Grand Trunk Western Railway Company v. George Lindsay

Citation58 L.Ed. 838,233 U.S. 42,34 S.Ct. 581
Decision Date06 April 1914
Docket NumberNo. 425,425
PartiesGRAND TRUNK WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. GEORGE LINDSAY
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Mr. George W. Kretzinger, Jr., for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 43 intentionally omitted] Mr. James C. McShane for defendant in error.

Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

The right of the plaintiff, who is defendant in error here, to recover for an alleged personal injury, was stated in two counts. In both, the wrong was alleged to have been occasioned by the negligence of the railway company, while it was engaged in carrying on interstate commerce, and while the plaintiff was employed by it in such commerce. In the first count, however, the act of Congress known as the safety appliance act [27 Stat. at L. 531, chap. 196, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3174] was expressly declared on. For the purposes of the writ of error which was prosecuted by the railroad company from the circuit court of appeals, numerous assignments of error were made and were all disposed of by the court in a full opinion. 120 C. C. A. 166, 201 Fed. 836. In view of the complexion of the case as here presented we need address ourselves to only one of such assignments, and to state the facts only so far as essential to its consideration.

The proof showed that the plaintiff was one of a crew working a switch engine, and that in a yard near Chicago such engine, coupled with four loaded freight cars, moving in interstate commerce, were held in order to make a coupling with a number of other loaded freight cars moving in interstate commerce, to the end that an interstate train bound eastward might be made up and depart. When by impact it was attempted to make the coupling, the cars failed to couple automatically, and after several efforts to cause them to do so, the plaintiff as switchman walked along beside the end of the car as it approached again the point of coupling, signaled to the engineer to stand fast, and entered between the cars for the purpose of ascertaining and remedying if possible the cause of the trouble. While between the cars and engaged in handling the coupler, the cars were pushed up and he was caught and his arm crushed. There was some proof tending to show that the switchman stepped in before the moving cars had entirely stopped, and some that he gave a signal to come ahead as he stepped in; but there was evidence tending to show to the contrary, and to support the inference that the act of the engineer in moving up was the result of a signal with a lantern, for it was dark, mistakenly given by some other employee in the vicinity, or a mistake of the engineer in misconceiving the movement of a lantern in the hands of some of those who were standing around. There was evidence tending to show that the coupler had been inspected shortly before the accident and no defect was observed by the inspector, but it was shown without dispute that it was defective at the time of the accident, and would not couple automatically because of a bent pin.

Among the errors assigned in the court below was the refusal of the trial court to give an instruction relating to the action of the switchman in entering between the cars and his supposed giving of the comeahead signal. This instruction, while leaving to the jury the determination of whether the switchman, in going between the cars to examine the coupling mechanism, gave a come-ahead signal nevertheless asked the court to instruct as a matter of law that if he had done so, his act was the proximate cause of his injury, and therefore he could not recover. Instead of giving this instruction the court modified it by leaving it to the jury to determine whether, under all the circumstances, the action of the switchman had been reasonably careful. The court, in its general charge on this subject, said:

'If, after he started to go between the cars, he has done something which was carelessly done, or which you can say from a preponderance of the evidence contributed approximately to the accident, then he cannot recover. . . . If there be contributory negligence at all, it depends not upon his assuming the risk under the circumstances in evidence in this case, but upon the care with which he acted while in the performance of the work which he assumed.

'You are further instructed that if you believe from the preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff gave a 'come-ahead' signal to the switchman or engineer,—one or both,—and after that went between the cars and was injured, then you have a right to consider whether the giving of the 'come-ahead' signal by the plaintiff was the proximate cause of the injury as distinguished from the condition of the coupler, and if you find that, under the circumstances, the 'come-ahead' signal was the proximate cause of the injury, then your verdict must be for the defendant.

'You are also instructed that where there is a safe and a dangerous way of doing an act, and the servant uses a dangerous way and is injured thereby, he is charged with negligence on his part and may not recover.'

The court below disposed of the refusal of the trial court to charge as a matter of law that there was no right to recover if the proof showed that the switchman had given the 'come-ahead' signal, upon the ground that there was no foundation for giving...

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