Jr., the inventor.By cross-action, Cook Chemical claimed infringement.The actions were consolidated for trial and the patent was sustained by the District Court.220 F.Supp. 414.The Court of Appeals affirmed, 8 Cir., 336 F.2d 110, and we granted certiorari, 380 U.S. 949, 85 S.Ct. 1082, 13 L.Ed.2d 967.We reverse.

Manifestly, the validity of each of these patents turns on the facts.The basic problems, however, are the same in each case and require initially a discussion of the constitutional and statutory provisions covering the patentability of the inventions.

II.

At the outset it must be remembered that the federal patent power stems from a specific constitutional provision which authorizes the Congress'To promote the Progress of * * * useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to * * * Inventors the exclusive Right to their * * * Discoveries.'Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.¹The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation.This qualified authority, unlike the power often exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the 'useful arts.'It was written against the backdrop of the practices—eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies—of the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public.SeeMeinhardt, Inventions, Patents and Monopoly, pp. 30—35(London, 1946).The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby.Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must 'promote the Progress of * * * useful Arts.'This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.And it is in this light that patent validity 'requires reference to a standard written into the Constitution.'Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., supra, 340 U.S. at 154, 71 S.Ct. at 131(concurring opinion).

Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.This is but a corollary to the grant to Congress of any Article I power.Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23.Within the scope established by the Constitution, Congress may set out conditions and tests for patentability.McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, 206, 11 L.Ed. 102.It is the duty of the Commissioner of Patents and of the courts in the administration of the patent system to give effect to the constitutional standard by appropriate application, in each case, of the statutory scheme of the Congress.

Congress quickly responded to the bidding of the Constitution by enacting the Patent Act of 1790 during the second session of the First Congress.It created an agency in the Department of State headed by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Department of War and the Attorney General, any two of whom could issue a patent for a period not exceeding 14 years to any petitioner that 'hath * * * invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, * * * or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used' if the board found that 'the invention or discovery (was) sufficiently useful and important * * *.'1 Stat. 110.This group, whose members administered the patent system along with their other public duties, was known by its own designation as 'Commissioners for the Promotion of Useful Arts.'

Thomas Jefferson, who as Secretary of State was a member of the group, was its moving spirit and might well be called the 'first administrator of our patent system.'See Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J.Pat.Off.Soc. 237, 238(1936).He was not only an administrator of the patent system under the 1790 Act, but was also the author of the 1793 Patent Act.In addition, Jefferson was himself an inventor of great note.His unpatented improvements on plows, to mention but one line of his inventions, won acclaim and recognition on both sides of the Atlantic.Because of his active interest and influence in the early development of the patent system, Jefferson's views on the general nature of the limited patent monopoly under the Constitution, as well as his conclusions as to conditions for patentability under the statutory scheme, are worthy of note.

Jefferson, like other Americans, had an instinctive aversion to monopolies.It was a monopoly on tea that sparked the Revolution and Jefferson certainly did not favor an equivalent form of monopoly under the new government.His abhorrence of monopoly extended initially to patents as well.From France, he wrote to Madison (July 1788) urging a Bill of Rights provision restricting monopoly, and as against the argument that limited monopoly might serve to incite 'ingenuity,'he argued forcefully that 'the benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general suppression,'V Writings of Thomas Jefferson, at 47(Forded., 1895).

His views ripened, however, and in another letter to Madison (Aug. 1789) after the drafting of the Bill of Rights, Jefferson stated that he would have been pleased by an express provision in this form:

'Art. 9.Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in literature, & their own inventions in the arts, for a term not exceeding _ _ years, but for no longer term & no other purpose.'Id., at 113.

And he later wrote:

'Certainly an...