Grall v. Meyer

• Citation: 173 N.W.2d 61,38 A.L.R.3d 412
• Decision Date: 09 December 1969
• Docket Number: No. 53634,53634
• Parties: Viola GRALL and Charles Grall, Appellees, v. Paul MEYER, d/b/a Plamor Ball Room, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Page 61

173 N.W.2d 61

38 A.L.R.3d 412

Viola GRALL and Charles Grall, Appellees, v. Paul MEYER, d/b/a Plamor Ball Room, Appellant.

No. 53634.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 9, 1969.

Johnson, Burnquist & Erb, Fort Dodge, for appellant.

Bastian, Beisser & Carlson, Fort Dodge, for appellees.

LeGRAND, Justice.

This is an action by Viola Grall and Charles Grall, husband and wife, for injuries sustained by Viola Grall while she was a paying patron at defendant's dance hall. Charles Grall was not himself injured and joins as plaintiff only to recover for loss of consortium. We refer to the wife as though she were the sole plaintiff.

Defendant is the owner of Plamor Ball Room in Fort Dodge. The hall is a large rectangular room with an elevated stage at the north end and built-in booths along the entire east and west walls. The south end leads into a lobby. When necessary to provide more seating space, defendant installs movable tables and chairs along the east side parallel to the booths. There are then two rows of seating accommodations with an aisle between. When set up in this fashion, the tables and chairs encroach upon what is normally dancing area.

Plaintiff was familiar with the dance hall and its arrangement. She attended dances there three or four times each year. On May 7, 1966, she and her husband, together with another couple, arrived at Plamor Ball Room about 10:15 P.M. They found an empty booth, and plaintiff and her husband immediately set out to dance. They had danced only a few moments when plaintiff tripped over a chair belonging to one of the movable tables and fell to the floor, sustaining the injuries for which she now seeks recovery.

The case was tried to the court without a jury. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court made brief findings of fact which merely recited defendant was negligent for failing to provide a safe place for plaintiff to dance. Plaintiff was awarded judment for $3424.30, and her husband was given $200.00 for loss of consortium. We give no further consideration to the plaintiff's injuries nor to the amount of the recovery allowed, since they are not important to this appeal.

Defendant assigns three errors but they raise only one issue--that there is insufficient evidence to support the findings of the trial court.

The findings of fact by the court in jury-waived cases have the effect of a special verdict. They are binding on us if there is substantial evidence to support them. Rules 334 and 344(f)(1), Rules of Civil Procedure; Hackney v. Tower, 260 Iowa 1101, 1105, 152 N.W.2d 257, 259; Naxera v. Wathan, Iowa, 159 N.W.2d 513, 516; Townsley v. Sioux City, Iowa, 165 N.W.2d 523.

Several other well established rules are applicable here. One is that we construe the evidence broadly to uphold, rather than defeat, the trial court's judgment. Clark v. Marietta, 258 Iowa 106, 109, 138 N.W.2d 107, 109; Schnabel v. Vanghn, 258 Iowa 839, 845, 140 N.W.2d 168, 172; Brooks v. Dickey, Iowa, 158 N.W.2d 11, 13. Another is that negligence, contributory negligence and proximate cause are ordinarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact. Only in exceptional cases are they determined as a matter of law. Rule 344(f)(10), R.C.P.; Smith v. J. C. Penney Company, 260 Iowa 573, 576, 149 N.W.2d 794, 796.

The record before us is quite short. The entire case was tried without objection by defendant to the admission of testimony or other rulings of the trial court. No motion was made attacking the sufficiency of the evidence. No motion for new trial was filed. Under the provisions of rule 179, R.C.P., defendant may still raise here the question of sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of the trial court. Murphy v. Adams, 253 Iowa 235, 238, 111 N.W.2d 687, 689. That is the only question presented to us by this record.

At the time of the injury plaintiff was an invitee at defendant's place of business, and her right to recover is dependent upon the duty he owed her under such circumstances. An owner or occupier of real estate is not an insurer of those who use his property by invitation. He must only use reasonable care to make the premises safe for the intended use. There are numerous cases setting out this rule, and we cite only two of our more recent ones. Hanson v. Town and Country Shopping Center, Inc., 259 Iowa 542, 547, 144 N.W.2d 870, 874; Weidenhaft v. Shoppers Fair of Des Moines, Inc., Iowa, 165 N.W.2d 756, 758, 759 and citations.

We have sometimes said the duty of one who operates a place of entertainment or amusement is higher than that of the owner of private property generally. Priebe v. Kossuth County Agricultural Ass'n, 251 Iowa 93, 98, 99 N.W.2d 292, 295; Foust v. Kinley, 254 Iowa 690, 694, 117 N.W.2d 843, 845, 846. See also 86 C.J.S. Theaters and Shows § 42a, and § 42b(2), pages 726 and 730; and 4 Am.Jur.2d, Amusements and Exhibitions, section 85, page 209. This, however, does not change the standard of reasonable care by which liability is measured. All it does is recognize that the greater the danger, the higher the precaution necessary to constitute reasonable care.

Usually those operating places of entertainment or amusement do so under conditions which bring together large crowds whose conduct is difficult to supervise or control. Frequently such places involve participation in some game or sport, or watching some game or sport, with inevitable attendant dangers. The law requires only reasonable care of the operator of such places to protect his invitees from those dangers which he can or should anticipate under those conditions.

In Foust v. Kinley, supra, 254 Iowa at page 694, 117 N.W.2d at page 846, we said, 'He (the operator of a place of amusement) is not an insurer of the safety of patrons but owes to them only what, under the particular circumstances, is ordinary and reasonable care. He must guard them not only against dangers of which he had actual notice but also against those he should reasonably anticipate. Failure to carry out such duty is negligence.'

In LaSell v. Tri-States Theatre Corporation, 233 Iowa 929, 955, 11 N.W.2d 36, 47, after stating that increased danger requires increased watchfulness to avoid injury, we said, 'In fact, it (partial darkness) requires him to increase his care and watchfulness, if necessary, to make it commensurate with and in proportion to the patent and to the reasonably expectable and foreseeable dangers which may injure his invitees and patrons. Such increased care, nevertheless, is nothing more than the legal standard of ordinary, or reasonable, care. * * *'

In Priebe v. Kossuth County Agricultural Association, Inc., 251 Iowa 93, 104, 99 N.W.2d 292, 299, we quote with approval from Schubart v. Hotel Astor, Inc., 281 N.Y. 597, 22 N.E.2d 167, as follows: 'When one assembles a crowd * * * upon his property for purposes of financial gain to himself he assumes the responsibility of 'using all reasonable care to protect the individuals from injury from causes reasonably to be anticipated.' * * *; and whether * * * the precautions taken are sufficient is ordinarily a question for the jury to determine under all the circumstances.'

We must decide if, under these general rules, there was substantial evidence under which the trial court could find defendant negligent. We hold there was.

Beginning with Hanson v. Town and Country Shopping Center, Inc., supra, our business-invitee rule has been qualified to put it more in harmony with rules 343 and 344, Restatement, Second, Torts. Prior to Hanson we held a possessor of real estate was not liable for injuries from dangers of which the injured person had actual knowledge. Atherton v. Hoenig's Grocery, 249 Iowa 50, 54, 86 N.W.2d 252, 255. Since Hanson, the owner of land may nevertheless be liable if the circumstances are such that he should...