Graham v. Western Union Telegraph Co

• Decision Date: 16 February 1903
• Docket Number: 14,501
• Citation: 34 So. 91,109 La. 1069
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: GRAHAM v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO

34 So. 91

109 La. 1069

GRAHAM v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO

No. 14,501

Supreme Court of Louisiana

February 16, 1903

Rehearing denied March 30, 1903.

Action by John M. Graham against the Western Union Telegraph Company. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and plaintiff applies for certiorari or writ of review. Judgment of Court of Appeal reversed, and cause remanded.

Horace H. White, Chandler C. Luzenberg, and William C. McLeod, for applicant.

Denegre Blair & Denegre and William Wirt Howe, for respondent.

OPINION

NICHOLLS, C.J.

Statement of the Case.

The plaintiff brought suit in the civil district court for the parish of Orleans against the defendant company to recover damages against it by reason of its failure to promptly transmit and deliver to his wife a telegram announcing the serious illness and approaching death of her son.

The damages were claimed because of "the mental pain and anguish" occasioned the mother by not being able to reach the son prior to and after his death.

The district court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $ 250. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal, and the latter court sustained an exception of "no cause of action," which had been filed "on the ground that mental anguish and suffering, unattended by any injury to person property, health, or reputation, resulting from simple actionable negligence, is not sufficient basis for an action for damages."

The correctness of that judgment has been brought for review to this court.

Opinion.

In that opinion it is said that the doctrine announced by it is supported by the great weight of authority in the states of the Union and in England, though the Supreme Courts of Texas, Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee hold the contrary view.

The organ of the court cited the states in which the doctrine which it recognized as being the law prevailed, together with a long list of adjudicated cases, and extracts taken from the same.

The principal extract is taken from Butner v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 37 P. 1087, decided by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in which the court uses the following language: "Some [courts] hold that mental anguish is not a cause of action, but is merely a dependent incident to be taken into consideration, in addition to pecuniary damages shown, while others say that it is an independent cause of action -- a distinct element of damages. Some hold that negligence sufficient to uphold a recovery must be willful; others, that simple negligence will suffice. Some uphold recovery on the ground of punishment; others, upon the ground of compensation; and some blend both grounds. This conflict exists only between courts of the different states entertaining this view, but no instance is exhibited in the decisions of a single state. The Supreme Court of Texas, in the course of its adjudications upon this subject, has held both the affirmative and negative of all the propositions above enumerated. The Tennessee and Alabama cases are not authority in favor of plaintiff's position, because they refuse to recognize mental pain as an element of damage. They hold it to be an incident, merely, to be taken into consideration in addition to pecuniary loss."

In Kester v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (C. C.) 55 F. 603, the judge who rendered the opinion, after adversely criticizing the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas in So Relle v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 55 Tex. 308, 40 Am. Rep. 805, in which it was held that the addressee of a telegraph message might recover compensatory damages for mental anguish caused by the failure of the telegraph company to promptly deliver a message announcing the death of the plaintiff's father, and summoning her to his funeral, said: "We think the rule first laid down by the Texas court is a departure from the sound and safe principles of the common law. The difficulty of estimating a pecuniary compensation for mental anguish is itself a sufficient reason for the common-law rule in preventing a recovery for mental anguish in actions for simple negligence or breach of contract. The amount of litigation which would grow out of the adoption of such a rule would be intolerable. The measure of damages to be adopted would be so indefinite and indefinable as to subject the defendant in such cases to the possibility of great oppression."

It is useless for us to refer to decisions of courts exercising functions where the common law prevails upon a subject-matter in regard to which we have to be controlled by local law. In France, not only do material injuries furnish ground for legal actions for redress, but so, also, do what are there referred to as "moral injuries." The doctrine rests there upon jurisprudence. In Louisiana it rests upon positive statute. Article 1382 of the Code Napoleon, which relates to offenses and quasi offenses, corresponds to article 2315 of our Civil Code, and declares: "Tout fait quelconque de l'homme qui cause a autrui un dommage oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrive a le reparer." Under that article we find in Dalloz & Verge authorities to the following effect:

No. 46. "Un dommage materiel n'est pas le seule qui donne ouverture a l'action en reparation il suffit d'un interet moral."

No. 290. "Que le prejudice cause soit materiel ou moral la responsabilite est encourrue."

Nos. 107, 243. "Le chiffre des dommages interets dus a la veuve et aux enfans de la victime d'un accident de chemin de fer, doit etre base non seulement sur le dommage materiel par eux eprouve, mais encore sur le prejudice moral resultant de la perte du pere de famille des affections brisees et de la douleur sans que neanmoins la somme soit hors de proportion avec la perte reelle et appreciable a prix d'argent."

No. 342. "Lorsqu'il y a prejudice moral les tribunaux doivent l'apprecier suivant les regles de l'equite."

We find also under articles 1133-1149, Code Napoleon, which relate to contracts, the following authorities:

Under article 1149, No. 6: "Le prejudice moral donne lieu a des dommages, interets s'il peut etre evalue d'une facon quelconque."

No. 7. "Le seul prejudice moral cause par exemple par un appel sans fondement suffit pour donner lieu a des dommages interets."

No. 9. "La difficulte de determiner l'etendu d'un prejudice moral par exemple celui qui fait souffrira a un negociant le prolet de sa signature n'est pas un motif pour les juges de n'allouer aucuns dommages, interets: ils doivent en pareil cas apprecier le prejudice suivant les regles de l'equite."

Under article 1133, Code Napoleon:

No. 260. "Le prejudice peut etre materiel ou moral. Bien que le prejudice moral ne se compose pas d'elements faciles a resumer en chiffre comme le prejudice materiel il en doit etre tenu compte."

No 261. "Ainsi l'inexecution d'une promesse de marriage peut donner lieu a des dommages, interets aussi bien...