Grainger County v. State

• Decision Date: 05 May 1904
• Citation: Grainger County v. State, 80 S.W. 750, 111 Tenn. 234 (Tenn. 1904)
• Parties: GRAINGER COUNTY et al. v. STATE ex rel. MYNATT et al. STATE ex rel. FRANCISCO v. FOSTER et al. STATE ex rel. v. MILLER et al. STATE ex rel. v. ROANE COUNTY COURT et al. ILES v. STATE ex rel. MATLOCK et al. BERRY v. JACKSON.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

80 S.W. 750

111 Tenn. 234

GRAINGER COUNTY et al. v. STATE ex rel. MYNATT et al.STATE ex rel. FRANCISCO v. FOSTER et al.

STATE ex rel. v. MILLER et al.

STATE ex rel. v. ROANE COUNTY COURT et al.

ILES v. STATE ex rel. MATLOCK et al.

BERRY v. JACKSON.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

May 5, 1904

Appeal from Circuit Court, Grainger County; G. McHenderson, Judge.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Hamblen County; Hugh G. KyleChancellor.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Hawkins County; Hugh G. KyleChancellor.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Roane County; George L. Burke, Judge.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Loudon County; George L. Burke, Judge.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Claiborne County; C.J. St. John, Judge.

Controversies between Grainger county and others and the state of Tennessee on the relation of W. H. Mynatt and others; state of Tennessee on the relation of George B. Francisco and I. T Foster and others; state of Tennessee ex rel. and T. C Miller and others; state of Tennessee ex rel. and the county court of Roane county and others; T. C. Iles, chairman, etc., and the state of Tennessee on the relation of J. P. Matlock and others; Jas. G. Berry and C. C. Jackson.Decrees ordered pursuant to opinion.

NEIL J.

These cases were brought in the courts of the several counties above named, and, in various forms, involve the constitutionality of certain acts passed by the Legislature of 1903 abolishing divers civil districts in the counties named.

In order to a proper understanding of the exact questions raised, it will be necessary to quote the title and two sections of one of these acts.We select the Roane county act, which fairly represents the form and substance of all of the others.

The act affecting Roane county is chapter 16, p. 41, of the Acts of 1903.The title of the act is as follows:

"An act to abolish the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Tenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth and Twenty-First Civil Districts of Roane county, as now laid out and constituted; to abolish the offices of the justices of the peace and constables thereof; to attach the territory therein to the Third, Fifth, Seventeenth, Thirteenth and Sixteenth Civil Districts of said county and to renumber the same."

After making the changes above indicated, the act proceeds as follows:

"Sec. 3.Be it further enacted, that the number of civil districts for said county as herein established shall not be increased or diminished except by act of the General Assembly.

"Sec. 4.Be it further enacted, that the offices of all justices of the peace and constables, in the several districts herein abolished, be, and the same are hereby abolished, but this act shall not be construed to apply to justices of the peace elected in and for incorporated towns in said county."

The matter contained in the last clause of section 4, just quoted, does not appear in any of the other acts.

The general law in existence and applicable to all the counties of the state at the time these acts were passed is to be found in sections 95 to 99, inclusive, of Shannon's Code, and in the corresponding sections of the Code of 1858--77 to 81, inclusive.

The first of these sections, taken from the act of 1835(Acts 1835-36, p. 19, c. 1, § 2), provides that the districts already laid off in the several counties of the state shall continue until altered in the manner pointed out by law.

The remaining sections provide a general plan for laying off counties into civil districts by the county court.

Before entering upon a particular consideration of the acts above referred to, it is deemed useful to recall a principle of a accepted authority in the science of constitutional construction, to the effect that the Constitution is not the beginning of law for the state, but it assumes the existence of well-understood system which is to remain in force, and to be administered under such limitations and restrictions as that instrument imposes (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 74;People v. Draper,15 N.Y. 532;Pope v. Phifer, 3 Heisk. 682;Williams v. Taxing District, 16 Lea, 535), and that, in construing the Constitution, the state of the community at the time it was created must be considered (Pope v. Phifer, 3 Heisk. 386, 387;Jackson v. Nimmo, 3 Lea, 600).

Bearing in mind the rule above mentioned, it is to be remembered that, when the convention of 1870 undertook its work, it had before it a state fully organized, and possessing a constitutional, legislative, and judicial history.The state was then, as now, a political entity, having a corps of officers that were distinctly state officials, namely, a Governor, the heads of the several departments of state, judges of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General and reporter to the state, clerks of the Supreme Court, and the members of the two houses of the General Assembly.Then, as now, the state was divided, for convenience of administration, into counties, and these counties had each its corps of officers, namely, justices of the peace, constables, a sheriff, coroner, ranger, trustee, register, clerk of the county court, clerk of the circuit court, and clerk and master of the chancery court.Then, as now, the counties were already divided into civil districts, in which were to be elected justices of the peace and constables.The several counties were at that time also grouped into judicial circuits and chancery divisions; each circuit being presided over by a circuit judge, and served by a district attorney for the state, and each chancery division being presided over by a chancellor.These were also state officers, but assigned to limited areas--their respective circuits and divisions--and these areas were subject to change from time to time by the Legislature.

Before coming directly to a consideration of the acts in question, it will be proper to make a short review of the decisions of this court upon the constitutional powers of the Legislature over such of the above-mentioned offices as have been drawn into litigation or have been commented upon in the decisions of this court.

The most conspicuous of these offices which have thus been drawn into litigation are those of the circuit judges and chancellors.

At the September term, 1875, this court had under consideration an act entitled "An act to abolish the Second circuit court and the Second chancery court of Shelby county."In that case the following propositions were established, namely: That the power to ordain and establish courts contained in article 6, § 1, of the Constitution of 1870, includes the power to abolish particular circuit and chancery courts, but the Legislature cannot abolish the distinctive character of circuit and chancery courts themselves (that is, cannot abolish the system); that upon the abolition of a circuit or chancery court, with all of its powers and jurisdiction, the necessary consequence is that the circuit judge or chancellor is deprived of his office.Coleman v. Campbell, 3 Tenn. Cas. 355.The last of these propositions was reaffirmed at the April term, 1879, in Halsey v. Gaines, 2 Lea, 316; and all of them were reaffirmed at the April term, 1899, in the Judges' Cases, 102 Tenn. 509 et seq., 53 S.W. 134, and in State v. Lindsay,103 Tenn. 625, 53 S.W. 950, and, in substance, in the case of State ex rel. v. King,104 Tenn. 156, 57 S.W. 150, decided at the December term 1899.

In Powers v. Hurst, 2 Humph. 24, it was held that a register's constitutional term of four years could not be shortened by law; in Brewer v. Davis, 9 Humph.208, 213, 214, 49 Am. Dec. 706, the same decision was made in respect of the four-years term of a circuit court clerk.In State v. Cummins,99 Tenn. 667, 683, 42 S.W. 880, it was held that the Legislature could not deprive the sheriff of a substantial element of his office, as to take from him the county jail, and the care and custody of the prisoners therein, or abolish his office, for the reason that he is a constitutional officer, and, as such, protected by the Constitution.In State v. Leonard,86 Tenn. 485, 7 S.W. 453, it was held that the Legislature has no power to terminate the office of a judge of a county court elected under a constitutional law, and for a constitutional term of eight years, within that term, at the same time leaving the court with its jurisdiction in existence and unimpaired, by simply devolving the duties of the office upon another official, namely, the chairman of the county court.

As to the office of justice of the peace, it was held in Keys v. Mason, 3 Sneed, 6, under the Constitution of 1834, that the term was six years as to all justices of the peace, whether elected to fill a vacancy, as the one in question was, or elected generally, and that a legislative act was void which undertook, by direct legislation upon the office, to cut down the term of such a justice of the peace (one filling a vacancy) to the unexpired term of his predecessor.

In Cross and Mercer, Ex parte, 16 Lea, 486, the same question, in a special aspect, was again considered.

All of the foregoing authorities were referred to in the Judges' Cases, 102 Tenn. 510, 53 S.W. 134, and a comparison was there instituted between the offices above mentioned--register, sheriff, county judge, and the Supreme Court, on the one hand, and the inferior courts, upon the other.

In that case there were two opinions delivered in behalf of the majority of the court --one by McAlister, J., and the other by Wilkes, J.; the two concurring throughout, except upon one point, which does not fall within the scope of the present inquiry, and need not be further mentioned.

The opinion of McAlister, J., after stating that Keys v Mason, 3 Sneed, 6,...