Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. Holstein

• Decision Date: 11 December 1933
• Docket Number: No. 6429.,6429.
• Parties: GRAND TRUNK WESTERN R. CO. v. HOLSTEIN.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

67 F.2d 780 (1933)

GRAND TRUNK WESTERN R. CO. v. HOLSTEIN.

No. 6429.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

December 11, 1933.

William W. Macpherson, of Detroit, Mich. (H. V. Spike, of Detroit, Mich., on the brief), for appellant.

Elmer H. Groefsema, of Detroit, Mich. (Leo J. Carrigan and Thos. J. Bresnahan, both of Detroit, Mich., on the brief), for appellee.

Before MOORMAN, HICKS, and HICKENLOOPER, Circuit Judges.

HICKENLOOPER, Circuit Judges.

This is an action based upon alleged breach of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. 45 USCA § 11. Plaintiff testified that in the line of his duty he had brought a loaded hopper car to a stop by use of the hand brake, after a "drop" or "flying switch," experiencing no difficulty in doing so; that while the brake was still set the engine had again coupled to the car; and that he was standing upon the brake platform, "hanging on to the brake wheel," when suddenly it "spun" around, throwing him to the ground. He had not, he said upon the stand, attempted to release the brake, and the dog was firmly seated in the teeth of the ratchet wheel. Shortly after the accident, however, when asked by his fellow employees how his injury had occurred, he stated that he had set the brake so tightly that, when released by him, it had spun around, causing him to fall. He had also made this statement to the defendant's claim agent ten days after the accident. His only answer to this evidence was that he "did not remember" making such statements and that, if he had made them, they were untrue. Immediately following the accident, also, the brake was inspected and found in good condition. It was plaintiff's duty to release the brake as soon as the engine had recoupled to the car, and the testimony of the engineer supports defendant's contention that an attempt to do so was made. The plaintiff offered no evidence which is at all persuasive of the existence, or the nature, of any specific defect in the brake equipment.

Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that the court below should have directed a verdict for the defendant. The case of Didinger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 39 F. (2d) 798 (C. C. A. 6), is cited as controlling authority to the contrary. In that case we held that inefficiency of hand brake equipment might be established by showing a failure to function, when operated with due care, in the normal, natural, and usual manner; and that evidence that, after the brake had been properly set, it had suddenly released and "spun around the other way," unexplained, would establish such failure to function. We also applied the principle that failure to function is evidence of inefficiency of brake equipment, in Detroit, T. & I. R. Co. v. Hahn, 47 F.(2d) 59, where the use of the brake failed to check the speed of a car, and in Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Gowen, 65 F.(2d) 260, where the brake chain overlapped upon the staff, and, when further pressure was applied, slipped and permitted the brake wheel to jerk to the right — in the direction in which it was being turned — causing the brakeman to fall. But we have refused to apply such principle where the cause of the sudden spinning of the brake was left wholly to conjecture, and where the proofs of injury, though consistent with the existence of some defect, were at least equally consistent with some other theory of causation. Burnett v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (C. C. A.) 33 F.(2d) 579. The present case, we think, is to be aligned with Burnett v. Pennsylvania R. Co., rather than with the others.

It is to be noted that in Didinger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra, the appeal was taken from a verdict directed upon the opening statement of counsel. Consequently, there was in that case no countervailing evidence with which the claim of plaintiff might be inconsistent; and we there likened the situation to one calling for an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where proof of the occurrence requires the defendant to go forward with explanatory evidence, at the risk of suffering an adverse verdict based upon an evidential inference or procedural presumption. Compare, Lowery v. Hocking Valley R. Co. (C. C. A.) 60 F.(2d) 78; and upon the effect of a procedural presumption, Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Sieg, 53 F.(2d) 318 (C. C. A. 6). From this it would seem that the finding of inefficiency was even there founded upon an inference of physical defect to be drawn from the abnormal action of the brake under normal operating conditions. But if the plaintiff in this case must rely upon an inference of physical defect, he cannot recover. It is a familiar principle that if several inferences are deducible from the facts shown, and such inferences are equally consistent with all those facts, "a verdict in favor of the party bound to maintain one of those propositions against the other is necessarily wrong." See Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U. S. 333, 339, 53 S. Ct. 391, 77 L. Ed. 819, and cases there cited. No jury should be permitted to draw a conclusion from the evidence when the proper conclusion to be drawn lies wholly within the realm of speculation and conjecture.

The principle above referred to is ordinarily applied where either one of two conclusions may just as logically be drawn from the same set of circumstances. In such case there is no conflict of evidence. The facts are not disputed, but only the inference to be drawn from them. This is somewhat different from the situation here, where two different sets of circumstances are in evidence, each supporting only one logical inference, and where the resulting inferences, or conclusions, are wholly inconsistent with each other, yet we think that the same underlying principles should be applied in both cases. If the plaintiff presents evidence of and relies upon one set of...