Granger v. Granger, 137.

• Decision Date: 07 February 1941
• Docket Number: No. 137.,137.
• Citation: 296 Mich. 357,296 N.W. 288
• Parties: GRANGER v. GRANGER.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

296 Mich. 357

296 N.W. 288

GRANGER

v.GRANGER.

No. 137.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Feb. 7, 1941.

Suit by Winifred Merrill Granger against Sylvester B. Granger, to establish her dower right in real estate which was owned by her now deceased husband, William R. Granger, prior to their marriage. From a decree for plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

SHARPE, C. J., and NORTH and WIEST, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Eaton County, in Chancery; Laurie O. Telfer, Judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench, except BOYLES, J.

George W. Watson, of Charlotte (Martin D. Verdier, of Grand Rapids, of counsel), for plaintiff and appellee.

T. Carl Holbrook and Rex A. Spafford, both of Grand Ledge, for defendant and appellant.

McALLISTER, Justice.

Plaintiff filed her bill of complaint to establish dower rights in real estate which was owned by her now deceased husband, William R. Granger, prior to their marriage on August 3, 1937. Defendant is the nephew of the deceased, who claims ownership of the property in question, by virtue of a deed from his uncle, which was executed just before plaintiff's marriage. It was claimed by plaintiff that the conveyance worked a fraud upon her and was without adequate consideration. Defendant maintains that there was no plan to defraud plaintiff of her dower rights and that the consideration for the conveyance was both valuable and sufficient. Subsequent to the filing of her bill of complaint, plaintiff's husband died. The trial court awarded plaintiff a decree, and defendant appeals.

From the evidence it appears that plaintiff and William R. Granger had been acquainted over a period of many years. He had often visited at the home of her father, Mr. Merrill, one of whose daughters is the wife of William R. Granger's nephew, the defendant in this case; so that plaintiff is not only the widow of defendant's uncle, but is also the defendant's sister-in-law. Plaintiff and her husband were seen together frequently for a period of approximately six months before their marriage. On July 2, 1937, plaintiff made application for a license to marry William R. Granger at the office of the county clerk of Eaton county. The license was issued July 7, 1937, and mailed to plaintiff in Grand Rapids, where on August 3, 1937, the parties were married.

On July 27, 1937, seven days before the marriage, William R. Granger conveyed all of his real estate to his nephew, the defendant Sylvester Granger, reserving a life estate therein. The consideration to grantor by defendant is claimed to be a release of indebtedness and the execution of an additional contract extinguishing further indebtedness. A certain part of the real estate conveyed, had previously been sold by defendant to plaintiff's husband for $4,000. As part of the payment, defendant had received a note from William R. Granger for $3,500. The amount owing by William Granger to defendant on this note at the time of the conveyance of all of his real estate to defendant was $2,904. Subsequent to the conveyance of all of the real estate to defendant by William, but on the same day, a contract was entered into between William and defendant's father, George Granger, and defendant, Sylvester. This recited that William and George had conveyed their property to Sylvester; that each of the said grantors would have the use and income of their property during their lives; that William would pay an amount each month sufficient, when added to the income from George's property, to provide an income of $70 per month to George, with the proviso that the amount to be paid by William to provide such an income for George should not exceed $35 per month. The agreement further provided that all indebtedness owing by William to Sylvester or to the estate of Frances Nixon, of which estate Sylvester and George were the sole residuary legatees, was by the contract cancelled and discharged. William's indebtedness to the Nixon estate is conceded to have been, at the time of the agreement, the sum of $5,000. The value of all of William's property which was conveyed to Sylvester was found by the trial court to amount to at least $22,000. It is further claimed by defendant that William was indebted to him for more than $3,000 for rentals covering a period of 13 years on the property which William thereafter purchased from defendant, and which he subsequently reconveyed on July 27, 1937. It is contended by defendant that the consideration for William's conveyance of all of his property was the cancellation of the aggregate of the indebtedness of $2,904 on the real estate note, the $5,000 obligation to the Nixon estate, and the sum of approximately $3,000 for rentals.

The trial court found that the consideration for William's conveyance of property valued at $22,000 was merely the cancellation of the note for $2,904; that the consideration for the cancellation of William's indebtedness of $5,000 to the Nixon estate, was his coverant to insure an income for his brother, George, as provided in the agreement between George, Sylvester, and William; and that the item for rentals of approximately $3,000 never entered into the consideration, either for the conveyance or for the subsequent contract.

While the consideration recited in the conveyance, was stated to be one dollar and other valuable consideration, we are persuaded that the conclusion of the circuit court was correct, and that the consideration for the conveyance was the cancellation of the note for $2,904. There is no question that this obligation was cancelled in some one of the transactions between the parties. It was not cancelled in the contract between George, Sylvester, and William, as that contract specifically states ‘that in consideration of the amounts herein provided to be paid by William R. Granger from time to time, that all indebtedness owing him to Sylvester B. Granger or to the Estate of Frances Nixon, of which estate Sylvester B. and George L. Granger are the sole residuary legatees, said indebtedness being in the sum of approximately $5,000 is hereby cancelled and discharged.’ The failure to mention the note of $2,904 in this subsequent contract as being an obligation which was extinguished and the reference to all indebtedness owing to Sylvester or to the Nixon estate, being in the amount of $5,000, leads to the inevitable conclusion that the note for $2,904 had been previously cancelled as part of the consideration for the conveyance. Furthermore, the omission of any claimed obligation of rent as owing by William to Sylvester in the instrument in which all indebtedness to Sylvester, totaling $5,000 was extinguished, seems conclusive that no cancellation of the claim for rentals was made part of the contract. We are of the opinion that the trial court properly concluded that the so-called rentals were no part of the consideration for either the conveyance or the contract. After all of the alleged rentals had accrued, defendant had sold to his uncle, in 1929, the very property for which rentals are claimed to have been due, and it is beyond credence that, when William paid for this property, there would be no settlement or adjustment of such an indebtedness. The contract cancelling the $5,000 indebtedness was made subsequent to the conveyance, and the agreement itself recited that William had previously conveyed the real estate to Sylvester, reserving a life estate in himself.

Under the circumstances of this case, it is plain that the conveyance of property valued at $22,000 for the cancellation of a note for $2,904 was based upon a considerationgrossly inadequate. Even if it were conceded that not only the note of $2,904, but also the obligation to the Nixon estate of $5,000 was cancelled by reason of the conveyance, there would be a consideration of the cancellation of only $7,904 for real estate valued at $22,000, at least.

Defendant knew that plaintiff and his uncle had been spending considerable time with each other for a period of six months prior to the marriage. In his answer to plaintiff's bill of complaint, defendant admitted on information and belief ‘that for a time prior to said marriage’ the said William R. Granger and said plaintiff ‘had been going together.’ It appeared that some months after the marriage, plaintiff and her husband had called upon Mr. Towner, a banker who...