Grainger v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 18469
| Decision Date | 01 March 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 18469,18469 |
| Parties | A. B. GRAINGER, Respondent, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Burroughs & Green, Conway, for appellant.
J. Reuben Long, Conway, for respondent.
A. B. Grainger, the respondent herein, brought this action against Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, the appellant herein, under Section 21--840(c) of the 1962 Code, for the recovery of actual damages to his pick-up truck as a result of the negligent operation of a school bus. The statute mentioned requires insurance on all state owned school busses, indemnifying, among others, any person who suffers property damage by reason of the negligent operation of a school bus. Only actual damages may be recovered.
It appears from the complaint that the respondent is a member of the general public and he alleges that his property damage was caused by a collision between a pick-up truck owned and operated by him and a school bus. He further alleges the damage to his pick-up truck was directly and proximately caused by the negligence of the driver of the school bus. The answer of the appellant contained a general denial and a plea of contributory negligence and recklessness on the part of the respondent.
This case came on for trial before the Honorable Claude M. Epps, Judge of the Civil and Criminal Court of Horry County, and a jury. At the close of all the testimony, the appellant made a motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from all the testimony was that the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence. This motion was refused. The trial judge submitted to the jury the question of whether the driver of the school bus was guilty of negligence and whether the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence in the operation of his truck. The jury returned a verdict for actual damages in favor of the respondent. After the rendition of said verdict, the appellant moved for judgment Non obstante veredicto and, in the alternative, for a new trial. The motion was refused and this appeal followed.
A brief reference to the testimony is necessary for a proper understanding of the question raised by the exception of the appellant. According to the testimony of the respondent, on the morning of May 22, 1962, he was driving his truck over and along highway No. 306 at a speed of twenty-five to thirty miles per hour when he got behind a school bus and followed it a quarter of a mile on a straight paved road. Both vehicles were approaching the intersection of the paved highway, on which they were traveling, and an unimproved county road. The respondent lived approximately one-half mile from the scene of the accident, having resided there for thirty-eight years. The evidence shows that he knew of and was completely familiar with the intersection of the paved highway and the unimproved county road. He testified that as he attempted to pass the school bus at the intersection it turned left to enter the county road, colliding with his truck. When the respondent was asked as to why he did not pass the school bus before he got to the intersection, his reply was, 'I believe other cars were coming.' He testified that he saw no signal lights given by the school bus driver of any intention to turn into the unimproved county road. The respondent and a highway patrolman fixed the point of collision as being in the left lane of the center of the intersection of the two roads.
The motions of the appellant for a directed verdict and judgment Non obstante veredicto were on the ground that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from all of the testimony was that the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in overtaking and attempting to pass the school bus on the left side of said highway when within one hundred feet of the intersection of the unimproved county road and the paved highway.
Section 46--388 of the 1962 Code of Laws, provides:
'No vehicle shall at any time be driven to the left side of the roadway under the following conditions:
'* * * (2) When approaching within one hundred feet of or traversing any...
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