Grange Ins. Ass'n v. State

• Decision Date: 26 October 1987
• Docket Number: No. 17581-5-I,17581-5-I
• Citation: 49 Wn.App. 551,744 P.2d 366
• Parties: GRANGE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Assignee of Harold and Rose Marie Holloway, Appellant, v. STATE of Washington, Bob J. Mickelson, in his official and private capacity and Jane Doe Mickelson, his wife; Peter Bidlake, in his official and private capacity and Jane Doe Bidlake, his wife; John Doherty, in his official and private capacity and Jane Doe Doherty, his wife; Milton Skov, in his official and private capacity and Jane Doe Skov, his wife; Gary Stromier, in his official and private capacity and Jane Doe Stromier, his wife; State of Idaho; Clyde Hughes and Jane Doe Hughes, his wife; and John Does I through X, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 551

49 Wn.App. 551

744 P.2d 366

GRANGE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Assignee of Harold and Rose

Marie Holloway, Appellant, v. STATE of Washington, Bob J. Mickelson, in his official and private capacity and Jane Doe Mickelson, his wife; Peter

Bidlake, in his official and private capacity and Jane Doe

Bidlake, his wife; John Doherty, in his official and

private capacity and Jane Doe Doherty, his wife; Milton

Skov, in his official and private capacity and Jane Doe

Skov, his wife; Gary Stromier, in his official and private

capacity and Jane Doe Stromier, his wife; State of Idaho;

Clyde Hughes and Jane Doe Hughes, his wife; and John Does I

through X, Respondents.

No. 17581-5-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington,

Division 1.

Oct. 26, 1987.

Douglas R. Shepherd, Shepherd and Abbott, Everson, Wash., for appellant Grange Ins. Ass'n

John P. Howard, Boise, Idaho, Gerald M. Ormiston, Seattle, Wash., for respondent the State.

SHANNON WETHERALL, Judge Pro Tem. ^*

Grange Insurance Association, assignee of Harold and Rose Marie Holloway, appeals from an order granting the State of Idaho's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

FACTS

In 1977, Harold and Rose Marie Holloway purchased dairy cows in the State of Idaho. At that time, Idaho law required all cattle sold in Idaho to be tested for brucellosis, a highly contagious disease. Pursuant to that law, the dairy cows purchased by the Holloways were tested by a veterinarian employed by the State of Idaho's Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Animal Health. The health certificates The Holloways immediately proceeded to transport these cows to their dairy farm in Washington state. A short time later, the dairy farms surrounding the Holloways' farm experienced an outbreak of brucellosis. The affected farmers subsequently brought suit against the Holloways, alleging that the Holloways sold them dairy cattle infected with brucellosis. These suits resulted in the entry of two judgments against the Holloways in the amount of $2,933,235.12.

                for the Holloways' animals certified that the cows were free from "infectious, contagious, or communicable disease."   The certificates also stated that (1) the cows were intended for "INTERSTATE" sale;  (2) that the Holloways resided in Washington State;  and (3) that the testing was approved by the "import-export clerk" for the "Bureau of Animal Health, STATE OF IDAHO."
                

Appellant Grange Insurance Association (Grange Insurance) settled the claims against the Holloways and brought this contribution action as the assignee of all claims of Harold and Rose Marie Holloway. Grange Insurance contends that Idaho negligently implemented and maintained its program of brucellosis evaluation and control and that this alleged negligence on the part of Idaho was the cause of the injuries suffered by the Holloways in the original action.

Pursuant to CR 12(b)(2), Idaho sought and the trial court granted an order dismissing it from this action on the ground that a Washington court could not entertain personal jurisdiction over Idaho. We reverse.

DECISION

ISSUE I: By certifying livestock for export to Washington State, did the State of Idaho become amenable to the personal jurisdiction of a Washington Court within the intent of Washington's long-arm-statute, RCW 4.28.185, and the due process clause of the federal constitution?

The enormous expansion of personal jurisdiction in this country has been mirrored in Washington, and in several instances Washington has led the way in furthering such Historically, jurisdiction was grounded on the court's de facto power over the defendant's person. Therefore, his presence was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714, 733, 24 L.Ed. 565, 572 (1877). Today, due process requires only that in order to subject a nonresident defendant to a judgment in personam, the defendant must have certain minimum contacts such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945).

                expansion.   See Trautman, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction in Washington, 51 Wash.L.Rev. 1 (1975).   Long-arm jurisdiction in this state was intended to be operative to the full extent allowed by due process except where limited by the terms of RCW 4.28.185. 1   See Deutsch v. West Coast Mach. Co., 80 Wash.2d 707, 497 P.2d 1311 (1972);   Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash.2d 875, 425 P.2d 647 (1967);  Tyee Constr.  Co. v. Dulien Steel [744 P.2d 369] Prods., Inc., 62 Wash.2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963).   This court finds no reason to retreat from our current personal jurisdiction boundaries
                

As conditions precedent to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants pursuant to RCW 4.28.185(1)(a) and (b), the following factors have been promulgated: (1) The nonresident defendant must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state; (2) the cause of action must arise from, or be These factors are, in part, a distillation of the due process standards announced in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, and refined in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Va., 339 U.S. 643, 70 S.Ct. 927, 94 L.Ed. 1154 (1950); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957).

                connected with, such act or transaction;  and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, considerations being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation.   Tyee Constr.  Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., supra, 62 Wash.2d at 115-116, 381 P.2d 245
                

The first two factors are based on Washington's long-arm statutes. The third factor is related to the convenience of the forum and Federal constitutional due process restrictions to any state's assertion of personal jurisdiction upon nonresident defendants. International Sales & Lease, Inc. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 12 Wash.App. 894, 533 P.2d 445 (1975); Werner v. Werner, 84 Wash.2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974). ²

Washington courts have consistently applied the Tyee factors which we hold must be present if jurisdiction is to be entertained. We find that the Tyee factors are satisfied here.

With respect to the first two factors, Grange Insurance asserts that its cause of action rises from Idaho's purposeful act of certification. Whether a "tortious act" was actually committed is not presently before us. Grange Insurance alleged that the injury occurred in Washington and since such injury is an inseparable part of the "tortious act" as mentioned in RCW 4.28.185(1)(b), the "tortious act," for the purpose of this appeal, is deemed to have occurred within the state. See Hogan v. Johnson, 39 Wash.App. 96, 692 P.2d 198 (1984); Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., 81 Wash.2d 719, 722, 504 P.2d 782 (1972); Bowen v. Bateman, 76 Wash.2d 567, 575, 458 P.2d 269 (1969); Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 66 Wash.2d 469, 471, 403 P.2d 351 (1965).

Addressing the third Tyee factor, the question becomes under what circumstances should Washington courts refuse to hear the matter because of due process concerns? The 9th Circuit has set out the factors the court should consider when addressing the due process criteria: (1) the extent of the purposeful interjection into the forum state; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of defendant's state; (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. Cubbage v. Merchent, 744 F.2d 665 (9th Cir.1984); see also Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. Mogelberg Foods, Inc., 14 Wash.App. 527, 544 P.2d 30 (1975); Insurance Co. of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir.1981); Hirsch v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield of Kansas City, 800 F.2d 1474 (9th Cir.1986).

We find it appropriate to apply this seven factor test to the circumstances of the case at hand in determining the reasonableness

of a Washington court asserting jurisdiction over the State of Idaho.

(1) Extent of purposeful interjection

The due process clause protects a defendant's right to receive fair warning that his actions might subject him to suit in a given jurisdiction. This safeguard allows him to structure his conduct with a degree of assurance as to what will flow from his conduct. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985).

The purposeful availment prong is satisfied when a defendant takes deliberate actions within the forum state or creates continuing obligations to forum residents. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, supra at 2184. It is not required that a defendant be physically present within, or have physical contacts with, the forum, provided that his efforts are "purposefully directed" toward forum residents. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, supra at 2185; Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, LTD., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir.1986); Pacific Atlantic Trading Co. v. M/V Main Express, 758 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir.1985); See also Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643, 648, 70 S.Ct. 927, 929, 94 L.Ed. 1154 (1950).

In this case, we have an Idaho resident selling dairy cattle from a known...