Graham v. Quincy Food Service Employees Ass'n

• Decision Date: 12 June 1990
• Citation: Graham v. Quincy Food Service Employees Ass'n, 555 N.E.2d 543, 407 Mass. 601 (Mass. 1990)
• Parties: , 137 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2144, 60 Ed. Law Rep. 1243, 12 A.L.R.5th 1137 Christine A. GRAHAM v. QUINCY FOOD SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION and Hospital, Library and Public Employees Union.
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 543

555 N.E.2d 543

407 Mass. 601, 137 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2144,

60 Ed. Law Rep. 1243,

12 A.L.R.5th 1137

Christine A. GRAHAM v.QUINCY FOOD SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION and Hospital Library and Public Employees Union.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Norfolk.

Argued March 6, 1990.

Decided June 12, 1990.

Kathryn M. Noonan(Lisa J. Brandzel, Newton, with her), for plaintiff.

Robert M. Schwartz, Boston, for defendant.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

The plaintiff, Christine Graham, appeals from a final judgment entered for the defendant, the Quincy Food Service Employees Association and Hospital, Library and Public Employees Union (union) after the denial of her motion for summary judgment and the grant of summary judgment for the union.SeeMass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824(1974).The plaintiff argues that the judge erred in not granting summary judgment for her.Alternately, she contends that the case should be remanded for trial.We transferred the case to this court on our own motion.We reverse the judgment below and remand the case to the Superior Court for trial.

The plaintiff, an employee in the Quincy public school system, filed this suit in February, 1986, against the city, the school committee, various school officials, and the union.¹The plaintiff alleged that she had been demoted improperly from her position as a cook.The count against the union was for breach of the duty of fair representation, based on allegations that the union failed to assist her, beginning in April, 1985, in her efforts to seek reinstatement.

I.Summary judgment."Rule 56(c) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 365 Mass. 824(1974), provides that a judge shall grant a motion for summary judgment'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.''The party moving for summary judgment assumes the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact on every relevant issue, even if he would have no burden on an issue if the case were to go to trial.'Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17[532 N.E.2d 1211](1989).SeeLayne v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Cedar Junction, [406 Mass.] 156, 161 & n. 6[546 N.E.2d 166](1989).See alsoAttorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 371, cert. denied sub nom.Bailey v. Bellotti, 459 U.S. 970[103 S.Ct. 301, 74 L.Ed.2d 282](1982)."Doherty v. Hellman, 406 Mass. 330, 333, 547 N.E.2d 931(1989).

Generally, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.Alioto v. Marnell, 402 Mass. 36, 37, 520 N.E.2d 1284(1988).Thus, we assume that "all of the facts set forth in the [opposing party's] affidavits [are] true...."Coveney v. President & Trustees of the College of the Holy Cross, 388 Mass. 16, 17, 445 N.E.2d 136(1983).When the court below grants summary judgment for the nonmoving party, we invert the usual standard and "view the record in the light most flattering to ... the summary judgment loser," here, the plaintiff.Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1513(1st Cir.1989).

The plaintiff began working in the food services department of the Quincy public schools on October 15, 1973.She was promoted to the position of cook in 1978.In 1982, because of financial constraints, the Quincy school committee decided to demote four cooks to the position of cafeteria helper.The cooks were to be demoted in reverse order of their civil service seniority, in accordance with the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 39.The plaintiff was chosen for demotion on the basis of civil service records that listed an erroneous date adversely affecting her seniority.Despite the plaintiff's efforts to bring the error to the attention of the school committee, it voted to proceed on the basis of the official dates in the civil service records, although it promised to reinstate the plaintiff if it were later determined that she had been wrongly demoted due to an incorrect seniority date.Subsequently, the union filed an appeal to the Civil Service Commission to correct the seniority dates of the plaintiff and several other employees whose records listed incorrect seniority dates.

While awaiting action from the Civil Service Commission, the plaintiff worked as a cafeteria helper for the 1982-1983 school year.In early 1984, union officials effected what was, in essence, a merger with another union.The plaintiff vigorously opposed the merger and testified at a Labor Relations Commission hearing concerning her opposition.The plaintiff contends that "[t]he events surrounding the merger gave rise to hostility and discrimination by the union towards the plaintiff."After the merger was effected, the plaintiff continued to speak out against the arrangement and questioned union officers about the possibility that union funds had been improperly used.In response, the union president, Ruth DeCristofaro, removed the plaintiff from the union's grievance committee, on which she had served for about two years.

The plaintiff continued to pursue the matter of the incorrect seniority date.In February, 1985, the school committee offered to settle the matter of the incorrect seniority date in a manner unsatisfactory to the plaintiff.She refused the school committee's offer.On February 28, 1985, the Civil Service Commission held a hearing regarding seniority dates.Shortly thereafter, the Civil Service Commission decided that the plaintiff's seniority date as listed was incorrect and that it should be adjusted.²In April, 1985, the plaintiff asked the union to assist her in seeking reinstatement to the position of cook, in light of the favorable result she had received from the Civil Service Commission.DeCristofaro, one of the plaintiff's principal opponents in matters of union politics, informed the plaintiff that the union would not represent her regarding the seniority matter, "because [the plaintiff] could not win."When the plaintiff asked for a written memorandum to that effect, DeCristofaro responded, "Don't hold your breath."In June, the plaintiff again asked the union to assist her.The union's executive board refused.

Despite the union's refusal to assist her, the plaintiff pursued the matter with the school committee.In July, 1985, the school committee voted to reinstate the plaintiff and grant her back pay.In August, however, the plaintiff received a check from the school committee in an amount substantially less than she thought was due.She initially refused the check and then accepted it in partial payment.Despite the school committee's vote in her favor, when she reported to work in September, 1985, she was assigned to work fewer hours per week than other cooks and was assigned the tasks of a cafeteria helper, not a cook.

The plaintiff wrote a letter to the union's executive director, John Keefe, asking for the union's help in "resolv[ing] these conditions."There was no reply.No grievance was filed on the plaintiff's behalf.In December, 1985, the plaintiff again resorted to self-help and appealed to the school committee.The school committee voted not to award any further back pay and did not address the plaintiff's complaint that she was not being permitted to work as a cook.Because she was unsuccessful in her efforts to gain work as a cook, rather than as a cafeteria helper, she again requested that the union file a grievance on her behalf in September, 1986.The plaintiff received no helpful response from the union.The plaintiff stated that, during the time she served on the union's grievance committee, the committee never refused to assist a union member in pursuing a grievance.

Breach of the duty of fair representation occurs if a union's actions toward an employee are "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 87 S.Ct. 903, 916, 17 L.Ed.2d 842(1967)."[A] union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion...."Id. at 191, 87 S.Ct. at 917.Unions are permitted "a wide range of reasonableness" in representing the often-conflicting interests of employees; hence, unions are vested with considerable discretion not to pursue a grievance, as long as their actions are "not improperly motivated, arbitrary, perfunctory or demonstrative of inexcusable neglect."Baker v. Local 2977, State Council 93, Am. Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees, 25 Mass.App.Ct. 439, 441, 519 N.E.2d 1352(1988), quotingLocal 285, Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 9 M.L.C. 1760, 1764(1983).Therefore, "[a]lthough ordinary negligence may not amount to a denial of fair representation, lack of a rational basis for a union decision and egregious unfairness or reckless omissions or disregard for an individual employee's rights may have that effect."Trinque v. Mount Wachusett Community College Faculty Ass'n, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 191, 199, 437 N.E.2d 564(1982).

Under this standard, the grant of summary judgment to the union was improper.The facts, when taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, do not warrant a conclusion that, as a matter of law, the union did not violate its duty of fair representation.The union's argument that summary judgment was proper rests on two contentions: (1) that the plaintiff's grievances ³ were unmeritorious; and (2) that their meritlessness was the reason for its refusal to assist the plaintiff before the school committee.

1.The facts presented in the motion for summary judgment do not establish that the plaintiff's grievances were unmeritorious as a matter of law.Indeed, the union's argument that they were flies in the face of the plaintiff's limited but...