Graham v. Keys

• Decision Date: 04 January 1858
• Citation: 29 Pa. 189
• Parties: Graham <I>versus</I> Keys.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

29 Pa. 189

Graham versus Keys.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 4, 1858.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Fayette county.

Kaine, for plaintiff in error.—The only question involved is, whether the declarations of Graham, as proved by Keys, Randolph, and Gallaway, were sufficient to take the case out of the statute of limitations. The promises were all conditional, and were all refused by plaintiff. To take a case out of the statute, the promise must be "an immediate, unqualified promise to pay without restriction or condition:" Kensington Bank v. Patton, 2 Harris 479; Tanner v. Smart, 6 B. & C. 549; Suter v. Sheeler, 10 Harris 310.

J. B. and A. Howell, for defendant.—Graham acknowledged a subsisting debt of a specific amount, which he promised to pay without condition. He refused to pay the interest, but made no condition about the payment of the principal. The new promise and assumption comes within the principle of the cases decided: Magee v. Magee, 10 Watts 172-4-5; Bell v. Morrison et al., 1 Pet. 388; Harbold's Ex'rs. v. Kuntz, 4 Harris 213; Hart v. Pendergrast; Allison v. Jones, 9 Watts 380; Henwood v. Cheeseman, 3 S. & R. 500.

The opinion of the court was delivered, January 4, 1858, by KNOX, J.

A promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations may be inferred from a distinct admission of indebtedness unaccompanied by anything which negatives the promise. But where the admission is accompanied by an express declaration that the debtor will not pay, the bar of the statute is not removed. In the present case the suit was brought to recover money loaned in October, 1844. In January, 1853, the defendant admitted that he owed the money, and said he would pay the principal, but would pay no interest. The plaintiff claimed both principal and interest.

The admission of the indebtedness, and the offer to pay, were unconditional so far as regards the principal sum, and to this extent the plaintiff had an undoubted right to recover. But the error into which the court below fell was in allowing the plaintiff to recover interest from the time of the admission. The recovery must be controlled by the admission, and that was limited altogether to the amount of the money loaned in 1844. By refusing to take the money as a complete discharge of the debt, the plaintiff did not lose the benefit of the admission; but neither could he by delay in bringing suit to enforce his rights, enlarge the admission so as to include the subsequent accrued...