Graham v. School Dist. No. 69

• Decision Date: 13 August 1898
• Citation: Graham v. School Dist. No. 69, 54 P. 185, 33 Or. 263 (Or. 1898)
• Parties: GRAHAM v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 69.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

54 P. 185

33 Or. 263

GRAHAM v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 69.

Supreme Court of Oregon

August 13, 1898

Appeal from circuit court, Umatilla county; Stephen A. Lowell Judge.

Action by Effie Graham against school district No. 69. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

J.H. Raley, for appellant.

J.J Balleray, for respondent.

WOLVERTON J.

Plaintiff brought this action upon a contract alleged to have been entered into between her and the defendant to recover for services rendered as teacher. The contract was for a term of seven months, beginning September 28, 1896, at the rate of $35 per month. She acknowledges payment for four months, and demands judgment for a balance of $105. After all the evidence was submitted the court directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, upon the ground that plaintiff had failed to prove the contract sued upon. It appears from the pleadings that John Dand. Frank Snyder, and Joseph Hanscom were the duly-qualified and acting directors of the defendant from long prior to September 28, 1896 to November 3d of the same year, and there was evidence to the following purport: The plaintiff was authorized to teach in the district school by verbal arrangement with Dand, who represented that he had consulted the other two directors touching the matter, and in pursuance of such authorization began teaching September 28, 1896. On the 13th of October following, the three directors met at the house of Mr. Sherman, the clerk of the district, for the purpose of drawing up, and entering formally into, the contract with plaintiff, at which meeting its terms were discussed; but, owing to a disagreement respecting who was the legally authorized chairman, they adjourned without the transaction of any business. Subsequently, on November 4th, Dand and Snyder met at the school house, without notice to Hanscom, and, the clerk not being present, the plaintiff acted in his stead; at which meeting the contract sued on was drawn up and signed by the two directors and the plaintiff. The plaintiff continued teaching to the end of the term. She was paid four months' salary, in monthly installments, by warrants drawn upon the clerk, and signed by Hanscom as chairman of the board of directors. Shortly after the contract was signed, Hanscom told the plaintiff he was willing to have her teach the school as long as they had money, and to sign the contract for five months, but not for seven, and about the fifth month informed her that she could not collect her wages off the district. Snyder testified that at the time of the November meeting he was director of the district; that he was moving at the time into another district, some four miles distant, that he had moved some of his goods and taken his family away on the 3d, and moved the remaining goods on the day of the meeting.

Upon this state of the record, the defendant contends that it is conclusively shown that the pretended meeting of November 4th was not a regular meeting, nor was it a special meeting regularly called, and, further, that Snyder was not a director of the district at the time, and was without right or authority to act as such, and hence that the alleged contract was not lawfully authorized or executed. The plaintiff, while not conceding the correctness of this conclusion, nevertheless claims that, if it were tenable, the defendant subsequently ratified the contract, and is now estopped to deny its efficacy. The statute (Hill's Ann.Laws, § 2602, subd. 16) provides as follows: "Two directors shall constitute a quorum. Any duty imposed upon the board as a body must be performed at a regular or special meeting, and must be made a matter of record. The consent of the board to any particular measure, obtained of individual members when not in session, is not the act of the board, and is not binding upon the district. If a contract is made without authority from the board, the individuals making such contract shall be personally liable." Subdivision 14 of the same section provides that the directors, when employing teachers, shall enter into a written contract with them, to which contract the assent of both parties must be given in writing. It is plain that these subdivisions were intended to prescribe the mode and manner by which school districts shall contract with teachers for their services, and a contract entered into in violation of their provisions is not susceptible of enforcement. Hazen v. Lerche, 47 Mich. 626, 11 N.W. 413. But school boards are not unlike the governing boards of other municipalities and corporations and may by their subsequent acts so adopt or ratify contracts within the scope of their powers, informally entered into or executed, that the districts for which they act will be estopped to deny their validity. Athearn v. Independent Dist., 33 Iowa, 105. In that case it was said: "Performance of a contract, permission to the party with whom the corporation contracts to perform, the acceptance of the...