Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n

• Decision Date: 06 November 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-5980,85-5980
• Citation: 804 F.2d 953
• Parties: 35 Ed. Law Rep. 978 Stephen GRAHAM and Brett Lohrke, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, University of Louisville, Robert Weber, and Bill Olson, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 953

804 F.2d 953

35 Ed. Law Rep. 978

Stephen GRAHAM and Brett Lohrke, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, University of Louisville, Robert Weber, and Bill Olson Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-5980.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Sept. 22, 1986.

Decided Nov. 6, 1986.

Nader G. Shunnarah, Louisville, Ky., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Schuyler Olt (argued), Greenebaum, Doll and McDonald, Edward H. Stopher, Robert M. Brooks (argued), Louisville, Ky., John J. Kitchin, Kansas City, Mo., for defendants-appellees.

Before KEITH and KENNEDY, Circuit Judges, and CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.

CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Stephen Graham and Brett Lohrke appeal from the judgment of the district court dismissing their action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The plaintiffs claim that dismissal was improper because they had sufficiently alleged that certain actions taken by the defendants infringed upon their right of access to the courts. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court.

I.

Appellants Graham and Lohrke received athletic scholarships from the University of Louisville for participating in the Louisville football program for the 1983-84 school year. They reported for football training in August 1983 but prior to the start of the academic year they withdrew from the team for personal reasons. The University then cancelled the scholarships without any hearing. Paying their own tuition and fees, the appellants completed the fall semester at the University. During the semester, they appealed the cancellation of their scholarships to the University Financial Aid Committee which held a hearing and subsequently upheld the termination of the scholarships.

On April 3, 1984, appellants filed a law suit in Kentucky state court seeking to recover the amount of the tuition and fees they paid when their scholarships were cancelled. Prior to filing that action, Graham had successfully sought readmittance to the University football team. Graham was kicked off the team, however, when it was discovered that he had filed the state court action. Graham repeatedly requested, but was denied, readmittance to the team after that point.

On August 21, 1984, the Franklin Circuit Court of Kentucky entered summary judgment in the appellants' favor "in the amount of the costs of tuition, board and fees as awarded under the contract for the Fall semester of 1983 plus costs of this action, with interest...." The University satisfied this judgment.

In the fall of 1984, Graham enrolled in Western Kentucky University. Western Kentucky, like the University of Louisville, is classified as a Division I school under the guidelines of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). Graham wanted to play football at Western Kentucky, but he was unable to do so because of two NCAA rules. The first rule provides that a student-athlete transferring from one Division I school to another is not eligible to participate in NCAA sports at the new school for one academic and calendar year. This "transfer rule" states in pertinent part:

A transfer student from a four-year institution shall not be eligible for any NCAA championship until the student has fulfilled a residence requirement of one full academic year (two full semesters or three full quarters), and one full calendar year has elapsed from the first regular registration and attendance date at the certifying Division I or Division II institution. At a Division III institution, eligibility is not permitted for one calendar year from the student's official withdrawal date from the previous institution.

NCAA Bylaw 5-1-j-(7). The second pertinent NCAA rule provides that an athlete's eligibility must be completed within five calendar years from the time the athlete first enrolls in college. The "five-year rule" states in pertinent part:

(a) Division I--The student-athlete shall complete his or her seasons of participation within five calendar years from the beginning of the semester or quarter in which the student-athlete first registered at a collegiate institution, time spent in the armed services, on official church missions or with recognized foreign aid services of the U.S. government being excepted.

NCAA Bylaw 4-1-(a). The combined effect of these two rules was to prevent Graham from ever playing collegiate football again once he transferred to Western Kentucky, since at that time Graham was in his fifth and final year of eligibility. After Graham sat out the year required by the transfer rule, he was no longer eligible to play due to the five-year rule.

Lohrke never sought readmittance to the University of Louisville football program. Rather, he enrolled at Kentucky Wesleyan University, a Division Ill NCAA school, where he wanted to play football. Another NCAA rule provides that a student transferring from a Division I to a Division III school is exempt from the transfer rule, and therefore need not sit out one year, as long as the Division I school issues a written release or waiver. The exception provision states in pertinent part:

(m) A transfer student from a four-year collegiate institution is not subject to the residence requirement for NCAA championships under the following conditions:

* * * (13) If the student transfers to a Division III member institution from a Division I or Division II institution after competing in that sport at the previous institution provided the student received a written release from the director of athletics at the institution from which the student transferred.

NCAA Bylaw 5-1-(m)-(13). The University of Louisville declined to issue a written release for Lohrke, claiming that it could not do so without a written request from Kentucky Wesleyan, which had not been received.

On October 2, 1984, Graham and Lohrke filed the instant action with the district court. In Count I of the complaint Graham asserted that as a result of the University of Louisville's actions and application of the NCAA rules, he had been denied: "(1) his right to a procedural due process hearing guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (2) his substantive due process fundamental right of access to the Courts guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (3) his right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the Defendant University and its Defendant agents permit students who have not filed suit to participate." Graham sought damages, a permanent injunction prohibiting the NCAA and the University of Louisville from preventing him from playing football at Western Kentucky, a declaratory judgment stating that he was eligible to participate in any chosen NCAA football program, and a declaratory judgment against the NCAA requiring it to grant hearings for similarly situated individuals to determine whether in their cases the transfer rule should be waived.

Count II of the complaint contained Lohrke's claims. Lohrke's sole complaint against the University of Louisville concerned its refusal to issue a written waiver permitting him to participate in Kentucky Wesleyan's football program. He alleged that this refusal was an act of retaliation against him for filing his state court action. Lohrke's sole complaint against the NCAA was that its waiver rule did not provide for a hearing to determine whether grounds existed for issuing a waiver. For relief, Lohrke requested either a permanent injunction against the NCAA and the University of Louisville prohibiting them from denying his eligibility to play football at Kentucky Wesleyan or a declaratory judgment ordering the University of Louisville to issue a waiver. Lohrke further sought damages and a declaratory judgment against the NCAA prohibiting it from taking any action against Kentucky Wesleyan.

On September 30, 1985, the district court filed its memorandum opinion granting motions to dismiss which had been filed by the University of Louisville and the NCAA. The court found that the appellants had no protected property or liberty interest in participating in interscholastic athletics, and therefore concluded that Graham's dismissal from the Louisville football program in the spring of 1984 was not a deprivation of any "rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." (Quoting 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983). The court further found that the University and its officials were cloaked with Eleventh Amendment immunity against the claims for money damages. Further, the court rejected the appellants' contention that they had been denied access to the courts, noting that they had successfully pursued their state court action and were at least temporarily before the federal district court. The court also observed that the University had issued a written release for Lohrke to play football at Kentucky Wesleyan; consequently, Lohrke had received the relief he had requested and his claim against the University for refusing to issue a release was moot.

With regard to the NCAA, the court first discussed the legitimate purposes of the transfer and five-year rules. The court then questioned, but did not decide, whether there was sufficient "state action" by the NCAA to support the Sec. 1983 action against it. The court nonetheless concluded that the NCAA could not be liable under Sec. 1983 because it had not deprived the appellants of a right secured by the Constitution or laws but had merely impaired their ability to participate in interscholastic athletics--a nonprotected interest. The court therefore concluded that the appellants' complaint against the NCAA failed "to state a claim upon which relief may be granted."

This timely appeal followed the dismissal of the appellants' complaint.

II.

From the district court's opinion, it is evident that the appellants' complaint was dismissed pursuant...