Graning v. Sherburne County

• Decision Date: 08 April 1999
• Docket Number: 98-1734,Nos. 98-1552,s. 98-1552
• Parties: 14 IER Cases 1762 Terry GRANING, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. SHERBURNE COUNTY; Bruce Anderson, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 611

172 F.3d 611

14 IER Cases 1762

Terry GRANING, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. SHERBURNE COUNTY; Bruce Anderson Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Nos. 98-1552, 98-1734.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 12, 1999.

Decided April 8, 1999.

David A. Singer, Minneapolis, MN, argued (Wayne Kenas, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Cara Jane Debes, St. Paul, MN, argued (Mary A. Rice, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Before MURPHY, LAY, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Terry Graning held an administrative position in the Sherburne County sheriff's department until she was fired by Sheriff Bruce Anderson for breaching the departmental confidentiality policy. Graning alleged that the real reason for her dismissal was her support for Anderson's election opponent and sued both Sheriff Anderson and the county under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The district court ¹ granted summary judgment for the defendants on her § 1983 and defamation claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her claim under the Minnesota Data Practices Act. Graning appeals, and we affirm.

Terry Graning was employed by Sherburne County from April 24, 1990 until February 28, 1996. After Sheriff Richard Witschen announced his intention to retire, chief deputy Skip Gerlach and appellee Bruce Anderson, then lieutenant deputy, ran to succeed him. Graning actively supported Gerlach while the majority of the department staff apparently supported Anderson who won the November 1994 election and took office in January 1995. Graning says that the atmosphere in the department was extremely uncomfortable for her following the election. She felt that her relations with Anderson supporters were poor and that the sheriff and others were rude to her. After the election, Graning's supervisor told her that Anderson and his deputies were watching her closely. In the spring of 1995, her lunch schedule was changed and she was told she should no longer lunch with co-worker Gary Poslusny. Poslusny had also supported Gerlach, but there is no indication that Graning asked why the supervisor was concerned about her spending time with Poslusny. Graning felt that the hostility towards her began to improve after a year or so, but she was fired on February 28, 1996, about fourteen months after the election.

The events immediately prior to Graning's dismissal are largely uncontroverted. In February 1996, a confidential informant referred to as Pat Doe contacted the Foley police chief about someone she regarded as an habitual drunk driver who she believed was likely to harm himself and others. Pat Doe indicated that this individual was Larry Neiss and that she was frightened of him and feared her safety could be endangered if he learned she had given this information. The chief relayed the information about Neiss to the Sherburne County sheriff's department and Sheriff Anderson posted a memo on a departmental bulletin board to notify officers that Larry Neiss was suspected of frequently driving while intoxicated. The memo described identifying characteristics of Neiss and vehicles he was known to drive and listed bars he was known to frequent. A copy of his criminal history was also posted next to the memo. The bulletin board was located in a hallway in the non-public area of the office. Although the hallway was a limited access area, prisoners and other non-employees passed through it for various reasons. It is not disputed that Graning knew when she was hired that all items of departmental business were routinely considered to be confidential. Employees were prohibited from sharing such information with outsiders.

Not long after the memo was posted, Sheriff Anderson learned that Neiss had been informed by Dorothy Gilyard that the department was intent on arresting him. The record before the court does not provide much information about Gilyard, but appellees' reply brief in the district court mentioned that Leonard Graning, Terry Graning's husband, had testified that he told Gilyard about the Neiss memo. Sheriff Anderson suspected that Terry Graning was the source of the leak and called her into his office for questioning; Chief Deputy Lindberg and Sergeant Harrell were also present. The sheriff accused Graning of releasing information to Gilyard. Graning denied that, but admitted that she had told her husband that he should be careful or his name would be on the board like that "Weiss or Teiss character." At the conclusion of the interview, the sheriff terminated Graning's employment. Later that day the sheriff posted a notice on the bulletin board advising departmental personnel that Graning would no longer be working there because of a breach of confidentiality.

Graning challenged her dismissal, first through departmental procedures and then in court. She began by filing a grievance with the county director of human resources. After this grievance was rejected and her discharge upheld, Graning turned to the Sherburne County Board of Commissioners. The board heard her case in a contested evidentiary hearing in April 1996. In May it unanimously ruled against her, and she did not seek judicial review of its decision. Instead, she filed this action against Sheriff Anderson and Sherburne County, seeking monetary and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleging defamation and violation of the Minnesota Data Practices Act. MinnStat. § 13.01-13.99.

The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on Graning's § 1983 and defamation claims. It reasoned that she had not asserted facts sufficient to support a causal connection between her political affiliation and her termination and that the defendants had accorded her all the process she was due. It concluded there could be no defamation because Graning's admissions established that the contents of the sheriff's memo were true, and it declined to take supplemental jurisdiction over the Minnesota Data Practices Act claim.

On appeal, Graning argues that the district court erred in analyzing her first amendment claims under the framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). She also asserts that her discharge was arbitrary and capricious and thus in violation of her fourteenth amendment due process rights and that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether her defamation claim is barred by the defense of truth. ²

Appellees filed a cross appeal to preserve some alternative grounds on which they might prevail. They assert that Graning's § 1983 claims are subject to dismissal for the county because her alleged injuries were not the result of an official municipal policy and for the sheriff because he is entitled to qualified immunity. They also argue that Graning's defamation claim should be dismissed because Sheriff Anderson had a qualified privilege under Minnesota law in posting the statement about Graning's discharge.

Summary judgment is reviewed de novo and upheld only if the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir.1996). Summary judgment is not proper if there are genuine disputes over facts that could affect the outcome under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party based on the evidence presented in the district court. Id.

Graning seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that appellees violated her first amendment right to political affiliation and her fourteenth amendment due process rights. To establish a § 1983 claim against Sheriff Anderson, Graning must show his conduct deprived her of a constitutional right, privilege, or immunity and that he acted under color of state law. Reeve v. Oliver, 41 F.3d 381, 383 (8th Cir.1994). To establish a claim against the county, she must further establish that the "decisionmaker possess[ed] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). There is no issue here about the acting under color of state law requirement, but the parties disagree on whether the sheriff's decision, upheld by the Board of Commissioners, may be fairly said to represent municipal policy and whether any constitutional right was violated.

Graning argues that her first amendment rights were violated because she was fired for supporting Gerlach instead of Anderson in the November 1994 election, but appellees say she was fired for breaching the department's confidentiality policy. A state employee's right to freedom of political affiliation is protected under the first amendment. With the exception of those in policymaking positions, state employees may not be discriminated against because of their political affiliation. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); Billingsley v. St. Louis County, 70 F.3d 61, 63 (8th Cir.1995). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the complainant must show that she participated in a protected activity, that an adverse employment action was taken against her, and that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Stevens v. St. Louis Univ. Medical Center, 97 F.3d 268, 270 (8th Cir.1996). Once a prima facie case has been stated, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The employee has an opportunity to prove that the reason given is pretextual. ³...