Gramiak v. Beasley
Citation | 304 Ga. 512,820 S.E.2d 50 |
Decision Date | 09 October 2018 |
Docket Number | S18A0784 |
Parties | GRAMIAK v. BEASLEY. |
Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Michael Alexander Oldham, Assistant Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, DEPARTMENT OF LAW, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, for Appellant.
Rodney Samuel Zell, ZELL & ZELL, P.C., 1111 Bull Street, Savannah, Georgia 31401, for Appellee.
This case involves the grant of a post-conviction petition for habeas corpus. After a jury trial, Isaac Beasley was found guilty of rape, aggravated sodomy, kidnapping with bodily injury, and aggravated assault. He was convicted and sentenced to 20 years for the rape offense, 10 years for aggravated sodomy, to be served consecutive to the rape sentence, life imprisonment for kidnapping with bodily injury, to be served concurrent with the sentence for rape, and 10 years for aggravated assault, to be served concurrent with the sentence for aggravated sodomy. Beasley’s direct appeal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished decision. Beasley then filed a pro se habeas petition in which he asserted he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise on direct appeal Beasley’s claim that trial counsel failed to advise him that he faced a mandatory life sentence if convicted of the kidnapping charge. He claimed that if he had been properly advised by trial counsel, he would have accepted the State’s offer of a twenty year sentence, to serve ten years in prison, with respect to the rape charge and to nolle pros the remaining charges. After the habeas court hearing at which Beasley appeared pro se, but did not testify, Beasley obtained counsel who submitted a proposed order granting the habeas petition.
The habeas court adopted counsel’s proposed order setting aside the convictions and sentences. The final order concluded that Beasley’s trial counsel provided deficient representation when he failed to advise Beasley that he would face a mandatory life sentence if convicted of kidnapping with bodily injury. The order also concluded that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on appeal because there was a reasonable probability of a different result on appeal if the issue had been raised. These conclusions were based on the habeas court’s finding that, had Beasley been advised of the mandatory sentence he was facing, he would have pleaded guilty and would have been sentenced to serve ten years in prison.
The respondent warden appeals. On appeal from the decision of a habeas court that raises ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court will adopt the habeas court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we will apply the facts to the law de novo to determine whether counsel performed deficiently and whether any deficiency was prejudicial. See Humphrey v. Morrow , 289 Ga. 864, 866, 717 S.E.2d 168 (2011). For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the habeas court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
Under the familiar test of Strickland v. Washington ,1 to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the party asserting the claim must demonstrate both deficient performance of counsel and prejudice as a result of it. Where the issue is the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the showing of prejudice calls for a demonstration that a reasonable probability exists that, but for appellate counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the appeal would have been different. See Humphrey v. Lewis , 291 Ga. 202, 211 (IV), 728 S.E.2d 603 (2012), citing Nelson v. Hall , 275 Ga. 792, 794, 573 S.E.2d 42 (2002). Consequently, where the alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is premised upon the failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, two layers of fact and law are involved in the analysis of the habeas court’s decision.
To find that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance, a reviewing court must find appellate counsel’s failure to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on appeal represents deficient professional conduct. Even if deficient performance of appellate counsel is shown, a demonstration of prejudice requires a showing that, had the ineffective assistance of trial counsel been raised on direct appeal, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the appeal would have been different. This, in turn, requires a finding that trial counsel provided deficient representation and that the defendant was prejudiced by it. In this case, if Beasley cannot show his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel, then Beasley also cannot show ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, because an attorney is not deficient for failing to raise a meritless issue on appeal.
See Shelton v. Lee , 299 Ga. 350, 357 (3), 788 S.E.2d 369 (2016) ; Humphrey v. Lewis , supra, 291 Ga. at 214 (V) (A) (i), 728 S.E.2d 603. Because the ineffectiveness of trial counsel plays a role in both prongs of the test of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, we start by examining whether Beasley has demonstrated that trial counsel was ineffective.
Addressing first the deficient performance prong of ineffective assistance, the habeas court correctly concluded that trial counsel’s performance was deficient. The transcript of the motion for new trial hearing, which was made a part of the habeas court record, shows trial counsel acknowledged he did not discuss with Beasley the possibility that he could face a life sentence if convicted because it was counsel’s belief that even the combined sentences on all counts charged would not result in a life sentence. In fact, a conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury carries a mandatory life sentence. See OCGA § 16-5-40 (d) (4). A defendant is entitled to be fully informed of certain consequences of his decision to accept or reject a plea offer, including the right to the informed legal advice of counsel regarding the possible sentences that could be imposed following a conviction at trial.2 See Cammer v. Walker , 290 Ga. 251, 255 (2), 719 S.E.2d 437 (2011).
To establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel, however, Beasley must also show he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance. See Hall v. Lewis , 286 Ga. 767, 770 (II), 692 S.E.2d 580 (2010) (). See also Rozier v. Caldwell , 300 Ga. 30, 32 (2), 793 S.E.2d 73 (2016) ( ).
In a case such as this one, involving the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a rejected plea offer, the United States Supreme Court has held that where the performance of a criminal defendant’s trial counsel was deficient, the defendant "must show the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice." Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 156, 163 (II) (B), 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012). Three criteria must be met to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. The defendant must show:
[1] that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), [2] that the court would have accepted its terms, and [3] that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.
Id. at 164, 132 S.Ct. 1376. See also Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012).3 While this Court has not expressly applied this multi-step requirement for satisfying the prejudice prong for ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a rejected plea offer, the Court of Appeals has done so. See Walker v. State , 341 Ga. App. 742, 745-746, 801 S.E.2d 621 (2017) ; State v. Lexie , 331 Ga. App. 400, 403-404, 771 S.E.2d 97 (2015). Because the courts of this State are obligated to follow the rulings of the United States Supreme Court with respect to the Sixth Amendment standard for determining prejudice in cases asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, Georgia courts must apply the standard established in Lafler and Frye for demonstrating compliance with the Sixth Amendment right of counsel in cases involving plea offers. Accord Alcorn v. State , 121 So.3d 419 (III) (Fla. 2013) ( ).
The third criterion for demonstrating prejudice is readily established in this case. The sentence under the offer’s terms (if accepted by the defendant and the trial court) would have been less severe than the mandatory life sentence imposed for the conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury. It is the first and second criteria that pose difficult issues in this case.
With respect to whether the plea offer would have been presented to the trial court, the record reflects no intervening circumstances that might have prompted the State to withdraw its plea offer since the plea hearing was held immediately prior to the trial’s commencement. But a conclusion that the...
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