Granger v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 11 October 1927 |
| Citation | 215 N.W. 576,194 Wis. 51 |
| Parties | GRANGER v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Brown County; Henry Graass, Judge. Affirmed.
Action by Henry B. Granger against the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company to recover for personal injuries. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the Railway Company appeals.H. J. Killilea and Rodger M. Trump, both of Milwaukee, and North, Parker, Bie & Welsh, of Green Bay, for appellant.
Frank Brazner and Silverwood & Fontaine, all of Green Bay, for respondent.
This appeal presents the single question whether plaintiff's cause of action is barred by a release given by him which in form released and discharged the railway company from all claims which the plaintiff had at the time the release was signed or which he might thereafter have on account of personal injuries sustained at the time the plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment by the railway company.
[1] The release was signed in the offices of the railway company in Chicago six months after the injury, at a time when plaintiff was still undergoing treatment which caused him to suffer severe pain at the time the release was signed. The court is satisfied from the proof that the plaintiff was able to read the release. The plaintiff was given full opportunity to read it before he signed it. He was not prevented from so doing by any one representing the railway company. At the time of signing he was given a draft for $500 which contained on its face the statement that it was given in full payment of the claim on account of the personal injury here in question. Plaintiff took this draft to his home and retained it in his possession for some days, when he indorsed the same by writing his name under a statement on the back of the draft which provided that the indorsement of the draft constituted a receipt in full of the account stated on the face thereof. In view of these undisputed facts it is very clear that the plaintiff has not met the burden that rests upon one who seeks to avoid a written agreement of settlement on the ground that it was procured by fraud.
It is equally clear that both the plaintiff and the claim agent who represented the railway company acted under a mutual mistake of fact during the negotiations that led up to the signing of the release and the payment of the $500. During these negotiations there was no discussion of any of the elements of damages sustained as a result of plaintiff's injuries with the single exception of the amount of wages which plaintiff had lost. The amount of these wages was computed and the sum paid in consideration of which the release was given was the amount of these lost wages. Both plaintiff and the claim agent had been informed by the doctor employed by the company to treat the plaintiff that plaintiff's condition was such that he was able to resume light work. The plaintiff testified that he made the settlement relying on the statement of the doctor that he was pretty well along toward being cured, and that he would not have made the settlement but for this assurance by the doctor.
The situation was one where both parties in good faith relied upon the statement of the doctor. Had the plaintiff been well on the road to recovery and able to continue work at the same wage, the settlement would doubtless never have been questioned. The company had paid all medical and hospital bills, and by this settlement it paid the plaintiff the full amount of wages which he would have earned if he had not met with this accidental injury.
[2] But it would be against good conscience and all rules of fair dealing to hold that plaintiff, who is in such a serious physical condition that the railway company does not question that $12,000 is a fair measure of the damages sustained by plaintiff because of his injury, is bound by a settlement made when both parties were acting under a mutual mistake of fact as to the extent of plaintiff's injury and the duration of his disability. It would be most inequitable and unjust to hold the release binding under such circumstances. To so hold would be to determine that the claim agent took such undue advantage of the plaintiff as to be guilty of a species...
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