Graham v. United States

Decision Date29 April 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action 21-cv-03053-NYW
PartiesRICKY T. GRAHAM, and CONNIE L. ARCHULETA, Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Colorado
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Nina Y. Wang, Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the court on the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) (the “Motion” or Motion to Dismiss) filed on February 4, 2022 by Defendant United States of America. [Doc. 16]. The court considers the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and the Order of Reference for all purposes dated January 5 2022. [Doc. 9]. Being fully advised in the premises, the court concludes that oral argument would not materially assist in the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss. Upon review of the Motion, the related briefing, and the applicable case law, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The court draws the following facts primarily from the Complaint for Declaration to Quiet Title Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (the “Complaint”). [Doc. 1].[1] Plaintiffs Ricky T. Graham (Mr. Graham) and Connie L. Archuleta (Ms. Archuleta) are siblings who claim title to mineral interests in real property situated in Adams County Colorado (the “Property”). [Id. at ¶¶ 2, 4, 31]. In 1902, the United States conveyed the Property to David McD. Graham (David Graham I) via United States patent, “without mineral reservation.” [Id. at ¶¶ 25-26; Doc 1-5]. The Parties agree that a mortgage was recorded on the Property in 1903. [Doc. 16 at 2; Doc. 17 at 3; Doc. 17-2]. A notice of lis pendens was later filed in the District Court of Adams County, Colorado to foreclose on the mortgage, [Doc. 17 at 3; Doc. 17-3], and the mortgage was foreclosed upon in 1909. [Doc. 16 at 2; Doc. 16-1 at 11].

The Property subsequently passed through several owners. See [Doc. 16 at 2; Doc. 17 at 4; Doc. 16-1 at 11-28; Doc. 17-8; Doc. 17-9]. Eventually, the Property was owned by Ernest L. Tiedeman and Myra F. Tiedeman (the “Tiedemans”). [Doc. 16-1 at 28]. In August 1942, the United States recorded a notice of lis pendens on the Property, stating that the government had initiated an action “to purchase and acquire by condemnation the absolute fee simple title” to 20, 000 acres of land, which included the Property. [Doc. 16-1 at 29]. The Tiedemans conveyed the Property to the United States through a deed recorded on January 26, 1943 (the 1943 Deed”). [Id. at 32; Doc. 1-6].

Plaintiffs allege that they came into possession of mineral interests associated with the Property as follows: David Graham I died intestate in 1908. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 30, 32]. At the time of his death, David Graham I had four living children, [2] including Thomas A. Graham (Thomas Graham I). [Id. at ¶ 34]. Plaintiffs allege that Thomas Graham I acquired a one-fourth portion of the mineral rights after David Graham I's passing. [Id. at ¶ 35].

Thomas Graham I and his wife, Camille Graham, had four children, including Thomas M. Graham (Thomas Graham II). [Id. at ¶ 38]. The three other children preceded Thomas Graham I in death, leaving Thomas Graham II as the sole heir to Thomas Graham I and Camille Graham. [Id.]. Thus, Plaintiffs allege that after the deaths of Thomas Graham I and Camille Graham, the subject mineral interests were passed down to Thomas Graham II-Plaintiffs' father. [Id. at ¶ 39]. It is Plaintiffs' position that the subject mineral rights were conveyed to them upon Thomas Graham II's death. [Id. at ¶ 45].[3]

The United States, however, claims an ownership interest in the subject mineral rights. [Id. at ¶ 3]. Plaintiffs state that they became aware of the United States' claim to the mineral rights on December 6, 2018 via a letter sent by the United States Bureau of Land Management to Ms. Archuleta. [Id. at ¶ 41]. According to Plaintiffs, their “predecessors-in-interest were unaware, and should not have known to be aware, of any such claim by the United States as to the real property and/or the mineral interests” prior to Ms. Archuleta's receipt of the 2018 letter. [Id.]. On May 18, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Petition to Determine Heirship in the District Court for Adams County, Colorado, and filed a Notice of Hearing to Interested Persons pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1512-1303 on June 23, 2020. [Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5]. Though the United States never appeared in state court, it took the position through letters to Plaintiffs' counsel and the court that jurisdiction in state court was improper. See, e.g., [id. at ¶¶ 6, 10, 12]. On March 22, 2021, the state court “suspended proceedings until a federal action was completed.” [Id. at ¶ 13].

Plaintiffs initiated this federal action on November 12, 2021 pursuant to the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a et seq. See generally [id.]. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment[4] that (1) David Graham I had “right, title, and interest” in the subject minerals at the time of his death; (2) the United States has no interest in the subject minerals; and (3) Plaintiffs “are the heirs and present owners of a [one-fourth] interest . . . of the minerals.” [Id. at ¶ 47].

Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on February 4, 2022. [Doc. 16]. In the Motion, Defendant argues that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claim because the claim is barred by the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations. See [id. at 1]. Plaintiffs responded in opposition on February 25, 2022, arguing that their Quiet Title Act claim is not barred because neither Plaintiffs nor their predecessors in interest had actual or constructive knowledge of any claim to the mineral rights by the United States until 2018. See generally [Doc. 17]. With Defendant's consent and with leave of court, see [Doc. 20; Doc. 21], Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (the “Supplement”). [Doc. 22]. Defendant subsequently filed a Reply. [Doc. 23]. The Motion is thus ripe for disposition, and I consider the Parties' arguments below.

LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). As such, courts “are duty bound to examine facts and law in every lawsuit before them to ensure that they possess subject matter jurisdiction.” Wilderness Soc. v. Kane Cty., 632 F.3d 1162, 1179 n.3 (10th Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Indeed, courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party. 1mage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds, Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006)).

Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction may take two different forms-a facial attack or a factual attack-which implicate different analytical frameworks. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has explained that

[m]otions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may take one of two forms. First, a party may make a facial challenge to the plaintiff's allegations concerning subject matter jurisdiction, thereby questioning the sufficiency of the complaint. In addressing a facial attack, the district court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true. Second, a party may go beyond allegations contained in the complaint and challenge the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends. In addressing a factual attack, the court does not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's factual allegations, but has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1).

United States v. Rodriquez Aguirre, 264 F.3d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation and citations omitted)). The burden of establishing jurisdiction rests with the party asserting jurisdiction. Kline v. Biles, 861 F.3d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 2017).

II. Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity shields the United States and its agencies from suit. San Juan Cty. v. United States, 754 F.3d 787, 792 (10th Cir. 2014). This is so unless Congress unequivocally expresses its intention to waive the government's sovereign immunity in the statutory text.” Governor of Kan. v. Kempthorne, 516 F.3d 833, 841 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Application of the sovereign immunity doctrine precludes a federal court's jurisdiction over a case. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”); see also Rigsby v. United States, 91 Fed.Appx. 103, 105 (10th Cir. 2004) (a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction where “no sovereign immunity was waived.”). “Consequently, plaintiffs may not proceed unless they can establish that the United States has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to their claim.” Iowa Tribe Of Kan. & Neb. v. Salazar, 607 F.3d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 2010).

ANALYSIS

The United States argues that Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest knew or should have known in 1943-based on the recorded 1943 Deed-that the United States had a claim to the subject mineral interests and thus, Plaintiffs' Quiet Title Act claim accrued at that time. [Doc. 16 at 5-6]. It follows, according to Defendant, that because this case was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations, the government's waiver of sovereign immunity is inapplicable here and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. [Id. at 6]. In response, Plaintiffs argue that they and their predecessors in interests did not know and should not have known, of any claim asserted by the...

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