Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. United States

• Decision Date: 05 October 1915
• Docket Number: 2166.
• Citation: 229 F. 116
• Parties: GRAND TRUNK RY. CO. v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

229 F. 116

GRAND TRUNK RY. CO. v. UNITED STATES.

No. 2166.

Circuit Court, of Appeals. Seventh Circuit.

October 5, 1915

Rehearing Denied January 3, 1916.

In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois Kenesaw M. Landis, Judge.

Action for statutory penalties by the United States against the Grand Trunk Railway Company. Judgment for the United States and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

The United States, defendant in error, brought this suit against plaintiff in error to recover a penalty for violation of the act of June 29, 1906 (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, Supp. 1911, p 1341), commonly known as the Twenty-Eight Hour Law, and being 'An act to prevent cruelty to animals while in transit,' etc. The declaration is in one count, and charges that plaintiff in error knowingly and willfully confined a shipment of horses, loaded at Lucknow, in Ontario, Canada, transported from that point over its road through Michigan into Illinois, and destined to a point in British Columbia, for a period exceeding 28 hours, without unloading, in accordance with the requirements of the statute. The cause was submitted to the court without a jury, upon a stipulation of facts in substance as follows: The shipment, consisting of two cars containing 17 horses each, was loaded at 12 o'clock noon on February 1, 1911, at Lucknow, in Ontario, Canada, and left that place on that date; it reached Port Huron, Mich., at 12:50 a.m. on February 2, and Elsdon, Ill., on February 3, where it was unloaded at 11:30 a.m. on that day, making a total period of 46 hours and 30 minutes from the time it left Lucknow. The point of destination was New Westminster, British Columbia, in the Dominion of Canada, and the shipment was unloaded for the purpose of watering, feeding, and resting the animals at Elsdon, Ill. It was a continuous, through shipment between the above two Canadian points by connecting carriers, of which plaintiff in error was the originating carrier and carried the animals in question from Lucknow, Ontario, to Elsdon, Ill., on its own road. On one of the cars there was a 36-hour request. Upon the evidence thus presented, the court entered judgment against plaintiff in error in the sum of $500, to reverse which judgment this writ of error was sued out.

George W. Kretzinger, Jr., of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff in error.

Charles F. Clyne and Frederick Dickinson, both of Chicago, Ill., for defendant in error.

Before BAKER, KOHLSAAT, and MACK, Circuit Judges.

KOHLSAAT Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

The pertinent sections of the statute under which this suit was instituted, omitting the portions not essential to the consideration of the case, provide:

'That no railroad * * * whose road forms any part of a line of road over which cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals shall be conveyed from one state or territory or the District of Columbia into or through another state, or territory, or the District of Columbia, * * * shall confine the same * * * for a period longer than twenty-eight consecutive hours without unloading the same in a humane manner into properly equipped pens for rest, water, and feeding, for a period of at least five consecutive hours, unless prevented by storm or by other accidental or unavoidable causes which cannot be anticipated or avoided by the exercise of due diligence and foresight. * * * That any railroad * * * who knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the provisions (of the act) shall for every such failure be liable for and forfeit and pay a penalty of not less than one hundred nor more than five hundred dollars.'

It is plaintiff in error's contention that the provisions of the statute are applicable only to shipments of live stock originating within the United States; that since the point of origin of the shipment here involved was in Ontario, Canada, there was no violation of the act, notwithstanding the fact that the period of confinement while passing through Michigan and Illinois en route to final destination in British Columbia, as to one of the cars, exceeded the 28-hour limitation.

We find no difficulty in applying the act to the conceded facts in this case, and in doing so it is unnecessary to give to any of the words of the act a meaning different from their fair and obvious...