Granflaten v. Rohde, 8087
Citation | 66 S.D. 335,283 N.W. 153 |
Decision Date | 30 December 1938 |
Docket Number | 8087 |
Parties | HULDA GRANFLATEN, Respondent, v. HAROLD P. ROHDE, Appellant. |
Court | Supreme Court of South Dakota |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Minnehaha County, SD
#8087—Reversed
Bailey, Voorhees, Woods & Bottum, Sioux Falls, SD
Attorneys for Appellant.
L.E. Waggoner, R.C. Riter, Sioux Falls, SD
Attorneys for Respondent.
Opinion Filed Dec 30, 1938
This action was commenced by Hulda Granflaten to recover for personal injuries sustained by her while riding as a guest in an automobile owned and driven by Harold P. Rohde. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and from the judgment entered thereon and an order overruling motion for new trial defendant appeals.
The principal claim of error advanced by defendant is that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff was not sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the defendant under the act commonly known as the guest statute (§ 801, Rev. Code 1919, as amended by chap. 147, Laws 1933) which provides “that no person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation shall have cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such motor vehicle and unless such gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury, death or loss for which the action is brought.”
The complaint alleges that the defendant was wilfully, wantonly and grossly negligent in that he turned to the lefthand side of the highway and collided with a car approaching from the opposite direction. The testimony discloses that the accident occurred on the night of November 11, 1935, between 9 and 10 o’clock, while plaintiff and four guest passengers were driving in a northerly direction on highway No. 77 at a point about two miles south of Dell Rapids. Defendant was an experienced driver, was familiar with the highway and had driven it frequently. At the scene of the accident there was a gradual incline in the highway for a quarter of a mile. Defendant at the foot of this incline turned out to the left to pass a car going in the same direction and when in advance of this car saw another car approaching from the opposite direction. He attempted to avoid a collision by swerving to the right. Defendant had been driving between 65 and 70 miles per hour and testified that he was about too feet from the place of the collision when he first observed the car approaching from the opposite direction and that the left wheels of this car at the time of the collision were to the left of the center of the highway. The spokes in the left front wheel of defendant’s car were sheared off causing the defendant to lose control of his car and it went into the ditch 50 or 100 feet north of the place of the collision.
Defendant admits that he drank liquor during the afternoon and evening preceding the accident, but denies that he was under the influence of liquor. As to the collision and the events immediately preceding it, plaintiff testified:
Defendant on cross examination testified:
“I tried to pass a car going up hill but didn’t consider it dangerous at that particular point. It turned out that way. My car was not over the black line farther back. I don’t recall Mrs. Stevens telling me if I didn’t quit they would get out and walk. I heard no remark of that kind. She didn’t say anything like that that I heard. I don’t think I passed other cars on other hills on that same trip. Mrs. Kvenvold remarked once about passing cars going over hills. As we passed a car just before hitting the Duea car she made a remark, not in the nature of a protest but as anyone would warn a driver if you are sitting next to him—‘You are passing on a hill.’ Yes, I went on past, regardless of the warning. There wasn’t anything else to do at that time. I don’t claim it was the fault of the Duea car that the accident occurred. They were close to the center but still on their side of the road. I don’t claim they were speeding. I don’t think they were going as fast as I was. I admit that the accident was my fault to the extent that I was on the wrong side of the road. I don’t claim anybody else did anything that caused the accident.
On direct examination defendant testified:
Negligence may be defined as the failure to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances. Ordinary care in the abstract is such care under the same or similar circumstances as an ordinarily prudent or reasonable person would exercise. It is commensurate with existing and surrounding hazards. The greater the danger, the greater the care required, so that a very high degree of danger calls for a very high degree of care, which, however, amounts to ordinary care in view of the situation and circumstances. The guest statute subjects the owner or driver of an automobile to liability for injuries to a gratuitous guest in case of an accident only if the accident was caused by gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner or driver. The conduct within the meaning of the statute must be something more than negligence or failure to exercise ordinary care. In Melby v. Anderson, the meaning of “gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct” is expressed in the following language:
It is the contention of the defendant that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the reason that his conduct did not amount to gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct, the standard fixed by the legislature. In determining whether or not the court erred in submitting to the jury the question whether the conduct of the defendant constituted gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct the rule is the same as applies in negligence cases. If reasonable men having before them all the evidence on the question could not differ as to whether or not the exhibited conduct conforms to the standard established by the legislature, then the question becomes one for the court. But if under the proven or admitted facts different minds might...
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