Graham v. State
| Decision Date | 01 February 1983 |
| Docket Number | 8 Div. 807 |
| Citation | 427 So.2d 998 |
| Parties | Bryce U. GRAHAM v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Bryce U. Graham, pro se.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and J. Anthony McLain and James F. Hampton, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
Bryce Graham appeals from the June 10, 1982, order of the circuit court finding him in contempt of court. Ala.Code § 12-1-8(1) (1975). Graham was fined $100 and barred from practicing law before the issuing judge, Judge N. Pride Tompkins, for 180 days. He appealed to the Supreme Court, which, on November 23, 1982, transferred the cause to this court.
This appeal arose from appellant's representation of Paul Warren, who had been indicted by the March, 1982, term of the Colbert County Grand Jury for second degree theft. The following is a chronology of events related to Warren's case which shed light on the instant appeal:
November 4, 1981: A District Court complaint was prepared charging Warren with third degree burglary. An arrest warrant was also issued.
November 5, 1981: After Warren's arrest, he secured a bail bond pending his indictment.
December 23, 1981: Warren was appointed counsel, Alan Gargis, by District Court Judge George Carpenter. Warren also waived action on his case until the next term of the grand jury.
March 3, 1982: Warren was indicted for second degree theft.
March 15, 1982: Warren was arraigned and pled not guilty. He was represented by Alan Gargis.
March 22, 1982: With the advice and consent of Gargis, Warren pled guilty to the theft charge and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment.
March 25, 1982: The trial judge, N. Pride Tompkins, ordered a probation hearing, to be held on April 21, 1982.
April 5-19, 1982: Sometime during this period of time, Warren visited appellant at his office. After a discussion of his case, Warren retained appellant for the purpose of filing a motion for a new trial, and to appeal.
April 21, 1982: On the date set for Warren's probation hearing, appellant, as counsel for Warren, filed a motion for a new trial in his case. Gargis was still the attorney of record at this time. The probation hearing was postponed.
April 30, 1982: The trial judge set May 3, 1982, as the date for the hearing on the motion for a new trial. Warren's court-appointed counsel, Alan Gargis, was also notified of the hearing.
May 3, 1982: The hearing on Warren's motion for new trial was held. Appellant represented Warren at the motion. Mr. Gargis was dismissed as Warren's counsel. The motion was granted and the trial judge set June 14, 1982, as the date for his new trial.
May 10, 1982: Apparently, Warren's April 21, 1982, probation hearing was rescheduled to this date. The record also supports the conclusion that appellant was not to represent him at such. Upon the granting of Warren's motion for a new trial, the hearing became unnecessary.
May 13, 1982: Appellant filed a motion to quash the indictment charging Warren with second degree theft.
June 9, 1982: A hearing on the motion to quash was held. Without considering the merits of the motion, appellant was held in criminal contempt of court. He was dismissed as Warren's counsel, with the trial court to appoint new counsel.
At the May 3, 1982, hearing on Warren's motion for a new trial, appellant was confused as to whether a hearing on the merits was, in fact, scheduled. Warren was not present during the first portion of the hearing as appellant misunderstood the instructions given to him on April 30, 1982, by the trial judge and, thus, had not instructed him to appear. After an extensive colloquy concerning the misunderstanding, the trial judge postponed the hearing until the afternoon, in order that Warren could be present.
Later, in the morning meeting, the issue of the scope of appellant's representation of Warren was raised by the trial judge. We quote from the record:
That afternoon, after the motion for a new trial had been granted, the trial judge inquired of Warren as to who represented him. We quote from the record:
Gargis inquired of appellant as to why he accepted Warren's case and filed the motion without first notifying him. Appellant responded:
(R. 10-11) (Emphasis added).
Gargis requested the trial judge to explain his relationship with Warren's case if Warren decided not to retain appellant as trial counsel. The trial judge responded:
Subsequent thereto, appellant informed the trial judge that he would challenge Warren's indictment through a motion to quash. He also successfully argued to allow Warren to remain on his original bond pending his new trial. (R 13-15).
At the June 9, 1982, hearing on Warren's motion to quash the indictment, the trial judge, before addressing the merits of the motion, inquired of appellant as to whether he was to represent Warren at trial. We quote from the record:
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