Granato v. Bravo, 15165
| Decision Date | 18 July 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 15165,15165 |
| Citation | 498 S.W.2d 499 |
| Parties | Willie J. GRANATO, Appellant, v. Epifanio BRAVO et ux., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Joe E. Briscoe, Allen Curtis Lee, Robert Lynn McGowen, Devine, for appellant.
Franklin & Franklin, Jourdanton, for appellees.
This is an appeal by plaintiff, Willie J. Granato, from the action of the trial court in withdrawing the case from the jury and rendering judgment denying plaintiff's prayer for specific performance of an agreement by defendants, Epifanio Bravo and wife, Polo Bravo, to convey land to plaintiff.
The agreement sued on is based on the exercise by plaintiff of his rights under a purported option agreement.
On February 2, 1966, plaintiff and defendant, Epifanio Bravo, executed an instrument by which plaintiff became the lessee of The lease was for a term beginning January 1, 1966, and ending January 1, 1971.
On June 14, 1966, plaintiff and defendants executed an instrument bearing the caption, 'ADDENDA.' This instrument, after referring to the lease of February 2, 1966, which was described as recited that '. . . this additional agreement be made a part of said original rental contract and shall become an addenda thereto.' The operative part of the instrument declared that defendants gave plaintiff an option to purchase '. . . the above described land . . .' at any time during the term of the original lease at the price of $75 per acre, to be paid in cash at the time of purchase, with all rents paid by defendants prior to such purchase to be applied to the purchase price.
On May 15, 1970, plaintiff notified defendants in writing of his decision to exercise the option, and this suit was filed following defendants' refusal to deliver a deed.
At the conclusion of the testimony, motions for instructed verdict were filed by both plaintiff and defendants. Defendants' motion presented the sole contention that there was no consideration for the option contained in the June 14, 1966, addendum to the lease. The judgment of the trial court does not recite the basis for the withdrawal of the case from the jury and the ruling in favor of defendants.
Plaintiff presents a single point of error in which he asserts that there was evidence which would support a finding of consideration; that the addendum was but an incomplete statement of the oral agreement between the parties and that, therefore, the existence of consideration could be established by parol testimony; and that, in any event, even if a lack of consideration be assumed, the language of the addendum agreement constitutes an offer to sell which plaintiff accepted before it was revoked.
We find it unnecessary to consider plaintiff's point of error because we have concluded that, as defendants assert, under the evidence they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the description of the property is insufficient to support a decree of specific performance.
As already pointed out, defendants' motion for instructed verdict did not embody the contention that plaintiff had failed to adequately identify the land which he sought to force defendants to convey. However, despite the provision in Rule 268, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, to the effect that a motion for directed verdict '. . . shall state the specific grounds therefor', it is apparent that the failure of the movant to embody in the motion a ground which justifies the withdrawal of the case from the jury is not always fatal.
The decisions of the Texas courts support the conclusion that where a motion for instructed verdict is granted, 1 such ruling will be upheld if the record discloses a ground which establishes, as a matter of law, that the movant is entitled to judgment, even though such ground was not embodied in the motion for instructed verdict. The granting of a motion which makes no attempt to specify the grounds on which it is based will be upheld if the record discloses the existence of grounds adequate to support the withdrawal of the case from the jury. Harvey v. Elder, 191 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1945, writ ref'd). Sometimes, this result is based on the doctrine of harmless error. Baylor v. Eastern Seed Co., 191 S.W.2d 689 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1945, no writ). Some opinions justify this result on the theory that the opponent of the motion has waived the defect in the motion by failing to object to the lack of specification. Routte v. Guarino, 216 S.W.2d 607 (Tex.Civ.App.--Galveston 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Where the grounds specified in the motion are insufficient to justify the instruction of a verdict, the granting of the motion will nevertheless be upheld if the record discloses the existence of a ground which establishes that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As said in Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Allen, 412 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the question on appeal in such a situation '. . . is whether the prevailing party was entitled to judgment was a matter of law, and not whether he was entitled to judgment on the specific grounds alleged.'
We conclude that even if it be assumed that the only ground embodied in the motion for instructed verdict would not support the withdrawal of the case from the jury, the fact that the record discloses the lack of a sufficient description of the land which plaintiff seeks to compel defendants to convey requires that the granting of defendants' motion for instructed verdict be upheld. 2
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...1999, no pet.) (op. on reh'g); Smith v. Guthrie, 557 S.W.2d 163, 164-65 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Granato v. Bravo, 498 S.W.2d 499, 502-03 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1973, no writ). A directed verdict for a defendant is proper in two situations: when a plaintiff ......
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Peet v. Randolph
...related to, though not identical with, that of the sufficiency required to satisfy the statute of frauds. See Granato v. Bravo, 498 S.W.2d 499, 503 (Texas Civ. App. 1973). In Missouri, the substantive criteria governing the two are virtually indistinguishable, since the cases analyzing the ......
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Westchester Fire Insurance Company v. Admiral Insurance Company
...1999, no pet.) (op. on reh'g); Smith v. Guthrie, 557 S.W.2d 163, 164-65 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Granato v. Bravo, 498 S.W.2d 499, 502-03 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1973, no writ). A directed verdict is proper only under limited circumstances: (1) the evidence c......
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